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AB S T RA C T  
Given the increasing concerns over insecurity caused by terrorism, and the difficulty 
in quantifying the risk of crime or violent outbreaks in general, several experts have 
highlighted the importance of understanding the objectives and motivations of 
terrorists. If one could infer their preferences, it would be possible to understand better 
their possible nefarious actions in order to guide efforts towards proper counter-
terrorism measures. Indeed, one way to anticipate terrorists’ actions in counter-
terrorism analysis is to consider their judgments when modelling the decisions they 
might make. Such judgments will drive their chosen actions. Current efforts in 
modelling terrorist decision making make several assumptions such as rationality of 
the agents, agents who have a set of constant and ordered preferences, with the ability 
to perform a cost benefit analysis of their alternatives, among others. However, are 
such assumptions reasonable? This research seeks to analyse the types of assumptions 
made across various models for counter-terrorism analysis that represent the agents’ 
judgments and discuss their suitability from a descriptive point of view by drawing 
knowledge from the fields of behavioural decision analysis, politics, philosophy of 
choice, public choice and conflict management in terrorism. This research then 
explores the modelling implications resulting from this insight and provides some 
recommendations as to how some of these assumptions could be modified in order to 
describe terrorists’ preferences more accurately. An empirical research is also carried 
out, to analyse the effect of anger on the prioritisation of objectives, and to confirm 
the findings drawn from secondary research. Subsequently, we present a way of 
addressing some of the areas highlighted in the critical analysis. We suggest modelling 
state-dependent judgements of a terrorist organisation – making the assumption it 
behaves as an individual – via a multi-attribute utility model that incorporates state-
dependent priorities to account for preference change caused by exogenous triggers 
and representing the environment as a system dynamics model. 
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Introduction 
If you know the enemy and know yourself,  
you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.  
If you know yourself but not the enemy,  
for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.  
If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle. 
Sun Tzu – The Art of War (Tzu and Giles, 2008, p. 52)  
 
urposeful acts of violence, such as those perpetrated by terrorists, are a 
ubiquitous worldwide phenomenon. Recently, violence has been recognised as 
a cause of concern for the economic development of a country and global 
social instability. Governments are increasingly under pressure to find ways to tackle 
the issue (United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 2007). 
Since the 9/11 New York and the later 7/7 London terrorist strikes, and more recently 
the Boston Marathon bombing, governments and security officials increasingly have 
had to try to find ways to protect the public against attacks. Concerns over what 
needs to be protected and how has become a growing issue. Indeed, the fight against 
terrorism has become more and more difficult. Some experts, such as Richardson 
(2007), even go to the extent of saying the fight against terrorism can never be won, 
it is therefore natural for governments to turn towards preventive measures. 
Preventive measures have typically focussed on assessing threats using qualitative 
means by seeking expert judgement from underwriters, for instance. Now with the 
capacity brought by mathematical modelling, there exist new ways of modelling 
threats which lie in the remit of risk analysis (Broder 2000; 2006; Woo 2003). In risk 
modelling, the choice of methodologies to assess risks are dependent on the source of 
that risk. Statistical-based analysis such as Probabilistic Risk Analysis (see Bedford 
and Cooke 2001 for an overview of uses) are best suited for the analysis of risks 
occurring from natural or random events. On the other hand, risks caused by the 
action of an intelligent agent who is trying to achieve specific goals requires different 
means (Bier, 2006). As terrorism has an adversarial nature, the agent is going to react 
strategically when attacking. Therefore, pre-emptive means against one type of strike 
may increase the risks of another strike (Bier et al., 2005; Brown and Cox, Jr., 2011; 
Guikema and Aven, 2010; Kardes and Hall, 2005). Because of this, the task of the 
P
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Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is to “identify and prioritise the risks -
understanding the threat, the vulnerability, and the consequences. And then we have 
to apply our resources in a cost-effective manner, […]” (Chertoff, 2007), which requires 
an understanding of the various types of strikes terrorists are considering and the 
consequences of counter terrorism policies and actions (Ezell et al., 2010; Keeney and 
von Winterfeldt, 2011). Decision making models such as Multi-Attribute Utility 
Theory have recently been used in counter-terrorism analysis, and are built from the 
perspective of the terrorists (Keeney and von Winterfeldt, 2009; Merrick and McLay, 
2010; Rosoff and John, 2009). However, unlike most Decision Analysis modelling 
situations, modellers do not have access to the terrorists as decision makers. This 
means that such models have to be based on several assumptions concerning the 
objectives such agents have and the way they choose to maximise their utility. Hence, 
as suggested by Rosoff & John (2009), it is crucial to gain a greater knowledge of the 
malicious agents’ objective function to better understand the threat they cause. Thus, 
if one could infer their preferences, it would be possible to have more insight into their 
potential nefarious actions in order to guide efforts towards pre-empting those criminal 
acts. This may help with reducing the insecure climate caused by the phenomenon of 
terrorism. 
To model terrorists’ judgement, it is necessary to have insight into three areas of 
decision-making. First, as decision models are based on deriving an optimal solution 
given a number of objectives, an understanding of what drives terrorists is required. 
Classic decision-making approaches such as Multi-Attribute Utility Theory make the 
assumptions that the set of objectives and their weights remain static over time. 
However, objective weights, or priorities, have been seen to change over time 
depending on the scenario a decision maker is facing (Kornbluth, 1992).  Therefore, 
the ranking derived from such models can only be considered as an accurate 
representation of an agent’s preferences at the time the model was built. In the context 
of terrorism, where the agents adapt their strategies depending on the situation (Bier 
et al., 2005; Brown and Cox, Jr., 2011; Guikema and Aven, 2010; Kardes and Hall, 
2005), it appears essential to capture the dynamic nature of the prioritisation of 
objectives in order to provide some useful insight.  
Second, insight into the elements that influence judgement and hence decision-making 
can help with making models more realistic and descriptively accurate for risk 
analysis. Various elements are subject to have an impact on a decision maker’s 
judgement, including framing effects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), the amount of 
time available to make the decision (Wittmann and Paulus, 2009, 2008) and the effect 
of visceral factors (Lerner and Keltner, 2000; Lerner and Tiedens, 2006; Loewenstein, 
2000). Visceral factors such as anger can affect risk attitude, the evaluation of 
outcomes and their perceived likelihood (Lerner and Keltner, 2000; Lerner and 
Tiedens, 2006). In this research, we only focus on capturing the latter effects. Indeed, 
the changes that can be incurred by such factors are non-negligible as their impacts 
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can be significant, influencing both the agents and the environment in which they 
operate (Loewenstein 1996; 1999; 2000). We expect terrorists – both the organisation 
and the terrorists carrying out the orders – to be especially prone to visceral factors. 
Furthermore, because of its systematic influence, the effect of visceral factors is much 
more predictable than other effects such as cognitive deliberations, for instance 
(Loewenstein, 2000).  
Finally, gaining an understanding of how this kind of insight can be integrated to 
model such behaviours is necessary for developing a framework for combining the 
objectives of terrorists, and their changes over time.  
The aims of this research are twofold. First, it is to help make the assumptions of 
counter-terrorism more realistic and descriptively accurate for risk analysis. To do so, 
this research will attempt to provide some insight into the malicious agent’s objective 
function to better understand what they are trying to achieve, by trying to identify 
changes in an agent’s prioritisation of objectives and consequently the preference 
ordering for certain types of strikes. Second, this research aims to develop a 
framework, which will try to infer a terrorist preference ordering of harmful acts. To 
do this, we will draw from the fields of decision analysis, the formation of preferences, 
and the different areas surrounding terrorism (such as politics and conflict 
management). This dynamic framework will be based on their value system, their 
objectives and on the state of a system. Such a framework may help anticipate a 
motivation to cause social unrest by disruptive agents, by modelling their preference 
change over time and its impact on their choice of a harmful action.  
In the rest of this chapter, we will highlight the assumptions commonly made in 
current models for counter-terrorism analysis and the resulting implications for this 
research. We present the objectives of this research, the methodology we have used 
to achieve them, and finally, we provide the outline of this thesis. 
 
Before we discuss further, it is important to have an understanding of who the decision 
maker modelled is. Terrorists can be classified into the following categories: 
a. Sponsor state – sponsors one or more terrorist organisations, 
b. Terrorist organisation recruits, manages, and leads terrorist cells, 
c. Terrorist cell – trained operational units, 
d. Terrorist – active but not suicidal, and  
e. Terrorist – suicidal. 
Commonly, models for counter-terrorism analysis look at decisions made by terrorist 
organisations (b), who may be devising the strategies. Models which are modelling 
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decision at a micro level involve the categories c, d and e. The questions highlighted 
in this section relate to terrorists belonging to the categories b, to e.   
Models for counter-terrorism analysis have a common aim: modelling the occurrence 
of uncertain threats caused by terrorists. However, they are all based on strong 
assumptions, which can be arguable in the context of terrorism. These important 
assumptions can be broadly classified under the categories outlined below.  
 The rationality of the adversary and their ability to formulate 
the problem and compute the best outcome 
One of the main assumptions made in counter-terrorism models concerns the 
rationality of terrorists - they assume that these agents will choose the branch 
maximising the consequences of an attack. But is it always reasonable to assume 
the adversary has the ability to assess the parameters involved in each strategy to 
determine the branch returning the highest expected utility? This assumption can 
be plausible in some cases, but it becomes more debatable when the scenario 
involves strikes at the more complex end of the spectrum. This also requires us to 
know the terrorists’ utility function, which can be challenging. Indeed, modellers 
do not have access to them. In most models, terrorists are assumed to be political 
utility maximisers. However, their actions often do not seem to support this view. 
Whilst they have been seen to make their choices of strikes, locations and timing 
strategically, they also engage in actions that go against their political aims. Some 
of these include refusing to engage peacefully in democratic processes, conducting 
anonymous attacks, or eradicating competitive terrorist organisations that share 
their goals, and having changing goals as the situation progresses (Abrahms, 2008).  
Whether terrorists are rational or not will inform us on whether models of expected 
utility theory can be adequately used to model terrorists’ decision-making. The 
following question, therefore, arises:  
If terrorists are rational utility maximisers, what objectives are we omitting 
which would then explain their behaviour?  
 The utility functions of the adversary – what are the goals 
being maximised and are they stable? 
Most traditional decision models usually assume preferences to be static, and hence 
tend to ignore the potential for the agents to change their initial preferences 
through the decision process (Bennett and Howard, 1996; von Auer, 1998). 
Empirical research has shown that new information and changes in the 
environment have an impact on preferences and their ordering (Bradley, 2009; 
Hansson and Grüne-Yanoff, 2009; Loewenstein and Angner, 2003; Loewenstein et 
al., 2003). Hansson & Grüne-Yanoff (2009) explain that for complex situations, 
choices do not originate from a stable set of preferences. Moreover, according to 
Bradley (2009), what an agent’s choices and preferences depend on include his/her 
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convictions, desires, and these convictions depend among other things on the 
information he/she possesses. For these reasons, preferences are dependent on the 
environment, resulting in a potential preference ordering, which may differ at 
various points in time.  
So is it reasonable to assume that terrorists’ preferences are static, and if not, 
what should we take into account? 
This research will explore the literature on terrorism to further understand what 
motivates terrorists’ actions to determine whether models of political expected 
utility are sufficient to describe terrorists’ decision-making, and if not, what needs 
to be considered.  
 The ability of the defenders and attackers to assess uncertainties 
and evaluate the alternatives involved in the decision  
Counter-terrorism models, in particular those using Probabilistic Risk Analysis, 
rely heavily on the availability of intelligence data and expert knowledge. In the 
case of terrorism, this type of data is scarce and in most cases classified. 
Furthermore, providing an assessment of uncertainties, such as the likelihood of 
success of the attacker given a certain strike, requires modellers to make several 
assumptions. These include postulating that terrorists view the world objectively, 
and that their own belief of success/failure is unbiased.  
Given what we discussed earlier regarding preference change due to new 
information, emotions and changes in the environment, the following questions 
arise: 
Are terrorists’ preferences static and how can a Multi-Attribute Utility Theory 
model capture dynamicity of preferences?  
Do the triggers that motivate terrorists have an impact on their preferences and 
judgements? 
This research will investigate the dynamic aspects that could potentially lead to a 
change in preference ordering. This could help in inferring an opponent’s preference 
ordering based on their value system, their objectives and on the state of a system. 
Incorporating such dynamicity in a framework may help anticipate a motivation to 
commit criminal acts by disruptive agents, by modelling their preference change over 
time and its impact on their choice of a harmful action.  
In the next section, we detail the objectives of this research further.  
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This research has two main aims. First, it is to help make the assumptions of counter-
terrorism more realistic and descriptively accurate for risk analysis. Second, it is to 
develop a dynamic framework, which will help in inferring an opponent’s preference 
ordering based on their value system, their objectives and on the state of a system.  
One way to anticipate terrorists’ actions is to consider their judgements when 
modelling the decisions they might make - such judgements will drive their chosen 
actions - so proper counter-terrorism measures may be adopted. The current modelling 
techniques employed in counter-terrorism modelling make several assumptions 
regarding the terrorist as a decision maker. However, the prescriptive advice drawn 
from such models require these models to be requisite (Phillips, 1984). Consequently, 
one of the important underlying elements of these models is the adequacy of the 
assumptions, and the understanding of the decision maker modelled. In this section, 
we summarise the key objectives this research seeks to explore and address.  
The focus will be on modelling preference change induced by changes in priorities – 
in this research, we concentrate on changes in preference caused by various exogenous 
triggers. Such a modelling approach may help improve the understanding of agents’ 
dynamic preferences and hence their behaviour, but also may help in better 
anticipating potential risks of violence outbreaks based on changes in the environment. 
Achieving these two aims involved a multidisciplinary approach, which included 
investigating the following fields within the context of terrorism: conflict management 
and politics, the theory of choice, public choice, behavioural decision theory, expected 
utility theory, and multi-attribute utility theory.  
In summary, the main objectives of this thesis are: 
1. To critically analyse the assumptions made in counter-terrorism modelling. To 
bring knowledge from the fields of behavioural decision-making and psychology 
to provide insight into how decision-making is influenced by the effect of the 
visceral factor anger, an emotion terrorists are likely to be subject to. To bring 
knowledge from the various fields surrounding terrorism to provide insight into 
what influences terrorist’s decision making. In particular, analysing differences 
between types of terrorists, the characteristics of their rationality, the goals 
that drive them, and psychological elements which might affect their 
judgement.  
2. To contextualise this knowledge within modelling terrorist decision making 
using multi-attribute utility theory and provide some prescriptive guidelines. 
3. To empirically examine the effect of anger – an emotion we expect terrorists 
to be prone to – on the prioritisation of objectives, focussing in particular on 
terrorist objectives. 
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4. Based on hypothetical data, to develop a dynamic framework for capturing 
preference rankings that does not require the assumption of static preferences, 
by integrating system dynamics with multi-attribute utility theory to capture 
the effect of visceral factors on priorities. 
 
To achieve the aims and objectives as outlined in sections 1.2 and 0, this research 
involved a sequential approach based on several steps. We started with a qualitative 
approach, which guided the quantitative requirements for the subsequent steps. Then 
a framework that captured the aspects of the decision-making process of terrorists was 
constructed. According to Meredith et al. (1989), such an approach requires the 
assumption that we can model causal relationships, i.e. that a change in a value of a 
variable 𝛼 will lead to a certain consequence dependent on that variable, 𝑓(𝛼). 
As noted by Bertrand and Fransoo (2002), it is rare to find an explicitly defined range 
over which the variables change, and challenging to find quantitatively well-defined 
causal relationships. Because of this, predictions made by the models are not always 
unambiguous and verifiable. The nature of our research problem involves variables 
that are poorly defined quantitatively. Indeed, the level of anger, and other visceral 
factors cannot be explicitly expressed. Their levels have causal quantitative impacts 
on other dependent variables, which are also not well defined. Such models fall into 
the category of axiomatic quantitative modelling, as opposed to empirical quantitative 
modelling (Bertrand and Fransoo, 2002). In contrast to the former, empirical 
quantitative modelling requires models to be validated with reality, which given the 
nature of the application and the lack of available data would not have been feasible.   
In line with the axiomatic type of research, what we are concerned with is gaining 
greater insight into the structure of a problem, how variables in the defined model 
behave when certain other variables are changed. This is done by proposing a model 
representing a situation that is based on logical procedures. From such a 
representation, consequences can be derived and solutions to the given problem can 
be proposed (Roy, 1993). This is based on making several assumptions about the 
behaviour of a set of variables (Bertrand and Fransoo, 2002; Meredith et al., 1989; 
Roy, 1993). 
Axiomatic research can take two directions, normative and descriptive. The former 
approach is geared towards providing an understanding of processes to prescribe 
means of improving solutions currently available. These improved solutions can take 
the form of policies, strategies and other types of interventions to tackle an issue. On 
the other hand, the descriptive approach is concerned with providing an 
understanding of the processes within the model via the use of mathematical 
emulation (Bertrand and Fransoo, 2002; Meredith et al., 1989).  
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Given our investigation of various methodologies, we found that combining the 
normative and descriptive axiomatic approaches were best suited to achieving our 
research aims. Indeed, we are interested in both providing some insight into how the 
variables within the models are changing, as well as providing some prescriptive advice 
given the analysed behaviours. The research model by Mitroff et al. (1974) propose 
four phases to the research approach as outlined in Figure 1-1.  
In the next section, we describe the relationships across the three papers, and highlight 
the research methods we have used in each.  
 
As highlighted in section 1.2, current models for counter-terrorism analysis are based 
on strong assumptions relating to terrorists as decision makers. As the theory and 
findings in this area are scattered among several fields (conflict management, politics, 
and anthropology, for instance), there is a lack of prescriptive insight for modellers in 
the field of decision and risk analysis. For this reason, we have chosen to take a 
deductive approach to enable us to deduce some initial hypotheses relating to observed 
patterns in terrorist decision-making (Bryman, 2012). This was done through the use 
of accepted principles in the domain of rationality and behavioural sciences (Saunders 
et al., 2009). 
An inductive approach could also have been used. Indeed, this approach’s main 
strength lies in its ability to develop an understanding of an agent’s interpretation of 
the social world. For this reason, this approach has been favoured in social sciences 
as opposed to the deductive approach (Saunders et al., 2009). However, because of 
the inability to have access to the decision maker (i.e. terrorists) to analyse their 
patterns, we found the deductive approach more appropriate.  
In Chapter 2: “Time, Decisions, Visceral Factors & Modelling Preferences”, we give 
an overview of the underlying theories behind this research. We explore the theory of 
preferences and decisions from the perspective of economics, philosophy and 
psychology. We illustrate these concepts using a classic case of preference change: 
Ulysses and the Sirens. We provide a brief overview of the main frameworks used to 
model time dependent preferences. Furthermore, we also describe the different 
approaches used to model decisions and preferences in the context of terrorism, 
looking, in particular, at the cases where Expected Utility Theory (EUT) and expert 
elicitation are used. We briefly describe the key characteristics of the methods.  
The chapters that follow are standalone papers, aimed at different types of journals. 
Given their standalone nature, some repetitions of theoretical concepts were 
inevitable. Each paper is preceded with a prelude to ease the transition between them 
and for clarity.  
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Figure 1-1 Schematic diagram showing the detailed steps undertaken in the research and where they are 
developed into chapters and papers 
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In Paper I: “In the Opponent’s Shoes: On Modelling Terrorists’ Judgements For 
Counter-Terrorism Analysis”, we explore the types of assumptions made across various 
models that represent malicious agents’ judgements and discuss their suitability from 
a descriptive point of view. Subsequently, we discuss how some of these assumptions 
could be modified in order to describe terrorists’ preferences more accurately by 
drawing knowledge from the fields of politics, philosophy of choice, public choice, and 
conflict management in terrorism. Such insight, we hope, will help make the 
assumptions of these models more realistic for risk analysis. This paper was aimed for 
submission to a journal of management science nature, such as Risk Analysis. 
In Paper I, anger is highlighted as one of the factors that can have a significant impact 
on terrorist decision-making, and in particular, on the prioritisation of their objectives. 
Building on this insight, in Paper II: “Rational Self-Destruction: The Effect of Anger 
on the Prioritisation of Self-Destructive Objectives”, we describe a study of the impact 
of anger on the prioritisation of objectives, some of which were self-destructive. We 
also analyse the impact of such emotions on the preferences of self-destructive actions, 
and discuss the implications of the findings within the context of modelling 
preferences, in particular, those of terrorists. This paper was aimed for submission to 
a journal of a behavioural science nature, such as the Journal of Behavioral Decision 
Making. 
The empirical study of emotional impact on judgement and decision making in Paper 
II was based on the Appraisal-Tendency Framework. This framework suggests that 
specific emotions will have distinct impacts on judgements due to depth and content 
of processing (Lerner and Keltner, 2001, 2000; Lerner and Tiedens, 2006). Drawing 
from the analysis carried out in Paper I, we were interested on and tested for anger. 
A component of the Appraisal-Tendency Framework requires the analysis of the 
effects of another emotion of the same valence, but that differs in terms of another 
dimension. We chose to test for fear, which is of a negative valence like anger, but of 
opposite certainty dimension. Indeed, anger is considered to belong to the type of 
emotions related with a sense of certainty, while fear tend to be linked with a sense 
of uncertainty (Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Smith and Ellsworth, 1985). Similar to 
studies testing the effect of emotions on decision making (Ariely and Loewenstein, 
2006; Isen and Geva, 1987; Isen and Patrick, 1983; Isen, 2001; Lerner and Keltner, 
2001, 2000; Lerner et al., 1998; Loewenstein et al., 1997; Small and Lerner, 2008; 
Tiedens and Linton, 2001), we have adopted a controlled experiment to analyse the 
impact of these two emotions. 
Whilst so far, research within the field of terrorism modelling has assumed static 
preferences of terrorists, empirical research has shown that priorities may change over 
time. One of the factors that can have a significant impact and of particular relevance 
to the context of terrorism is the effect of anger on decision-making. This was 
highlighted in Paper I and the empirical study carried out and described in Paper II. 
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In Paper III: “Modeling State-Dependent Priorities of Malicious Agents”, by combining 
the theory derived above, we used System Dynamics to model the system surrounding 
the malicious agents in question. This could indicate the evolution of the variables in 
the environment that would trigger the fluctuations of the visceral factors experienced 
by the malicious agents.  
System Dynamics is a simulation modelling technique that has been used to model 
the behaviour of systems over time. This provides decision makers with a deeper 
understanding of the systems, the causal effects, and feedback mechanisms enabling 
them to create and optimise control policies (Coyle, 1996; Forrester, 1969, 1968; 
Richardson and Pugh, 1981; Sterman, 2001, 2000). Furthermore, due to the highly 
complex and inter-related nature of the causal factors behind violence outbreaks, a 
holistic approach is required in order to approach the phenomenon. System Dynamics 
has indeed been used to model the behaviour of a broad range of systems. This tool 
has the potential to both visually highlight interrelated relationships and to describe 
mathematically the non-linear behaviour of effects over time (Chamberlain, 2007; 
Ellis, 2003; Gil et al., 2005; Grynkewich and Reifel, 2006; Saeed, 2009; Skarin et al., 
2009). 
By integrating System Dynamics to the agent’s Multi-Attribute Utility Theory model, 
the proposed framework will allow us to investigate how to infer the impact of the 
visceral factors on the weights assigned to the objectives. This could help have a better 
understanding of what motivates malicious agents and hence have a greater insight 
into their preference patterns. This framework can be used to infer how terrorists’ 
priorities may change over time and their impact on their choice of a harmful action. 
We suggest modelling state-dependent priorities of a terrorist organisation – making 
the assumption it behaves as an individual decision maker – via a multi-attribute 
utility model that incorporates dynamic priorities to account for preference change 
caused by exogenous triggers. We model a possible terrorist’s multi-attribute utility 
function as well as a System Dynamics model representing the terrorist situation. 
Combining the two approaches would inform how the agents may re-prioritise their 
objectives in response to changes in their environment and hence their behaviour. This 
may help in better anticipating potential risks of violence outbreaks based on changes 
in the environment. Finally, we show how a preference ordering can be derived from 
them and highlight how such an analysis may support risk management in this 
context. 
This last paper was published in the American journal Decision Analysis:  
Sri Bhashyam, S., Montibeller, G., 2012. Modeling State-Dependent Priorities of 
Malicious Agents. Decision Analysis 9, 172–185. 
  
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Time, Decisions, Visceral Factors  
& Modelling Preferences 
Chapter 1 has highlighted the key questions that this research seeks to explore 
and address. We highlighted the three areas of decision-making where insight 
is necessary to model terrorists’ judgement.  
First, understanding what drives terrorists, i.e. what their objectives are, is required 
in order to describe their preferences and judgement using decision analytical models. 
Traditional decision models tend to ignore the potential for the agents to change their 
initial preferences through the decision process (Bradley, 2009; Hansson and Grüne-
Yanoff, 2009; Loewenstein and Angner, 2003; Loewenstein et al., 2003). The dynamicity 
of preferences is especially relevant in the context of models for counter-terrorism 
analysis. Indeed, some of terrorists’ actions can lead us to think terrorists’ do not have 
static preferences (Cordes et al., 1984; Landes, 1978; Mickolus, 1980). 
Second, to help make models more realistic and descriptively accurate for risk analysis, 
further insight into the elements which influence judgement and decision making can 
inform how changes should be defined and viewed. Factors such as anger can affect  
risk attitude and the evaluation of outcomes and their likelihood (Lerner and Keltner, 
2000; Lerner and Tiedens, 2006). In this research, we focus on capturing effects from 
such factors, as they can incur non-negligible influences both the agents and the 
environment in which they operate (Loewenstein 1996; 1999; 2000). Furthermore, 
because of its systematic influence, the effect of visceral factors is much more 
predictable than other effects such as cognitive deliberations, for instance 
(Loewenstein, 2000). 
Finally, by gaining an understanding of how such insight can be integrated in order 
to model this kind of behaviours, we can attempt to develop framework for combining 
the objectives of terrorists, and their changes over time into a model. This may help 
anticipate a motivation provoke a state of terror. 
This chapter thus explores preference change and discusses the factors influencing it 
in context of this research. It begins with the paradigm case of Ulysses and the sirens 
as an illustration to formalise a well-known case of preference change, before providing 
an overview of the psychological ramifications behind the phenomenon of preference 
change in the second subsection. Finally, the last sections provide an overview of how 
C 
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time dependent preferences have been modelled, and the current modelling techniques 
used in counter-terrorism decision analytical models.   
 
Before discussing the theory behind preference change, and how visceral factors (one 
of the exogenous determinants of preference change) contribute to changes in 
preferences, we begin by an illustration of preference change using the case of Ulysses 
and the sirens.  
“You must bind me very tight, 
Standing me up against the step of the mast 
And lashed to the mast itself so that I cannot stir from the spot. 
And if I beg and command you to release me, 
You must tighten and add to my bonds.”  
Homer –  The Odyssey (Homer et al., 2002, p. 161) 
The legend of Ulysses and the sirens is a paradigm case often used to illustrate various 
aspects of time dependent decisions, and dynamic inconsistencies leading to preference 
change. These include inter-temporal discount rates, binding and self-control (Baron, 
2008), naive or myopic sophisticated choice mechanisms (Elster, 2000; Hammond, 
1997), decision frames (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) among other things. Here, this 
metaphor is used to describe how preference changes could be explained by assuming 
that Ulysses wanted to pursue multiple objectives and that there is a potential for 
preferences to change due to a change in priorities caused by changes in the 
environment.  
In the legend, Ulysses is faced with the choice to either sail towards the sirens to listen 
to their enchanting singing, and consequently be lured to his demise and that of his 
crew, or sail away as advised by the sorceress Circe. Ulysses’ decision can be described 
by the following decision tree (Figure 2-1). At the initial node, Ulysses can decide to 
either sail towards the sirens, and either fall into the addictive behaviour (a), or, after 
having indulged his curiosity, desist before sailing into the rocks (b), or by avoid the 
sirens completely, following Circe’s advice (c). Initially, at time 0 (decision node 𝑛0), 
Ulysses would favour alternative (b) to (c), and finally (a), which is the worst one as 
it leads to death (b P0 c P0 a , where P0 stands for ‘Preferred to’ at time 0). 
However, sailors deciding to move to the next node with the intention to reach the 
initial most preferred alternative (b) are faced with another decision. In the case of  
sailing towards the sirens and listening to their singing, there is a switch in preferences, 
leading sailors to now prefer alternative (a) (initially the worst alternative) to 
alternative (b) (a P1 b) at time 1 (decision node 𝑛1). 
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Figure 2-1: Ulysses' Decision Tree 
 
What is of interest in this research is the importance of taking into account a potential 
for preference change, as illustrated by Ulysses’ tale. Traditional decision models for 
the most part, are static, and hence tend to ignore the potential for the agents to 
change their initial preferences through the decision process (Bennett and Howard, 
1996; von Auer, 1998). Fixing a preference ordering at the beginning of a decision 
process and ignoring aspects leading to a potential change how objectives are 
prioritised can lead to an evaluation of performances that does not reflect the one that 
a rational agent would have gone through to evaluate his/her alternatives at each 
decision node.   
Let us now analyse Ulysses' problem using a multi-criteria decision analysis framework 
(Belton and Stewart, 2001; Öztürk et al., 2005; Roy, 2005). Using a value focussed 
thinking approach (Keeney, 1996), we can presume what his values could have been, 
and assess how these influence his preferences. An interpretation of the legend would 
have Ulysses’ objectives as follows: the hero wishes to return to Ithaca, by maximising 
his life expectancy, and that of his crew (minimise collateral damage) and enjoy the 
sail back home, which are displayed in the following value tree (Figure 2-2).  
 
 
Figure 2-2: Ulysses Value Tree 
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Ulysses preference ordering can then be derived by calculating the overall performance 
of each alternative which depends on the weights (relative importance given the range 
of attributes) Ulysses would give to each objective. Thus, the overall performances at 
time 𝑡 of alternatives 𝑗 = 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, would be: 
𝑽𝒋
𝒕 = ∑ 𝒘𝒊
𝒕
𝒊
∗ 𝒗𝒊,𝒋
𝒕  (1) 
With 𝒘𝒊
𝒕 the weights at time 𝑡 for each objectives i = LE, CD, P, 
And 𝒗𝒊,𝒋
𝒕  the partial performance at time 𝑡 of alternatives  
j = a, b, c on the ith objective  
The partial performances are assessed on an interval scale ranging between zero for 
the lower bound (worst performing alternative on the ith objective) and one hundred 
for the upper bound (best-performing performing alternative on the ith objective). 
Let us assume we are at the initial node, 𝑛0 where Ulysses has to decide between the 
three alternatives. Ulysses being King of Ithaca is responsible for the lives of his crew, 
but most importantly the people of Ithaca, and hence we could infer his weights to 
be: 
𝒘𝑳𝑬
𝟎 > 𝒘𝑪𝑫
𝟎 ≫ 𝒘𝑷
𝟎 (2) 
In other words, his first and foremost objective is to remain alive (LE), followed by 
ensuring the safety of his crew (CD), and finally, indulging with some pleasant or 
enriching adventures (P).  
Following this, we can infer the following relationships between the partial 
performances of each alternative vis-à-vis the objective of Life Expectancy: 
𝒗𝑳𝑬,𝒂
𝟎 ≪ 𝒗𝑳𝑬,𝒃
𝟎 ≤ 𝒗𝑳𝑬,𝒄
𝟎  (3) 
i.e. the performance of alternative (a) on Life Expectancy is far lesser than the two 
others (in fact if the lower bound of the scale is zero, then 𝑣𝐿𝐸,𝑎
0 = 0, as it leads to 
death of Ulysses and the crew). In addition, alternative (b) is at least as good as 
alternative (c) (similarly, if the upper bound of the scale is one hundred, then 𝑣𝐿𝐸,𝑐
0 =
100 as Ulysses and his crew safely sail away with alternative (c). 
A similar relationship can be written for the performance of each alternative vis-à-vis 
Collateral Damage:  
𝐯𝐂𝐃,𝐚
𝟎 ≪ 𝐯𝐂𝐃,𝐛
𝟎 ≤ 𝐯𝐂𝐃,𝐜
𝟎  (4) 
Chapter 2 Time, Decis ions , Viscera l Factors  
& Model l ing Preferences   
 
 
21 
Similarly, we also have 𝐯𝐂𝐃,𝐚
0 = 0, as it leads to death of Ulysses and the crew and 
𝐯𝐂𝐃,𝐜
𝟎 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎). 
Finally, we can infer the following relationships of partial performances vis-à-vis the 
last objective. 
𝐯𝐏,𝐜
𝟎 ≪ 𝐯𝐏,𝐛
𝟎 < 𝐯𝐏,𝐚
𝟎   (5) 
i.e. the pleasure obtained from alternative (c) is far lesser than the two other. 
(Similarly, vP,c
0 = 0 as it is the lower bound in this case, Ulysses does not get to listen 
to the sirens at all), and because alternative (b) only enables Ulysses to listen to the 
Sirens for a limited time only, it is not as good as alternative (a) (which is the upper 
bound, and hence vP,a
0 = 100).  
Hence, we can now derive the preference order by calculating the overall performances 
of each alternative: From (1) we have:  
𝑉𝑎
0 = 𝑤𝑃
0 ∗ 100 
Vb
0 = wLE
0 ∗ 𝑣𝐿𝐸,𝑏
0 + wCD
0 ∗ 𝑣𝐶𝐷,𝑏
0 + wP
0 ∗ 𝑣𝑃,𝑏
0  
Vc
0 = wLE
0 ∗ 100 + wCD
0 ∗ 100 
From this relationships, we can derive Ulysses’ preference ordering at time 0, and we 
find that b P0 c and c P0 a, hence, by transitivity of preferences b P0 c P0 a (see Appendix 
2.A for details). 
Following this method, Ulysses’ best alternative would be to try and reach point (b) 
in the decision tree (Figure 2-1), and according to this decision framework, having 
fixed the weights, he would manage to reach point b, as the preference ordering would 
remain stable, i.e. 𝑏 𝑃1 𝑎, which is not the case. 
We argue that one way to explain the preference change can be represented by a 
change in weights in moving from 𝑛0 and 𝑛1. Within this new environment, a new 
evaluation would be performed at 𝑛1. Ulysses’ objectives remain the same and the 
partial performances can be assumed stable, the relative importance of the objectives 
could change. In addition, because alternative (c) is no longer available, an adjustment 
of the relative performances is required, and we have the following new relationships: 
𝒗𝑳𝑬,𝒂
𝟏 ≪ 𝒗𝑳𝑬,𝒃
𝟏   (6) 
Similarly to the partial performances at time 0, we have 𝑣𝐿𝐸,𝑎
1 = 0 as it is the lower 
bound, and 𝑣𝐿𝐸,𝑏
1 = 100 as it is the upper bound. 
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A similar relationship can be written for the performance of each alternative vis-à-vis 
Collateral Damage:  
𝐯𝐂𝐃,𝐚
𝟏 ≪ 𝐯𝐂𝐃,𝐛
𝟏  (7) 
Similarly, we also have vCD,a
1 = 0, and vCD,b
0 = 100 
Finally, 
𝐯𝐏,𝐛
𝟏 < 𝐯𝐏,𝐚
𝟏  (8) 
With vP,b
1 = 0, and vP,a
1 = 100.  
Due to the addictive behaviour, it could be that 
𝒘𝑳𝑬
𝟎 > 𝒘𝑪𝑫
𝟎 ≫ 𝒘𝑷
𝟎  has evolved into 𝒘𝑷
𝟏 ≫ 𝒘𝑳𝑬
𝟏 > 𝒘𝑪𝑫
𝟏  (9) 
i.e. now Ulysses mostly cares about his enjoyment by listening to the sirens longer, 
regardless of the risks incurred to his life and the ones of his crew, explaining the 
preference change at time 1 (node 𝑛1) into 𝑎𝑃1𝑏.  
Similarly as was done for time 0, we can derive the preference ordering and we find 
that when  
𝐰𝐏
𝟏 > 𝐰𝐋𝐄
𝟏 + 𝐰𝐂𝐃
𝟏  
we can observe at n1 𝐕𝐚
𝟏 − 𝐕𝐛
𝟏 > 𝟎 ⟹  𝐚𝐏𝟏𝐛 (see Appendix 2.A for details) 
Graphically, this can be described by the figures below, which show an illustration of 
the possible evolution of the overall performances and the weights as Ulysses travels 
closer to the Sirens, i.e. between 𝑛0 and 𝑛1 (see Figure 2-3, Figure 2-4). The closer 
Ulysses travels towards the siren, the longer he is exposed to their singing, which has 
an effect on the weights. While the those on Life Expectancy and Collateral Damage 
decreases over time (due to the exposure to the singing), the one on Pleasure increases, 
thus at some point, cause a change of preference between alternative (a) and (b) 
before reaching 𝑛1 .  
 
Figure 2-3 Evolution of Weights 
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Figure 2-4 Evolution of Overall Performances 
From this simple example, it appears that static decision models may not be sufficient 
to describe an agent’s preference pattern over time when priorities change. However, 
if we could adapt a multi-criteria framework, so it would incorporate the potential for 
weight variation arising from changes in the environment, then we believe it would 
be possible to build a dynamic framework that could help in systematically evaluating 
potential changes in preferences. To do so, it is necessary to understand the 
psychological ramifications behind preference change in order to understand what 
could cause weights to vary over time. These are described in the next subsection.  
 
“Knowing how people’ s preferences change over time will go some way toward 
explaining and predicting their behaviour”  
(Loewenstein and Angner, 2003, p. 327) 
This section begins by discussing the debate between the two schools of thoughts 
regarding how preference change should be defined and viewed. Subsequently, an 
overview of how visceral factors (one of the exogenous determinants of preference 
change) contribute to changes in preferences is provided. 
 
Preference formation is not a new topic of research, and has been investigated in 
various fields, from economics to philosophy, psychology, anthropology, among others. 
However, due to the complexity of the phenomenon, the progress has been slow and 
has not yet brought a consensus about what leads to preference formation and what 
characterise tastes (Loewenstein et al., 2003).  
Indeed, on the topic of preference change, there are two schools of thought. In their 
famous essay, “De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum”, Stigler & Becker (1977, p.76) 
state  
“ One does not argue over tastes for the same reason that one does not 
argue over the Rocky Mountains –  both are there, will be there next year, 
too, and are the same to all men.”   
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This school of thought argues that tastes and preferences are stable over time, and do 
not vary significantly between individuals. They argue that their hypothesis of stable 
tastes/preferences enabled better predictions as to observable behaviour. Stigler and 
Becker’s thesis makes a distinction between final preferences and underlying 
preferences. Whilst final preferences may change over time (a preferred model of a car 
for instance), they treat the underlying preferences as constant (the image one wishes 
to achieve by owning a certain model of a car). 
On the other hand, Simon (1981) disagrees with the stable preference school, arguing 
that as new experiences produce new tastes, considering utility functions as fixed 
entities is unrealistic. Instead, he proposes to regard those as evolving structures that 
describe the changes in tastes using a ‘production function’. The production function 
is defined by the utility gained from the new/accumulated experiences. The case of 
the change of preferences between 𝑛0 and 𝑛1 in the case of Ulysses and the sirens is 
due to an increase in consumption (in this case, listening to the sirens) which increases 
his preferences for it as in habit formation (Hammond, 1997; Loewenstein and Angner, 
2003).  
If 𝑢(𝑐𝜏, 𝑠𝜏) is Ulysses utility function, with 𝑐, the consumption (listening to the sirens), 
and 𝑠 the habit stock (how long he has been listening to the sirens), then his marginal 
utility gained from listening to the sirens increases the longer he listens to them, 
formally: 
𝜕2𝑢(𝑐, 𝑠)
𝜕𝑐𝜕𝑠
> 0, 
and as the activity as a harmful impact on Ulysses’ overall utility, we have: 
𝜕𝑢(𝑐, 𝑠)
𝜕𝑠
< 0. 
The framework this research aims to build consists of compromising between the 
concepts proposed by the two schools of thought. We suggest keeping the objectives 
of the agents in question stable over time. However, to model potential changes in 
preferences, a production function similar to the one described by Simon, is used to 
determine potential changes in priorities. As described by the case of Ulysses and the 
Sirens, new weights are elicited at 𝑛1 that take into account the new information, and 
new experiences that the agent has gone through and may affect the relative 
importance given to each objective. 
The next subsection will provide an understanding of the determinants of preference 
change that may affect the types of agents this research focuses on.  
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« Ce n’ est jamais à  cause d’ un é tat d’ esprit qui n’ est pas destiné  à  durer  
Que l’ on prend des ré solutions dé finitives. » 
Marcel Proust –  A la recherche du temps perdu. A l’ ombre des jeunes filles en 
fleurs  
(Proust, 1927, p. 142) 
 
"It is always thus, impelled by a state of mind which is destined not to last,  
That we make our irrevocable decisions."  
Marcel Proust –  Remembrance of Things Past: Within a Budding Grove 
Sources of preference change can be split into two main categories: endogenous and 
exogenous. The first one arises when the utility of a consumption depends on the past 
consumptions, i.e. someone’s tastes today are influenced by what has been ‘tasted’ 
previously (Hammond, 1976; Loewenstein et al., 2003). Sources of exogenous 
preferences change include emotions and visceral factors, which are covered in this 
section (for a deeper treatment of the other determinants of preference change, see 
Loewenstein & Angner 2003). 
Visceral factors denote certain types of emotions, drive states and feeling states; such 
factors, for instance, include anger, fear, hunger, and other cravings. These factors 
affect preferences in the sense that they have a motivating effect on people’s behaviour 
by altering their needs or desires. For example, hunger will lead to a heightened 
preference for food, thirst for drinks, or anger for aggression. In the case of Ulysses, 
stimulation from listening to the sirens will lead to a heightened preference to sail 
closer in order to hear more. Because such factors are driven biologically, they are 
susceptible to have a strong impact on altering preferences. Indeed, Loewenstein & 
Angner (2003) explain that tastes are partly determined by biological processes which 
regulate the human body. These processes are there to ensure homeostasis1 is 
maintained. Following some sort of discomfort, transient changes in preferences are 
induced specifically in order to reinstate balance (Elster, 1998; Frederick et al., 2002; 
Loewenstein and Angner, 2003; Loewenstein, 2000, 1996).  
Contrary to popular belief, Loewenstein (2000) explains that the influence of visceral 
factors on behaviour being highly systematic is much more predictable than cognitive 
deliberations, for instance. For this reason, such behaviours can be modelled, and one 
way to achieve it is using state-dependent preferences. 
We can formally express an agent’s instantaneous utility function as follows: 
𝑢(𝑐𝜏, 𝑠𝜏) 
                                        
1 Human homeostasis consists of physiological reactions aimed at regulating and 
stabilising the body in response to fluctuations caused by the external environment. 
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where 𝑐𝜏 represents the vector of consumption activities states in period τ, for e.g. the 
level of aggressive behaviour, 𝑠𝜏 represents the vector of visceral states in period τ, for 
e.g. the level of anger.  
Then, taking Loewenstein’s analogy of the application of the carrot and the stick, the 
carrot can be represented as: 
𝜕2𝑢(𝑐, 𝑠)
𝜕𝑐𝜕𝑠
≥ 0, 
which describes the marginal utility of 𝑐 that is increasing in 𝑠, in other words, the 
angrier one is, the more utility he/she will gain from aggression.   
The stick, denoting the negative impact of the discomfort experienced on the overall 
utility is represented by: 
𝜕𝑢(𝑐0, 𝑠)
𝜕𝑠
< 0, 
where 𝑐0 represents a zero consumption (for e.g. not indulging in aggressive 
behaviour).  
Because of its transient character, economists have generally shied away from the idea 
of modelling behaviours caused by visceral factors. However, the changes  incurred by 
such factors can have significant impacts on both the agent and the environment in 
which he operates (Loewenstein 1996; 1999; 2000), which is especially the case in the 
context of this research.  
Indeed, if one wants to anticipate a motivation to cause social unrest by disruptive 
agents, visceral factors appear to be a fundamental element of the modelling aspect. 
As Loewenstein states,  
“ To predict or make sense of viscerally driven behaviour, it is necessary 
to incorporate visceral factors into models of economic behaviour”  (2000, 
p.431). 
In the next section, a brief overview of the various types of time dependent models is 
provided. 
 
From what has been discussed in the previous sections, it appears necessary to provide 
an overview of the various means that have been employed to model the impact of 
the aforementioned factors on preferences. The first subsection aims to provide a brief 
overview of the main frameworks used to model time-dependent preferences.  
The appearance of new mathematical models has enabled a greater flexibility in 
modelling dynamic utility. Such models can be sub-divided into two categories, models 
without instantaneous utility (universal utility models), as opposed to models based 
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on instantaneous utility (recursive, additive and myopic utility models). The four 
types of models are described briefly below; for a detailed survey of the literature, see 
von Auer (1998). 
 Recursive utility models 
In recursive utility models, the utility is derived by adding the aggregate utility 
from future consumption to the utility gained from the present consumption. In 
addition, as the future is assumed a separable entity from the present and the 
past, recursive models do not allow habits to be modelled. 
 Additive utility models 
Additive utility models take into account habit formation (derived from past 
consumption) as well as the utility from future consumption, which is discounted. 
 Myopic utility models 
Myopic utility models are a subset of the additive utility models, describing a 
short-sighted behaviour. In addition to discounting the future entirely, i.e. does 
not take into account the future consumption when evaluating the current 
consumption, the agent also chooses to ignore his/her future preferences. This is 
defined as a naive choice mechanism (Strotz 1955; von Auer 1998; 1999).  
 Universal utility models 
Universal utility models are the most general types of utility models. The three 
models described above are special cases of universal models. Unlike these, 
universal utility models do not only look at the instantaneous utility, they also 
look at the intertemporal utility function for any period 𝑡, each of which depend 
on past consumptions.  
In addition to these models, some other methods have been explored.  
 Dynamic decision models 
Classic decision models have favoured modelling decision from a static point of 
view, that is with a stable set of objectives and attributes. Some studies, however, 
have been conducted to capture dynamic nature of decisions from a time-
dependency point of view. Intertemporal decision models, for instance, can help 
make trade-offs between the present costs of a policy versus its future benefits 
(Harvey, 1995, 1992). Rios-Insua et al., (2004) develop a decision support system 
capturing multiple conflicting objectives that consequences span over several time 
periods. Optimal strategies are determined by modelling different discounting 
methods and by allowing imprecise multi-attribute additive utility model.  
On the other hand, cognitive science and psychology have paid particular 
attention to this area. The effect of the availability of time to decide  and an 
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individual’s duration perception, has been researched (Diederich, 1997; Wittmann 
and Paulus, 2009, 2008).  
Decision Field Theory (DFT) stands aside from static-deterministic theories; 
instead, it provides a dynamical-stochastic description of decision-making. Rather 
than approaching decision-making from a rational decision-maker point of view, 
DFT aims to model the psychological processes involved in decision-making. In 
such models, preferences evolve over time, and factors which determine the 
evolution include the motivational value of an outcome (Townsend and 
Busemeyer, 1995)  
 Other methods 
Besides these models, more recently, other types of time dependent preference 
models have been developed, which incorporate multi-attribute aspect of 
decisions. Time dependent preferences have also been investigated in multi-
criteria problems since the early 1990’s by integrating Multi-Criteria Decision 
Analysis (MCDA) with other techniques, such as goal programming (Agrell et 
al., 1998; Caballero et al., 1998; Hämäläinen and Mäntysaari, 2001; Kornbluth, 
1992) , machine learning (Natarajan and Tadepalli, 2005), and by integrating 
time discounting (Atherton and French, 1998; French et al., 2005). Similarly, the 
influence of the environment on multi-criteria problems has been investigated by 
integrating MCDA with system dynamics (SD) since the early 1980’s (Andersen 
and Rohrbaugh, 1992; Bell et al., 2003, 2001; Brans et al., 1998; Dennis et al., 
1983; Gardiner and Ford, 1980; Gruver et al., 1984; Kunsch and Springael, 2008; 
Macharis, 2000; Papamichail and Robertson, 2005; Santos et al., 2008; Springael 
et al., 2002). 
These models attempt to provide a framework enabling a decision maker to 
evaluate alternatives having effects over a long time period. They do so by taking 
into account the future state of preferences into the overall performance 
evaluation of the alternatives. However, they do not provide a model that enables 
anticipation of changes regarding how objectives are prioritised in future states. 
To contextualise modelling preferences and decisions within our research application, 
in the next section, we describe the different methods used to model uncertainty and 
decisions in counter-terrorism analysis. 
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In this section, we provide an overview of the different approaches used to model 
threats caused by terrorism, looking, in particular, at the cases where Expected Utility 
Theory (EUT) and expert elicitation are used. We briefly describe the key 
characteristics of the methods. 
 
In natural hazard analysis, such as earthquakes, and failure experienced in engineered 
processes, Logic Trees such as Event Trees (ET) and Decision Trees (DT) have been 
extensively developed (Bedford and Cooke, 2001). Conversely, DTs have not yet been 
explored as extensively in the context of terrorism. For a comprehensive review of the 
use of these approaches within the context of terrorism, see Ezell et al. (2010) and 
Merrick and Parnell (2011).  
Logic trees (Probability Trees, ETs, DTs) and Influence Diagrams (ID) provide a 
useful framework for the analysis of uncertainty by formalising various scenarios that 
describe the sequence of events leading to the various outcomes that can be expected 
(Ezell et al., 2010; Paté-Cornell, 2007).   
Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) in the context of terrorism threats aims to model 
the situations and decisions from the perspective of the defender’s preferences. By 
deriving a ranking of risks, i.e. a ranking of the attacks terrorists might potentially 
employ, the defender can then decide how to allocate resources to protect against 
them. In these traditional models, the risks are determined based on the evaluation of 
three parameters. These parameters are the threat (the probability that an attack 
would occur), the vulnerability (given the timing, location and type of attack, the 
probability that damages occur), and the consequences (given the timing, location and 
type of attack, the expected extent to which the damage occurs). These are subjective 
judgements elicited by experts (Willis and Corporation, 2005; Willis, 2007). Similar 
risk functions have been used in the literature (Dillon et al., 2009; von Winterfeldt 
and Rosoff, 2005).  
Von Winterfeldt & O’Sullivan (2006) use a DT approach along with sensitivity 
analysis to assess the cost-effectiveness of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems 
countermeasures. They do so by comparing different types of attacks, their probability 
of success and impact on the economy. Pinker (2007) uses IDs to describe and 
formalise the risks and defence mechanisms into a structure to highlight the main 
issues which policy makers face. The aim is to support the joint optimisation of two 
types of defensive mechanisms (public warnings and the deployment of physical 
resources) by improving the understanding of the effects and interactions between 
these two mechanisms. Bakir (2008) investigates various counter measures to secure 
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cargos at ports of entry using DTs.  Building on the work of Bakir (2008) and Keeney 
(2007), Merrick & McLay (2010) look at the impact of screening policies on deterring 
terrorists from using nuclear attacks by incorporating additional objectives. Their 
solution however, is sensitive to parameters relating to both the uncertainties faced 
and those representing the objectives of the decision makers. Bakir & Von Winterfeldt 
(2011) make policy recommendations for means to scan containers against nuclear or 
radiological weapons using a DT. Similarly, their solution is also sensitive to certain 
key parameters such as the probability of an attempted attack and the probability of 
its success.  
A recent trend also includes the use of DTs and IDs to model decisions from the point 
of view of the attacker (Ezell et al., 2010; Keeney, 2007; Rosoff and John, 2009). In 
this case, the attacker’s preferences are estimated to try to infer their favoured attacks 
(Ezell et al., 2010). Keeney (2007) developed value models for both the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) and terrorist organisations to evaluate various counter-
terrorism means and highlight possible terrorist priorities and actions. Rosoff & John 
(2009) developed an MAUT model embedded in a simulation that generates attack 
based risk profiles and probabilities of a terrorist leader selecting each attack. Expert 
elicitation is sought as a proxy for building the MAUT from the point of view of a 
terrorist organisation.  
One of the benefits of these methods is that they provide a framework to structure of 
large sets of information and relationships between actions and consequences (Paté-
Cornell and Guikema, 2002; Pinker, 2007).  It also enables the decomposition of events 
leading to the final uncertainty of the consequence, thus aiding the elicitation of 
probabilities for these events (Ezell et al., 2010; Keeney and von Winterfeldt, 1991). 
Such a benefit is especially relevant in this case, where these assessments have to 
reflect the degrees of beliefs of an agent we do not have access to.  
 
In an attempt to capture the interactions between the defender and the attacker, a 
feature that is difficult to do using PRA, Game Theory (GT) has been extensively 
researched in the context of terrorism (Hausken and Zhuang, 2011; Wilson and Olwell, 
2006; Zhuang and Bier, 2007). There is a wealth of literature in the context of 
resource-allocation decisions for the protection of potential targets (Bier et al., 2007b; 
Major, 2002; Wilson and Olwell, 2006; Zhuang and Bier, 2007), and in the context of 
hostage situations and negotiation analysis (Atkinson, 1999; Corsi, 1981; Lapan and 
Sandler, 1988). For an excellent review on the development in games in the context 
of terrorism, see Sandler & Siqueira (2009) and Kardes (2005). 
Two types of methods can be used in GT: games of complete information, and games 
of incomplete information. In both cases, the same assumptions as those in a DT are 
made. Players are assumed to be rational and intelligent, i.e. able to compute which 
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alternative best achieve their goals, thus will know which option will maximise their 
goals. Whilst in games of complete information the assumption of knowing what these 
goals are is made, games of incomplete information do not require this assumption. 
GT has been adapted to account for incomplete information regarding one of the 
players. In cases where probability distributions from different players are not 
consistent, multiple utilities can be used in the game (Harsanyi, 2004). GT models 
with asymmetric information include studies by Lapan & Sandler (1993) and Arce & 
Sandler (2007) where knowledge is updated through the game. In these studies, a 
distinction can be made as to the types of choice models, continuous choices for both 
players (Major, 2002; Zhuang and Bier, 2007), continuous choices for the defender, 
discrete for the attacker (Bier et al., 2007b).
 
In an attempt to capture the benefits of both PRA and GT approaches, Adversarial 
Risk Analysis (ARA) has recently been investigated. GT on its own does not capture 
the risk aspect of the threat, whilst PRA on its own does not capture the interactive 
nature of adversarial threats. Hence, these approaches have been combined to try to 
further the insight that could be gained. ARA attempts to capture the risk associated 
with the attacks, as well as the preferences of both the defender and the attackers. 
Paté-Cornell & Guikema (2002) were the first to combine the two approaches, using 
GT and influence diagrams to order and structure the large breadth of information, 
which describes terrorist threats. By showing the links between the various actions 
and consequences, their model is used to set priorities among both threat and 
countermeasures. Two separate influence diagrams are used to represent with one, the 
terrorists’ behaviour, and with the other, the government’s decisions, which they call 
a two-sided model. Their models are single period, which means that at each period, 
variables are updated to reflect of an action taken, or new information is gained. More 
recently, Parnell et al. (2010) developed a probabilistic defender-attacker-defender 
model which captures the decisions of both the defender and attacker at various 
stages, as well as the uncertainties related to the implementation detection and 
outcomes of the attacks. Rios and Rios Insua (2012) analysed various standard 
counterterrorism models, illustrating the application of ARA to the same problems 
with the aim of supporting the decisions of a defender against an attacker. In their 
model, they attempt to predict the attacker’s decision behaviour using subjective 
utility theory, and making the assumption the attacker is rational. 
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Other simulation methods which use an agent’s objective to try to infer preferences 
include Multi Agent Simulations (MAS) and machine learning. MAS are being 
increasingly used by the government to model terrorist activities. These MAS have 
been designed as an educating simulator, to train analysts to uncover terrorists within 
the society, or even plots within a given time and budget. Further, this tool has been 
used by the army to decide upon the best attack/defence strategies during a conflict, 
by simulating them on the MAS and observing the resulting scenario (Lucas et al., 
2007)   
A key research project using this technique is the work by Weaver et al. (2001) which 
is partly funded by the CIA and the Defence Intelligence Agency. This simulation 
program is used to assist intelligence analysts in their job of tracking down terrorists 
(Goldstein, 2006). More recent work in MAS attempts to connect several elements, 
such as personality, emotions, and cognitions in their simulation of decision models 
(Silverman et al., 2006a, 2006b). These simulations, unlike the approaches described 
earlier, focus on the behaviour of individuals as well as collaborations between 
individuals in that simulation (Morrison and Cohen, 2006). Similar assumptions have 
to be made as to their behaviour and decision making abilities.  
Reinforcement learning, a machine learning technique, can be used within the context 
of terrorism. It enables the simulation of sequential decision-making problems in the 
case of large state spaces (which can be more difficult with DT as mentioned above). 
It also has the potential for modelling the dynamicity of preferences (Natarajan and 
Tadepalli, 2005) and to capture the effect of emotions (El-Nasr et al., 2000). However, 
to our knowledge, terrorists’ preferences using machine learning has not been explored. 
 
This chapter has explored preference change and highlighted the factors influencing 
it in context of this research. We provided an overview of the psychological 
ramifications behind the phenomenon of preference change. In the context of terrorist 
decision making, these main factors are the effects of visceral factors on judgements 
and preferences. These can cause impulsive behaviours as individuals are compelled 
to take action to restore balance. As such, they are also likely to discount heavily the 
future when evaluating a course of action. Furthermore, their ability to process 
information can as well be affected (Lerner and Keltner, 2001, 2000; Lerner and 
Tiedens, 2006; Loewenstein and Angner, 2003; Loewenstein, 2000, 1999, 1996). 
As seen in section 2.4, one way to anticipate terrorists’ actions is to consider their 
judgements when modelling the decisions they might make. However, in the context 
of terrorism, modellers encounter a difficulty: the non-availability of the decision 
maker from whom to elicit preferences and judgements. As such, these models have 
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to be based on several assumptions with regards to the objectives such agents have 
and the way they chose to maximise their utility. 
Given the empirical insight from the area of psychology, and the current modelling 
techniques, the following questions arise:  
 Knowing preferences appear altered due to exogenous triggers, how can a 
MAUT model capture their dynamicity? Do the triggers, which motivate 
terrorists, have an impact on their preferences and judgements? 
 One main assumption in current models for counter-terrorism analysis consists 
of the rationality of terrorists. But can they be considered as rational decision 
makers? If so, what is the utility they try to maximise? Are they solely political 
expected utility maximisers?  
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Appendix 2.A Ulysses’ MCDA model 
Ulysses preference ordering can then be derived by calculating the overall performance 
of each alternative which depends on the weights (relative importance given the range 
of attributes) Ulysses would give to each objective. Thus, the overall performances at 
time 𝑡 of alternatives 𝑗 = 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, would be: 
𝐕𝐣
𝐭 = ∑ 𝐰𝐢
𝐭 ∗ 𝐯𝐢,𝐣
𝐭
𝐢   (1) 
With wi
t the weights at time t for each objectives i = LE, CD, P, 
  and vi,j
t  the partial performance at time t of alternatives  
j = a, b, c on the ith objective 
The partial performances are assessed on an interval scale ranging between zero for 
the lower bound (worst performing alternative on the ith objective) and one hundred 
for the upper bound (best performing alternative on the ith objective). 
Let us assume we are at the initial node, 𝑛0 where Ulysses has to decide between the 
three alternatives. Ulysses being King of Ithaca, is responsible for the lives of his crew, 
but most importantly the people of Ithaca, and hence we could infer his weights to 
be: 
𝒘𝑳𝑬
𝟎 > 𝒘𝑪𝑫
𝟎 ≫ 𝒘𝑷
𝟎    (2) 
In other words, his first and foremost objective is to remain alive (LE), followed by 
ensuring the lives of his crew (CD), and finally, indulge with some pleasant or 
enriching adventures (P).  
Following, we can infer the following relationships between the partial performances 
of each alternative vis-à-vis the objective of Life Expectancy: 
𝒗𝑳𝑬,𝒂
𝟎 ≪ 𝒗𝑳𝑬,𝒃
𝟎 ≤ 𝒗𝑳𝑬,𝒄
𝟎  (3) 
i.e. the performance of alternative (a) on Life Expectancy is far lesser than the two 
others (in fact if the lower bound of the scale is zero, then 𝑣𝐿𝐸,𝑎
0 = 0, as it leads to 
death of Ulysses and the crew). In addition, alternative (b) is at least as good as 
alternative (c) (similarly, if the upper bound of the scale is hundred, then 𝑣𝐿𝐸,𝑐
0 = 100 
as Ulysses and his crew safely sail away with alternative (c)). 
A similar relationship can be written for the performance of each alternative vis-à-vis 
Collateral Damage:  
𝐯𝐂𝐃,𝐚
𝟎 ≪ 𝐯𝐂𝐃,𝐛
𝟎 ≤ 𝐯𝐂𝐃,𝐜
𝟎  (4) 
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(Similarly to the Life Expectancy partial performances, we also have vCD,a
0 = 0, as it 
leads to death of Ulysses and the crew and vCD,c
0 = 100) 
Finally, we can infer the following relationships of partial performances vis-à-vis the 
last objective. 
𝐯𝐏,𝐜
𝟎 ≪ 𝐯𝐏,𝐛
𝟎 < 𝐯𝐏,𝐚
𝟎  (5) 
i.e. the pleasure obtained from alternative (c) is far lesser than the two other. 
(Similarly, vP,c
0 = 0 as it is the lower bound in this case, Ulysses does not get to listen 
to the sirens at all), and because alternative b only enables Ulysses to listen to the 
Sirens for a limited time only, it is not as good as alternative (a) (which is the upper 
bound, and hence vP,a
0 = 100).  
Hence, we can now derive the preference order by calculating the overall performances 
of each alternative: From (1) we have:  
Va
0 = wP
0 ∗ 100 
Vb
0 = wLE
0 ∗ 𝑣𝐿𝐸,𝑏
0 + wCD
0 ∗ 𝑣𝐶𝐷,𝑏
0 + wP
0 ∗ 𝑣𝑃,𝑏
0  
Vc
0 = wLE
0 ∗ 100 + wCD
0 ∗ 100 
 
Let us derive the preference relation between alternative (c) and alternative (b) by 
looking at the sign of Vc
0 − Vb
0 
Vc
0 − Vb
0 = wLE
0 ∗ (100 − 𝑣𝐿𝐸,𝑏
0 ) + wCD
0 ∗ (100 − 𝑣𝐶𝐷,𝑏
0 ) + wP
0 ∗ (−𝑣𝑃,𝑏
0 ) 
From (3) and (4) we have (100 − 𝑣𝐿𝐸,𝑏
0 ) ≥ 0 and (100 − 𝑣𝐶𝐷,𝑏
0 ) ≥ 0,  
And, from the assumption made in (3) and (4), we can say that at that point we have 
(100 − 𝑣𝐿𝐸,𝑏
0 ) and (100 − 𝑣𝐶𝐷,𝑏
0 ) which are very small compared to 𝑣𝑃,𝑏
0 , hence 
Vc
0 − Vb
0 = wLE
0 ∗ (100 − 𝑣𝐿𝐸,𝑏
0 ) + wCD
0 ∗ (100 − 𝑣𝐶𝐷,𝑏
0 ) + wP
0 ∗ (−𝑣𝑃,𝑏
0 ) ≤ 0 
But as we have from (5) 𝑣𝑃,𝑏
0 ≫ vP,c
0  hence, 𝑣𝑃,𝑏
0 > 0 
Therefore,  
Vc
0 − Vb
0 < 0 
or Vc
0 < Vb
0 ⟹ bP0c ∎  
 
Similarly, let us derive the preference relation between alternative (c) and alternative 
(a) by looking at the sign of Va
0 − Vc
0: 
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Va
0 − Vc
0 = wLE
0 ∗ (−100) + wCD
0 ∗ (−100) + wP
0 ∗ 100 
So, 
𝑉𝑎
0 − 𝑉𝑐
0 = (−𝑤𝐿𝐸
0 − 𝑤𝐶𝐷
0 + 𝑤𝑃
0) ∗ 100 
And, from the assumption made in (2), we can say that at that point we have the 
relationship: wP
0 ≪ (wLE
0 + wCD
0 ) hence, 
(−𝑤𝐿𝐸
0 − 𝑤𝐶𝐷
0 + 𝑤𝑃
0) ∗ 100 ≪ 0 
Hence  
𝑉𝑎
0 − 𝑉𝑐
0 ≪ 0 
or Va
0 < Vc
0 ⟹ cP0a ∎  
 
Hence, by transitivity of preferences, at 𝑛0, we have bP0c and cP0a ⟹  bP0cP0a  ∎ 
Following this method, Ulysses’ best alternative would be to try and reach point (b) 
in the decision tree (Figure 2-1), and according to this decision framework, having 
fixed the weights, he would manage to reach point (b), as the preference ordering 
would remain stable, i.e. 𝑏𝑃1𝑎, which is not the case. 
We argue that one way to explain the preference change can be represented by a 
change in weights in moving from 𝑛0 and 𝑛1. Within this new environment, a new 
evaluation would be performed at 𝑛1. Whilst Ulysses’ objectives remain the same and 
the partial performances can be assumed stable, the relative importance of the 
objectives could change. In addition, because alternative (c) is no longer available, an 
adjustment of the relative performances is required, and we have the following new 
relationships: 
vLE,a
1 ≪ vLE,b
1  (6) 
Similarly to the partial performances at time 0, we have vLE,a
1 = 0, and vLE,b
1 = 100 as 
they are the lower and upper bound respectively. 
A similar relationship can be written for the performance of each alternative vis-à-vis 
Collateral Damage:  
vCD,a
1 ≪ vCD,b
1  (7) 
Similarly, we also have vCD,a
1 = 0, and vCD,b
1 = 100. 
 
Finally, 
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𝐯𝐏,𝐛
𝟏 < 𝐯𝐏,𝐚
𝟏  (8) 
With, vP,b
1 = 0, and vP,a
1 = 100. 
 
After having listened to the sirens for a while, it could be that 
𝐰𝐋𝐄
𝟎 > 𝐰𝐂𝐃
𝟎 ≫ 𝐰𝐏
𝟎 has evolved into 𝐰𝐏
𝟏 ≫ 𝐰𝐋𝐄
𝟏 > 𝐰𝐂𝐃
𝟏  (9) 
i.e. now Ulysses mostly cares about his enjoyment by listening to the sirens longer, 
regardless of the risks incurred to his life and the ones of his crew, explaining the 
preference change at time 1 (node 𝑛1) into 𝑎𝑃1𝑏.  
Let us formalise the new relationships at 𝑛1. Similarly, let us look at the sign of Va
1 −
Vb
1 as was done for n0, from (1), (6),  (7),  (8), we have: 
𝑉𝑎
1 − 𝑉𝑏
1 = 𝑤𝐿𝐸
1 ∗ (−100) + 𝑤𝐶𝐷
1 ∗ (−100) + 𝑤𝑃
1 ∗ (100)  
Hence, when  
𝑤𝑃
1 > 𝑤𝐿𝐸
1 + 𝑤𝐶𝐷
1  
we can observe at 𝑛1 Va
1 − Vb
1 > 0 ⟹  aP1b  ∎  
 
  
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Prelude to Chapter 3  
In the Opponent’s Shoes:  
On Modelling Terrorists’ Judgements for 
Counter-Terrorism Analysis 
 
The previous chapter explored the theory behind preference change and highlighted 
the factors influencing it. We provided an overview of the psychological ramifications 
behind the phenomenon of preference change. In the context of terrorist decision-
making, these main factors are the effects of visceral factors on judgements and 
preferences. 
We saw that one way to anticipate terrorists’ actions is to consider their judgements 
when modelling the decisions they might make. However, non-availability of the 
decision maker, from whom to elicit preferences and judgement, renders modellers’ 
task challenging. As such, these models have to be based on several assumptions 
concerning the objectives that such agents have and the way they chose to maximise 
their utility.  
Using secondary research in terrorism and behavioural decision-making fields, we seek 
in this first paper to answer questions raised in the previous chapters. Specifically, 
these are: 
 Knowing preferences appear altered due to exogenous triggers, how can a 
Multi-Attribute Utility Theory model capture their dynamicity? Do the 
triggers, which motivate terrorists, have an impact on their preferences and 
judgements? 
 One main assumption in current models for counter-terrorism analysis 
consists of the rationality of terrorists. However, can they be considered as 
rational decision makers? If so, what is the utility they try to maximise? Are 
they solely political expected utility maximisers?  
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Counter-Terrorism Analysis 
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g.montibeller@lse.ac.uk   
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Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK 
ABSTRACT 
Terrorism is caused by the actions of malicious agents against society. One way to 
anticipate terrorists’  actions in counter-terrorism analysis is to consider their 
judgements when modelling the decisions they might make - such judgements will 
drive their chosen actions - so proper counterterrorism measures may be adopted. 
Nevertheless, several assumptions – such as rationality of the agents, agents who have 
a set of constant and ordered preferences, with the ability to perform a cost-benefit 
analysis of their alternatives, among others - need to be made in those models. 
However, are such assumptions reasonable? In this paper, we analyse the types of 
assumptions made across various counter-terrorism analytical models that represent 
malicious agents’  judgements and discuss their suitability from a descriptive point of 
view. Subsequently, we suggest how some of these assumptions could be modified to 
describe terrorists’  preferences more accurately, by drawing knowledge from the fields 
of behavioural decision analysis, politics, and philosophy of choice, public choice, and 
conflict management in terrorism. Such insight, we hope, might help make the 
assumptions of these models more realistic for risk analysis. 
Key-words: Terrorism, value models, decision making, rationality, probabilistic risk 
analysis, descriptive validity 
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Ira furor brevis est. Anger is a short madness.  
Horace Book I, epistle ii, line 62 c. 20 BC and 14 BC 
 
robabilistic Risk Analysis includes various methods, such as event trees, 
decision trees, and influence diagrams. Initially developed in nuclear 
engineering (Bier et al., 2007a; Kaplan and Garrick, 1981; Starr, 1969), 
traditional Probabilistic Risk Analysis has been used to evaluate the chances of 
natural random events, such as earthquakes or mechanical failures, as well as in the 
context of counter-terrorism. Methods such as event trees, decision trees and influence 
diagrams have been used to represent the sequence of events leading to a consequence, 
and decompose the uncertainties leading to outcomes (Ezell et al., 2010; Keeney and 
von Winterfeldt, 2011; Keeney, 2007; Rosoff and John, 2009). Some of the recent work 
in this domain include the research by Bakir and von Winterfeldt, (2011); Bakir, 
(2008); Merrick and McLay, (2010); Merrick and Parnell, (2011); Parnell et al., (2010); 
von Winterfeldt and O’Sullivan, (2006).  
In risk modelling, a distinction has to be made concerning the source of that risk, as 
it will have an impact on the choice of methodology. Risks caused by natural or 
random events contain a chance component, which can be adequately modelled using 
statistical-based analyses such as Probabilistic Risk Analysis, see Bedford and Cooke 
(2001) for an overview of uses. However, treating the risks caused by the action of an 
agent as random events is not always appropriate, making Probabilistic Risk Analysis 
less adequate (NRC, 2010, 2008). Unlike these events, the actions of an agent are 
driven by their need to achieve certain goals (Bier, 2006). Terrorism falls into this 
category. Its adversarial nature means the adversary behaves strategically. Pre-
emptive methods taken against one type of attack may increase the risk of another 
type of attack  (Bier et al., 2005; Brown and Cox, Jr., 2011; Guikema and Aven, 2010; 
Kardes and Hall, 2005).  
Contrary to most Decision Analysis models, in the counter-terrorism context, 
modellers do not have access to terrorists as decision makers. Hence, the objectives 
such agents might use and the way they chose to maximise their utility can only be 
based on assumptions. Typically, current methods model the utility maximisation of 
one or two main objectives that are used to evaluate a fixed set of alternatives.  
Most counter-terrorism modelling methods are idealised and based on several 
assumptions about how terrorists make decisions and their judgements. These include 
the rationality of the adversary and their ability to formulate the problem and 
P 
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compute the best outcome; knowing the adversary’s utility functions of the adversary 
– what are the goals being maximised; and the ability of the defenders and attackers 
to assess uncertainties and evaluate the alternatives involved in the decision. However, 
how realistic are these assumptions in light of what we know from the fields of 
behavioural decision analysis, politics, and the philosophy of choice, public choice, and 
conflict management in terrorism? 
Making such normative assumptions may be unrealistic and could therefore lead to 
wrong counter-terrorism measures. Indeed, modelling risks using traditional 
Probabilistic Risk Analysis methods does not account for how an attacker might 
respond to the actions of the defender (Brown and Cox, Jr., 2011). We believe 
terrorism models could be more informed by empirical findings from the fields 
discussed above, which have not been widely researched in risk analytical models for 
counter-terrorism analysis. Extending the breadth of understanding of terrorists as 
decision makers, what their objectives are and what influences them could help 
towards increasing the validity of the models from a descriptive point of view. We 
hope this can help in the management of risk caused by terrorism. This paper will 
attempt add some insight in that area by critically analysing several elements 
influencing the way terrorist make decisions.  
This paper is composed of the following sections. We first provide a short overview of 
Expected Utility Theory, Multi Attribute Utility Theory, then the various methods 
used in the context of counter-terrorism modelling and we discuss the validity of the 
assumptions made in such models in relation to the type of decision maker we face 
(depending on whether it is an organisation, an active, or a suicidal terrorist). 
Subsequently, we show the relevance and considerations to be made when modelling 
decisions of a terrorist, tying in empirical evidence from behavioural decision-making 
as well as evidence from the terrorism literature. Finally, we explore the implications 
of this insight for current decision models.  
 
In this section, we review the main approaches to modelling threats caused by 
terrorism. In each of these approaches, certain assumptions need to be made. These 
can be broadly classified under two categories: uncertainties (regarding an attacker’s 
decision, capability, and success, and defender’s success) and decisions (based on the 
preferences of the defender and attacker). Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) relies 
heavily on modelling uncertainties, using expert elicitation to capture the probabilities 
associated to them. Game Theory (GT) on the other hand relies on modelling a 
situation based on the decisions of the players, making the assumptions that both 
actors are rational. As Adversarial Risk Analysis (ARA) combines both approaches, 
it needs to make assumptions in both categories.  
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PRA in the context of terrorism threats aims to model the situations and decisions 
from the perspective of the defender’s preferences. By deriving a ranking of risks, i.e. 
a ranking of the attacks terrorists might potentially employ, the defender can then 
decide how to allocate resources to protect against them. In these traditional models, 
the risks are determined based on the evaluation of three parameters. These are the 
threat (the probability that an attack would occur), the vulnerability (given the 
timing, location and type of attack, the probability that damages occur), and the 
consequences (given the timing, location and type of attack, the expected extent to 
which the damage occurs). These parameters are subjective judgements elicited by 
expert (Willis and Corporation, 2005; Willis, 2007). Similar risk functions have been 
used throughout the literature (Dillon et al., 2009; von Winterfeldt and Rosoff, 2005). 
Key work in this area includes that of Von Winterfeldt & O’Sullivan (2006), Pinker 
(2007), Bakir (2008) Keeney (2007), Merrick & McLay (2010) and Bakir & Von 
Winterfeldt (2011). 
A recent trend in modelling terrorism using a decision analytical approach includes 
the use of Decision Trees (DTs) and Influence Diagrams (IDs) to model decisions from 
the point of view of the attacker (Ezell et al., 2010; Keeney, 2007; Rosoff and John, 
2009). In this case, the attacker’s preferences are estimated in order to try to infer 
their favoured attacks (Ezell et al., 2010). Keeney (2007) developed value models for 
both the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and terrorist organisations to 
evaluate various counter-terrorism means and highlight possible terrorist priorities 
and actions. Rosoff & John (2009) developed an MAUT model embedded in a 
simulation which generated attack-based risk profiles and probabilities of a terrorist 
leader selecting each attack. The authors used expert elicitation as a proxy for building 
the MAUT from the point of view of a terrorist organisation.  
In an attempt to capture the interactions between the defender and the attacker, a 
feature that is difficult to do using PRA, GT has been extensively researched in the 
context of terrorism (Hausken and Zhuang, 2011; Wilson and Olwell, 2006; Zhuang 
and Bier, 2007). There is a wealth of literature in the context of resource-allocation 
decisions for the protection of potential targets (Bier et al., 2007b; Major, 2002; Wilson 
and Olwell, 2006; Zhuang and Bier, 2007), and in the context of hostage situations 
and negotiation analysis (Atkinson, 1999; Corsi, 1981; Lapan and Sandler, 1988). For 
an excellent review on the development in games in the context of terrorism, see 
Sandler & Siqueira (2009) and Kardes (2005). 
To capture the benefits of both PRA and GT approaches, ARA has recently been 
suggested. GT on its own does not capture the risk aspect of the threat, whilst PRA 
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on its own does not capture the interactive nature of adversarial threats. Hence, these 
approaches have been combined to try to further the insight that could be gained. 
ARA attempts to capture the risk associated with the attacks, as well as the 
preferences of both the defender and the attackers. Paté-Cornell & Guikema (2002) 
were the first to combine the two approaches, using influence diagrams to order and 
structure the large breadth of information that describe terrorist threats and GT. 
More recently, Parnell et al. (2010) developed a probabilistic defender-attacker-
defender model which captures the decisions of both the defender and attacker at 
various stages, as well as the uncertainties related to the implementation detection 
and outcomes of the attacks. Rios and Rios Insua (2012)  analyse different counter-
terrorism  models, illustrating the application of ARA to the same problems with the 
aim of supporting the decisions of a defender against an attacker.  
 
In the context of counter-terrorism analysis, PRA analytical tools, and other 
modelling methods, including DTs and GTs, make similar strong assumptions. These 
can be categorised into the following themes:  
 The rationality of the adversary and their ability to formulate the problem and 
compute the best outcome 
In models which represent terrorists' decisions (such as GT and modelling LTs or IDs 
from the point of view of the attacker), the issue of the rationality of the decision 
maker arises. Following the standard models of decisions under uncertainty, agents 
are regarded as rational decision makers who maximise expected utility (Sheffrin, 
1996).  
It should be noted that rationality can be described by two distinct concepts: Simon’s 
concept of substantive rationality and the psychologist’s view of procedural 
rationality. Whilst the former is concerned with whether a behaviour is adequate given 
the desire to achieve a given set of goals, the latter only describes a behaviour which 
has been reasonably deliberated (Simon, 1986). In the models we describe here, the 
concept of rationality adopted is the substantive one. 
Under this premise, and provided that an agent satisfies Savage’s axioms of rationality 
(North, 1968 see Appendix 3.A), his/her choices can be explained using von Neumann 
and Morgerstern’ Expected Utility Theory (EUT). In this case, Mono or Multi 
Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) can be used to model the utility of an agent’s choice 
(see Appendix 3.B). This requires the knowledge of the set of objectives the agent is 
trying to achieve, and this set is assumed to remain consistent. In this context, 
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modellers therefore expect terrorists to be able to choose the branch maximising the 
consequences of an attack, i.e. that they are utility maximisers.  
 The utility functions of the adversary – what are the goals being maximised? 
Modelling terrorist decision-making using GT, ARA or using DT from the terrorists’ 
perspective requires us to know their utility function. The challenging part here is 
about the ability to determine what the adversary is trying to achieve. Given the 
terrorist rationality proposition, which enables the assumption of consequence 
maximisation to be made, modellers need to know which consequences terrorists are 
trying to maximise.  
In order to capture the lack of knowledge about the attack’s preferences, GT has been 
adapted to account for incomplete information regarding one of the players. In cases 
where probability distributions from different players are not consistent, multiple 
utilities can be used in the game (Harsanyi, 2004). GT models of asymmetric 
information include studies by Lapan & Sandler (1993) and Arce & Sandler (2007) 
where knowledge is updated through the game. 
 The ability of the defenders and attackers to assess uncertainties and evaluate the 
alternatives involved in the decision  
PRA relies heavily on the availability of intelligence data as well as expert knowledge 
to assess the parameters involved in the models. These are, for instance, the likelihood 
of the attacker’s success given a particular strike, and the defender’s success in 
preventing it. To do that requires the assumption that terrorists view the world 
objectively, for example, that his/her perception of the probabilities of achieving 
certain consequences is not biased. 
In the context of terrorism, quantifying uncertainties (relating, for instance, to the 
capabilities of an attacker or the probabilities of success) can be problematic due to 
the lack of data. In such cases, subjective expert elicitation is sought to obtain these 
values. For an overview of subjective expert elicitation, see Hora (2007). 
Based on EUT and MAUT, several types of models have been developed with the aim 
of attempting to infer preferences of agents. Because modellers use this normative 
decision model to infer the preferences of an agent, it is essential to understand the 
descriptive elements that may affect this decision maker and examine if and how these 
assumptions might be violated.  
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PRA analytical tools, and other modelling methods, including DTs and GTs, as we 
have discussed, make several main assumptions: 
 The rationality of the adversary and their ability to formulate the problem and 
compute the best outcome 
 The utility functions of the adversary – what are the goals being maximised 
 The ability of the defenders and attackers to assess uncertainties and evaluate the 
alternatives involved in the decision  
It has been argued that given the above assumptions, counter-terrorism models can 
provide some interesting insight as to what a rational player might do, but that it is 
not necessarily what the players will end up choosing in reality. In other words, the 
solution observed arises from a normative view rather than a descriptive one (Ezell et 
al., 2010).  
Decision makers can be subject to various biases; these can be induced by external 
influences, such as the availability of data, but can also be influenced by the state of 
mind in which the agent finds himself. In fact, research has shown that strong 
emotions such as passions or visceral factors can have an important and non-negligible 
influence on decision-making (Loewenstein, 2000). Gaining an understanding of these 
factors can be especially useful in order to develop stronger models to describe 
terrorism decision-making, which are based on assumptions that are more realistic. In 
this section, we highlight several issues relating to their validity and propose some 
alterations. 
Before discussing further, it is worthwhile clarifying who we mean by a decision maker. 
Terrorists can be classified into the following categories: 
a. Sponsor state – sponsors one or more terrorist organisations, 
b. Terrorist organisation recruits, manages, and leads terrorist cells, 
c. Terrorist cell – trained operational units, 
d. Terrorist – active but not suicidal, and  
e. Terrorist – suicidal. 
Commonly, models for counter-terrorism analysis look at decisions made by terrorist 
organisations, category b, - these might be the ones making overall decisions regarding 
strategies. Other models, which are describing a situation at a more micro-level, such 
as those for negotiation analysis, involve the categories c, d and e. In this research, 
the decision makers we focus on relate to terrorists belonging to the categories b, to 
e. Further, we make the assumption that categories b and c might behave as an 
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individual decision maker. We consider that agents belonging to the categories d and 
e have free will. In other words, they are acting the strategy that was decided by the 
organisation, but they are free to decide not to carry out the act should they change 
their mind. 
In the following sections, we will first discuss the issues surrounding the above 
assumptions by referring to findings from the fields of behavioural decision analysis, 
politics, and the philosophy of choice, public choice, and conflict management in 
terrorism. We subsequently discuss the implications of these findings on the 
assumptions made in terrorism modelling. Specifically, we provide some guidelines for 
relaxing some of the assumptions and adjusting some of them.  
 
A key assumption in most decision models, specifically, is that the players are rational 
decision makers. In particular, this is the case in GT, ARA, and DTs when they are 
used from the view of a terrorist. This enables modellers to gain an insight on the sort 
of decisions that might be made. A significant question therefore arises: Can terrorists 
be considered as rational decision makers, or homo economicus? In other words, can 
they be considered as agents seeking to maximise utility? In addition, if that is the 
case, what is the utility they try to maximise? This assumption can be reasonable in 
some cases, but more arguable when looking at attacks at the more complex end of 
the spectrum. Indeed, Ezell et al. (2010) note that bioterrorism, for instance, requires 
a certain level of technical skills to make those assessments, and it would be unsafe 
to assume the adversary has them (Simon, 1986; van Hees and Roy, 2007). 
The following subsection critically analyses the literature on terrorism rationality as 
well as provide some recommendations for relaxing the concept of rationality to 
describe terrorists’ decision-making.   
3.3.1.1 Inconsistencies in Terrorist Decision Making  
Terrorists’ rationality may be questioned from an economic point of view for several 
reasons. Their choice of actions may not always be achieving the best outcome in 
terms of their long-term objectives: political benefits (Keeney and von Winterfeldt, 
2009). Furthermore, their chosen targets may also not invariably be the ones providing 
the optimal outcome given their set of objectives (Abrahms, 2008; McCormick, 2003).  
Such inconsistencies in decision-making can be explained by several elements. First, 
terrorists, as any decision makers, may not escape the effect of bounded rationality 
(Simon, 1986). Bounded rationality theories do not require certain assumptions of 
standard expected utility theories to be met. In particular, the set of alternatives 
available to the decision makers is not fixed, probabilities of outcomes may not be 
known by them. Furthermore, as they may be limited in computational ability, they 
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may resort to other choice strategies rather than maximising a utility function (Simon, 
1982).  
As terrorists operate in groups, McCormick (2003) argues it might be necessary to 
view those as the product of organisational decision-making to understand their 
decisions.  
Whilst terrorists will, similarly to organisations, use heuristics to evaluate options and 
outcomes to make their decisions, they do so to the extreme, taking a black-and-white 
view of the world, otherwise called splitting (Maras, 2012; Post, 1984). This then 
distorts their view of themselves, their enemy, and hence the way they will evaluate 
their options and the resulting outcomes (McCormick, 2003).  
3.3.1.2 Is the Terrorist a Homo Economicus Agent? Modelling 
Considerations 
An important consideration concerns the types of terrorists we face. Caplan (2006) 
classifies them into three categories, Sympathisers, Active terrorists and Suicidal 
terrorists, each type having different characteristics. Knowing which type of terrorists 
we are dealing with can give us an indication to the type of rational behaviour we can 
expect from them. Indeed, Caplan (2006) argues that although terrorists are not 
perfectly rational, if we relax the concept as we discuss below, we can consider them 
rational. In order to analyse terrorists’ rationality, it is useful to look at the three 
standards of a rational decision maker (or homo economicus): Responsiveness to 
incentives, Narrow self-interest, Rational expectations. 
 Responsiveness to incentives 
Terrorists are observed to have a negatively-sloped demand curve, in other words, 
riskier tactics are used only if they are the more effective tactic (Berman and Laitin, 
2005; Hoffman and McCormick, 2004).  
The view that terrorists will make trade-offs between costs, and political benefits is 
supported by empirical evidence. Indeed, their choice of targets, their strategies, and 
tactics are made using careful evaluations of economic costs, risks, time, and likelihood 
of success. They also have seen to be strategic in varying the levels of risk in their 
‘portfolio’ of attacks, and choose an offensive strategy that both minimises resources 
and maximises damage and probability of success (Abrahms, 2004; Cordes et al., 1984; 
Landes, 1978; Mickolus, 1980; Pape, 2003; Rios and Rios Insua, 2012). 
Furthermore, terrorists are versatile in their choices; in other words, they can adapt 
rapidly to changes in the environment. For instance, they have been seen to change 
targets quickly if security had been tightened at an original chosen target (Cordes et 
al., 1984; Mickolus, 1980; Woo, 2006). 
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We can argue that suicide tactics, for instance, can be considered as rational, since 
they are quite cost-effective in terms of aimed casualties and lives claimed. On average, 
a Palestinian suicide strike costs $150, and compared to other strikes worldwide, 
achieves four times as many deaths, to over six times in Israel (and twenty six times 
more victims). Furthermore, these strikes are observed mostly when there are no other 
viable alternatives (Berman and Laitin, 2005; Hoffman and McCormick, 2004).  
 
 
 
 Narrow self-interest 
Another characteristic of a rational decision maker is that he or she is narrowly self-
interested. In other words, a rational decision maker will not engage in actions in 
which they are entirely disinterested. Here the questions relate to the rationality of 
terrorists for engaging in such costly behaviour to gain little or nothing in return. 
With regards to sympathisers, as Caplan (2006) argues, we can safely make the 
assumption of narrow self-interest. On the other hand, in the case of active and 
suicidal terrorists, it may be less straightforward.  
It must be noted that the concept of narrow self-interest has been criticised for its 
validity; indeed, it appears to be an arbitrary limitation. Sen (1977) raises the point 
that commitment, for instance, violates certain concepts of rationality as economists 
see it. In this particular case, the evaluation of the act goes beyond the quality of the 
consequence; rather, a decision maker would judge the value of the act by the rules 
of behaviour or the meaning of the act itself.  
If we relaxed this somewhat rigid assumption of narrow self-interest, we could still 
consider active and suicidal terrorists as rational under this condition. Indeed, 
interviews of failed suicidal terrorists revealed that their reasons for this sacrifice lie 
in the cause they serve, and not because of the benefits their family would have 
received (Merari et al., 2009). This also suggests that in the case of suicidal terrorists, 
the agents value their cause more than their lives, and hence evaluate the 
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Figure 3-1: Relationship between the willingness to participate given 
the risk to a terrorist’ s life - Negatively sloped demand curve 
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consequences of the act according to the cause rather than the consequence to 
themselves.  
 Rational expectations 
Another consideration that we can make about terrorists is whether their expectations 
or beliefs are rational. Economists refer to such expectations when actors make 
assessments which are unbiased, in other words, the assessed values should average 
around the true value of the variable (Sheffrin, 1996). So is this the case for terrorists?   
Their rationality is often questioned because of the beliefs they have. For instance, 
the sacrifice of a suicide bomber would lead him to obtain life in paradise in the 
company of seventy-two virgins. From this view, the length of life on earth, compared 
to that in Paradise is negligible (Oliver & Steinberg 2006).  
Caplan (2006) however, argues we need to look further as this does not suffice to 
justify terrorists’ rationality. What proof do terrorists have that they would gain such 
a thing? One proposition suggested is a model of rational irrationality (Caplan 2000, 
2001), whereby there is an added benefit in holding beliefs that are evidently against 
their benefit. Caplan (2006, p.98) proposes this benefit could be a psychological one, 
such as giving people a “sense of meaning and personal identity”. In this way, if the 
costs of holding the beliefs and these are balanced, we can view this choice as a rational 
estimate of its cost. In other words, “people genuinely embrace irrational beliefs, but 
remain rational enough to adjust their convictions when the cost of irrationality has 
a spike” (Caplan, 2006, p. 101). 
In fact, interviews with failed Palestinian suicidal terrorists enabled to gain some 
psychological insight into what might drive terrorists to sacrifice their lives (Merari 
et al., 2009). In majority, the failed terrorists had two main traits: susceptibility to 
social influence, and people of authority; and sub-clinical suicidal characteristics, some 
of which due to depression of post-traumatic stress syndrome. To some extent, these 
traits can explain their self-destructive act.  
The failed suicidal terrorists were characterised with “a narrow prospective and a 
constricted experience of reality. They have fewer available resources for planning and 
implementing deliberate strategies of coping with decision making, and they are more 
likely to show inept and ineffective ways to cope with ordinary experience of daily 
living” (Merari et al., 2009, p. 94). Furthermore, they are seen to have a dependent 
and avoidant personality style, which distinguishes them from other types of active 
terrorists. Such personalities tend to internalise their anger and other emotions making 
them more prone to becoming martyrs. Their low self-esteem makes them look for 
interpersonal relationships, guidance, and care. In contrast, other types of active 
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terrorists were impulsive and emotionally unstable; a personality style more prone to 
externalise their emotions (Merari et al., 2009). 
In the next subsection, we analyse the modelling implications of relaxing the standards 
of rationality for the different types of terrorists.   
3.3.1.3 Considerations Relating Relaxing the Assumption of 
Rationality  
Whilst we can safely assume Sympathisers behave according to the three standards 
of a rational decision maker, these standards need to be relaxed for the Active and 
Suicidal terrorists. In this section, we provide some considerations and suggestions to 
reflect the standards being relaxed depending on the types of terrorists with which we 
are dealing. 
 Explaining the inconsistencies 
A greater understanding of the dynamics inside terrorist organisations could 
provide some insight into their group dynamics. As discussed earlier, given 
terrorists operate mostly in groups (McCormick, 2003), analysing their decision-
making from the perspective of organisational making could then enhance the 
descriptive validity of models describing their decision-making process.  
 Responsiveness to incentives 
As discussed in the previous section, the three types of terrorists (Sympathisers, 
Active, and Suicidal) are considered to respond to incentives.  
Such behaviour can enable us to guide assessing the probability of a particular 
strike being selected (if using DTs from the defender’s view), or the attractiveness 
of a certain strike based on how risky the environment is in a particular location. 
We can then make the assumption that if in a certain location, a strike 𝑆, has an 
efficiency 𝑒 and a level of risk 𝑟, it will be preferred to a strike 𝑆′, with efficiency 
𝑒′ and a level of risk 𝑟′ if 𝑒 > 𝑒′ and 𝑟 ≤ 𝑟′. 
 Narrow self-interest 
A rational decision maker will not engage in actions in which he/she is entirely 
disinterested. Whilst it is safe to assume that Sympathisers act according to 
narrow self-interest principles, the case of Active and Suicidal terrorists requires 
some adjustments to be made.  
The question in the case of active and suicidal terrorists is what benefit they 
value in their behaviour. Therefore, it may be useful to have an understanding of 
what benefits the adversary might gain from being an active terrorist. These types 
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of terrorists evaluate the consequences of their act according to the cause they 
serve rather than the consequences to themselves. One way to reflect this could 
be by assigning a relatively higher weight on objectives relating to the benefits to 
the cause resulting from the act than the weight assigned to the cost to the 
terrorist’s life. Such objectives are discussed further in subsection 3.3.2.3. 
 Rational expectations 
A distinction has to be made between Active and Suicidal terrorists.  
Active terrorists – agents seeking to externalise their emotions 
Active terrorist may be close to adhering to the standard of rational expectation. 
Therefore, it is also important to revaluate the defenders’ understanding of what 
the adversary believes is worth believing, in other words, what the defenders think 
contributes to the adversary’s utility from engaging in terrorism.  
Indeed, as we saw earlier, even though the agent might choose to have irrational 
beliefs (some that are devoid of evidence, for instance), they would not have them 
if they did not gain some sort of benefits from them. It has been found that active 
terrorists are impulsive, emotionally unstable and are prone to externalise their 
emotions (Merari et al., 2009). Acting out their anger could therefore be a benefit 
that justifies the cost of engaging in terrorism. Should the costs of having these 
beliefs become too high, one might expect them to modify their thoughts on the 
matter. Consequently, this is likely to have an impact on the utility functions as 
well as the probability of a strike being chosen. Therefore, when describing the 
utility of active terrorists, modellers should incorporate the benefit gained from 
externalising their anger.  
Suicidal terrorists – agents seeking attention  
Caplan (2006) does not support suicidal terrorists having rational expectations. 
Even as the cost rises, some suicidal terrorists will choose to carry on and die 
rather than revaluate their beliefs, as observed by the research carried out by 
Merari et al. (2009) who interviewed failed suicidal terrorists (some of whom had 
pressed the trigger, but the devices had failed).  
In order to model adequately suicidal terrorist decision-making, and how to 
evaluate the attractiveness of suicidal terrorism, it may be useful to have an 
understanding of the benefits that suicidal terrorists seek from such an act. In 
their case, the psychological benefits can explain suicidal terrorists’ willingness to 
participate in such a self-destructive act. Their personality type makes them seek 
care and guidance from stronger personality figures. The benefit they seek when 
becoming martyrs or victims is the attention they would get from it. The utilities 
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describing what suicidal terrorists may gain from engaging in terrorism should 
incorporate this element.  
If we, therefore, posit that terrorists can be considered as rational actors who will 
maximise a utility, the question remains as to what utility they are trying to 
maximize. In the next subsection, we look at what added benefit terrorists might 
find in engaging such costly acts, and discuss what type of utility we should 
expect them to be maximising.  
 
In this section, we discuss the validity of the dominant view relating to terrorists 
being politically motivated. Providing some empirical evidence from areas such as 
psychology, terrorism, political violence, political science and, international security, 
we present some suggestions regarding the element to include when modelling the 
utility of a terrorist.  
3.3.2.1 Are Terrorists Political Utility Maximisers?  
As discussed in section 3.3.1.2, the view that terrorists will make trade-offs between 
costs and political benefits, is supported by empirical evidence. Target and strikes are 
carefully chosen to balance costs, risks time and likelihood of success (Cordes et al., 
1984; Landes, 1978; Mickolus, 1980; Pape, 2003; Rios and Rios Insua, 2012). For this 
reason, the dominant view suggests that terrorists are political utility maximisers 
(Keeney and von Winterfeldt, 2009). Formally, terrorism becomes an attractive form 
of protest when the political benefits gained by terrorism outweigh the costs, but this 
does not always seem observed (Abrahms, 2008).  
Could it be then that terrorism was a means to achieve something quite different? If 
some of their actions lead us to doubt their rationality because it goes against their 
political goals, maybe it could be that certain objectives important to terrorism have 
not been considered.  
In addition to the political benefits, Abrahms (2008) also points out other benefits to 
take into account, which are not related to political ones. Indeed, individuals seem to 
want to belong to a terrorist group for the social aspect of it. This can explain why, 
even though beneficial to them politically, terrorists are reluctant to participate in 
peaceful or democratic negotiations.  
Thus, one objective modellers need to take into account is maximising the viability of 
terrorist units. As Abrahms, (2008 p.101) highlights,  
“terrorist organisations behave more as social solidarity maximizers than 
as political maximizers.”  
To our knowledge, most decision models do not consider these.  
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In the next subsection, we analyse the implications of these additional benefits that 
terrorists consider.  
3.3.2.2 Do Modellers Know What Terrorists want? 
One assumption made in decision models relates to the ability for decision-makers to 
clearly identify and formulate a set of relevant objectives they want to achieve and 
against which they will evaluate their alternatives. To some extent, it is reasonable 
to make this assumption in the terrorism context. Terrorists have been seen to choose 
attacks that offer the best compromise between the operational aspects, such as costs 
and feasibility, and the benefits gained out of the strike. Further, the psychological 
study of “Self Martyrs”/“Suicide Bombers” and organisers of suicide attacks done by 
Merari et al. (2009) revealed that the organisers had high coping resources which 
enabled them to plan strategically. However, various terrorism models of preferences, 
do not consider all the objectives terrorists might consider.  
 Avoid over-simplifying models 
In the evaluation homeland security decisions, Keeney & von Winterfeldt (2011) 
focus on two main objectives, minimising the loss of lives and the costs of the 
decisions when evaluating policies. This assumes terrorists would only consider a 
strike based on these two objectives, but is that an adequate representation of 
how terrorists would evaluate objectives? 
A strong assumption in several models, especially in game theoretical ones, is that 
objectives are diametrically opposed, which is not necessarily always the case. 
Each side may have additional objectives that the other side may not consider. 
For instance, Paté-Cornell & Guikema (2002) evaluate various types of strikes 
based on the symbolism of the attack, the amount of destruction done and the 
extent of political destabilisation caused. Even as this helps simplify the model, 
terrorists may consider other objectives, such as causing panic, as we highlighted 
above. 
 Extend the objectives against which strikes are evaluated 
Based on the variety of attacks used by terrorists, we argue that the objectives, 
which are generally used in counter-terrorism models, may not always be 
sufficient. Take the case of the Anthrax attack in 2001, for instance. The strike 
did not cause many casualties relative to other types of attacks (five deaths). On 
the other hand, a widespread panic, nationwide disrupted mail delivery as well 
as costs of $1 billion resulted from the strike (Cordesman, 2005). More recently, 
the shut-down of Boston following the marathon bombing is estimated to cost 
around $1 billion (Plummer, 2013).  
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According to Richardson (2007), Kydd and Walter (2006), the benefits sought by 
terrorism can be grouped into the following categories: 
 Revenge by causing damage in terms of loss of human lives and economic 
losses 
 Renown by the delivery of a symbolic message  
 Reaction such as achieving a regime change, territorial change, policy 
change, social control, or maintaining the status quo 
In the next subsection, we provide some suggested objectives to be included in 
terrorists’ utility functions.  
3.3.2.3 Suggested inclusion of further objectives in terrorists ’ utility 
functions 
Defining and eliciting the objectives that need to be included in the decision models 
can be challenging for several reasons. First, it requires an understanding of what the 
adversary is trying to maximise.  
The effectiveness of a strike can be measured using various attributes, and choosing 
the wrong attribute could lead to the model providing a solution that does not solve 
the problem at hand. To illustrate, we take the case of the Anthrax attack. If the 
effectiveness were measured in terms of lives lost, this strike would be deemed to 
underperform. On the other hand, if the effectiveness were measured in terms of its 
psychological and economical impacts and disruptions, then it would perform higher 
than a suicide attack.  
Abrahms (2008) suggests that additional benefits to that of political ones need to be 
taken into account, which are summarised in Table 3-1. Whilst trying to use tactics 
to gain a political change, terrorists’ strategies will also include an element that will 
ensure their existence is continued and justified. This can mean resisting to participate 
in negotiations, or rejecting them. Some of their goals and means to achieve them can 
be detrimental to their cause, such as remaining competitive through destroying 
competing terrorism groups. When building counter-terrorism analysis models, risk 
analysts need to devote more effort into understanding what the objectives that drive 
the terrorism organisation are. Some research into their goals has been done, but is 
focussing on the political objectives driving terrorists (Keeney and von Winterfeldt, 
2009; Kydd and Walter, 2006; Pape, 2003).  
As highlighted in the previous section, identifying objectives terrorists may consider 
is done using subjective judgement based on intelligence data or expert knowledge. 
This means that errors can arise from misinterpreting this information. Further, 
modellers also make the assumption terrorists may be more sophisticated than they 
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actually are and have the ability to formulate a relevant set of objectives given the 
circumstances.  
 
When evaluating the utility of alternatives and likelihood of outcomes, decision 
makers are subject to two main factors, bounded rationality that may cause violating 
some axioms, and the effect of emotions. As Elster (2000, p.7) highlights,  
“when we act under the influence of passions, they may cause us to deviate 
from plans laid in a cooler moment.”   
In decision models, specifically DTs and GT, assumptions are made concerning the 
utility functions and the probabilities assigned to consequences (Rios and Rios Insua, 
2012). Indeed, given the issues arising from the non-availability of data, modellers rely 
heavily on making highly subjective assessments. These have been argued to represent 
only degrees of beliefs, and hence that the situation/game modelled may not be one 
that reflects reality. The solution suggested by these models may therefore not be an 
answer to the problem a defender is trying to solve (Ezell et al., 2010; Guikema and 
Aven, 2010).  
Two areas of concern arise. One surrounds the extent of the validity of these estimated 
values. The other consideration to be made is whether these values are up to date, 
i.e. have they taken into account any changes in the environment and or the actions 
of the defenders. These could have an impact on the utility functions and probabilities 
of the attacker.  
The following two subsections will provide some theoretical background relating to 
the descriptive elements involved in decision making before providing some 
prescriptive advice as to how these could be incorporated in the third subsection.  
3.3.3.1 Is the Influence of Visceral Factors on Decision Making 
Negligible? 
Can we reasonably assume that terrorists are capable of formulating a set of objectives 
that will enable them to evaluate what the best-performing option is when under the 
influence of emotions? According to Merari et al. (2009), suicide bombers and their 
organisers are especially prone to the influence of emotions.  
When looking at terrorism decision-making, the effect of passions or visceral factors 
might need to be taken into account. Passions or visceral factors are strong emotions 
such as anger, fear, love, cravings. Because of their strength and the state in which 
they put the individual into, they cause a temporary change of behaviour. This 
modified behaviour can be described as irrational; indeed, the individuals seem to act 
against their own interest. Passions, visceral factors and negative emotions have an 
Chapter 3 In the Opponent ’s Shoes:   
On Modell ing Terrorists ’ Judgements for Counter-Terrorism Analysis   
 
 
63 
impact on the way agents evaluate probabilities, their risk attitude and the way they 
view performances of options (Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2007).  
 
Ends Means 
1. Prolong their 
existence 
Using strategies that instead of promoting policy concessions 
from the defender, hardens their willingness to make them 
Lack of success even for prolonged length of time does not 
make the group give up and disband. They create new issues 
to remain relevant when their political aims are no longer 
actual 
2. Ensure their 
continued viability  
Avoiding to peacefully engage in democratic processes 
3. Avoid disbanding 
Often rejecting negotiated settlements even though they offer 
substantial policy concessions 
4. Guarantee their 
survival  
Adopting unstable political goals that can never be fully 
fulfilled 
5. Avert organisation-
threatening reprisals  
Conducting anonymous attacks, even though they preclude 
the possibility of coercing policy concessions 
6. Remain competitive  Eradicate competitive terrorist organisation with identical 
ideologies that compete for members, regardless of the 
adverse effect it might have on their political cause 
Table 3-1 Terrorists’ additional means-ends objectives (Adapted from Abrahms 2008, p.102) 
 
The effects of passions and visceral factors can be categorised into four main streams. 
Because cognition is temporarily distorted, decision makers’ evaluation of an 
outcome’s probability or the outcome itself is altered. Furthermore, they may become 
blind to certain consequences, and look only at consequences made salient by the 
passions. Decision makers’ will is altered and weakened such that, options which 
outcome is worse than others are chosen. These effects also have implications towards 
the way modellers evaluate how decision makers discount time. Indeed, if the 
deliberative system evaluates equally long and short-term consequences, the affective 
system will put a much greater emphasis on short-term outcomes (Loewenstein and 
O’Donoghue, 2007). Passions and visceral factors influence an agent to behave 
extremely myopically, and to seek the immediate rewards, disregarding any 
detrimental effects, such as the effects observed in addiction. In the context of 
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terrorism, this phenomenon is especially observed in the case of suicide bombers or 
self-martyrs (Merari et al., 2009). 
Specifically, it has been shown that negative affective states may influence decision-
making in various ways, including altering the agent’s decision process, or shaping the 
agent’s motives. It has been suggested that distinct states may lead to different 
influences (Isen and Geva, 1987; Isen and Patrick, 1983; Lerner and Keltner, 2001, 
2000; Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003; Wright and Bower, 1992). For instance, research 
on the impact of sexual arousal and decision-making has demonstrated the importance 
of situational forces on preferences and which way these swerve depending on the 
emotional state (Ariely and Loewenstein, 2006; Loewenstein et al., 1997). Similarly, 
research suggests that certain emotional states, such as sadness or fear induce biases 
favouring different types of attributes. Whereas anxious individuals would favour low-
risk/low-reward options, sad individuals are biased in favour of high-risk/high-reward 
options (Raghunathan and Pham, 1999).  
3.3.3.2 Time Frames of Decisions – Do Preferences Remain Static 
Over Time? 
Modellers need to consider the temporal dimension of decisions and its effects on 
preferences. For instance, the design of most decision analytical models, such as that 
of Rosoff & John (2009), is mostly valid at the time it was built. Indeed, the values, 
preferences, and utilities modelled are considered static; they do not account for 
potential changes in objectives, or fluctuations in beliefs over time. These changes can 
occur for various reasons, such as changes in the environment or changes in terrorist 
leaders.  
Terrorists’ motivations include a reaction to an event. Therefore, understanding what 
the objectives terrorists might wish to maximise at a given moment requires the 
understanding of the state of the environment, and the recent actions from the 
defender. Modelling causal relationships we believe can help in providing an insight 
on the prioritisation of objectives. Certain modelling tools, such as System Dynamics 
provide the platform to evolve with time, or gain an insight on the directions towards 
which distinct variables might be moving. However, GT or DTs need to be updated 
accordingly, and can be done using Bayesian Updating (Paté-Cornell and Guikema, 
2002).  
The uncertainties that terrorists face and which are most often modelled are the 
probabilities of acquiring the material required to perform the strike. Subsequently, 
the likelihood of success of a strike needs to be determined. Questions arise as to 
whether terrorists are able to estimate accurately the probability of being detected 
and their strike being prevented, as well as on the other hand, look at the degree to 
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which their strike might be successful. This requires modellers to make further 
assumptions as to the extent of their knowledge regarding the defensive capabilities 
of the defenders. However, assuming this was the case, do they have the ability to 
estimate the required probabilities involved in complex attacks?  
Furthermore, as visceral factors have a strong impact on the assessment of the 
performance of alternatives, risk attitudes and the assessments of probabilities are 
also altered. Empirical research, in fact, shows that emotions have a non-negligible 
impact on the judgement of risk (Isen and Geva, 1987; Isen and Patrick, 1983; Lerner 
and Keltner, 2001, 2000; Loewenstein et al., 2001). Fear in particular influenced risk 
assessments by inflating them, whereas anger did the opposite. Additionally, fear 
induces risk-averse choices, whereas the opposite is observed with anger (Lerner and 
Keltner, 2001, 2000; Wright and Bower, 1992).  
3.3.3.3  Suggested Considerations when Modelling Terrorist 
Evaluation of Alternatives and Uncertainties 
Once objectives have been determined, there are still some challenging issues to bear 
in mind. DT and GT models require an assessment of how alternatives would be 
scored by the adversary. Does the adversary have the ability to formulate the problem 
and compute the best outcome? This is arguable, given the circumstances in which 
the decision makers might be.  
We believe considering the impact that emotions and visceral factors have on the 
assessment of options can provide support and guidance to interpret the data and 
estimate how terrorists might score options. Considerations we suggest are classified 
into four main categories: 
1. Myopic Decision Makers 
Given the visceral factors terrorists might be experiencing, empirical research supports 
they would have the tendency to prioritise short-term objectives rather than long-
term ones. In this case, the objective function should consider this to provide a more 
descriptively accurate picture. Consequently, models could heavily discount time, so 
for instance, in an MAUT model, a much heavier weight should be allocated to the 
short-term objectives that one would expect to assign in circumstances where the 
agents would not be subject to strong emotions.  
2. Altered View of Objectives   
The emotional impact will cause certain objectives to be more important in terrorists’ 
mind, and might result in several other objectives being omitted from the objective 
function. The objectives made more salient due to visceral factors are not always 
rational, in other words, the consequences arising from fulfilling these objectives can 
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be detrimental to the agent – as observed in the case of road rage (Loewenstein, 2000, 
1996). Allocating more weight – if not all in some extreme cases – to some of the 
objectives less geared towards achieving their political gain and more towards the 
‘social aspect’ of the terrorist organisation may capture this behaviour. These 
objectives are summarised in Table 3-1.  
3. Utility Functions/Risk Attitude   
As discussed earlier, emotions can have a non-negligible impact on decision makers. 
Empirical research shows how certain negative emotions have an impact on risk 
attitudes (Raghunathan and Pham, 1999). Fearful agents’ choices appear more risk-
averse, whereas anger leads to the opposite behaviour (Lerner and Keltner, 2001; 
Lerner and Tiedens, 2006).  
Taking into account these varying risk attitudes in MAUT models can be done by 
adjusting the shape of the utility functions of the agents within the MAUT models. 
Indeed, different risk attitudes could have an impact on the ranking of options. 
The level of emotion experienced by the terrorists will need to be represented by the 
steepness of the utility function; the stronger the emotion experienced, the steeper the 
utility function will be. Furthermore, the shape of the utility function will depend on 
the type of emotion experienced. A terrorist experiencing fear will have a concave 
utility function (risk aversion); in contrast, a terrorist experiencing anger will have a 
convex utility function (risk proneness).   
4. Biased Assessment of Uncertainties 
When incorporating probabilistic assessment from the point of view of the terrorists, 
it is important to bear in mind that decision makers are often prone to biased 
assessments. This can arise from various factors, including overconfidence, 
representativeness, etc. (Bazerman, 2005). Therefore, assuming that the adversary is 
a well-calibrated and unbiased decision maker may not be realistic. As highlighted 
earlier, visceral factors can worsen the effects further, thus the performance of 
alternatives, and risk assessments is bound to be altered.  
Hence, when assessing the performance of certain strikes and their likelihood of success 
from the view of the terrorists, their state of mind should be considered when building 
the model. In particular, we suggest that the inferred judgements made by terrorists 
be adjusted as follows to reflect the impact of visceral factors. 
Terrorists under the influence of fear (suicidal terrorists, for example) will tend to be 
more pessimistic (Lerner and Keltner, 2001, 2000), hence, the probabilities of success 
of a strike, and the probabilities of the risk they encounter should be scored lower and 
higher respectively. On the other hand, terrorists under the influence of anger 
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(sympathisers or active terrorists) will tend to be more optimistic (Lerner and Keltner, 
2001, 2000), thus, the probabilities of success of a strike, or the probabilities of the 
risk they encounter should be scored higher and lower accordingly. Incorporating the 
biased views of terrorists based on their emotions (fear or anger) could add to the 
descriptive validity of the models. 
In Table 3-2, we summarise the key areas of concern and our suggested considerations 
when building terrorism models.  
Area of 
Concern 
Key Modelling Considerations 
Responding to 
Incentives 
Actions taken by the defender can have an impact on the actions the 
attacker will take. Sympathisers, active and suicidal terrorists all respond 
to incentives. This means that if measures are taken to strengthen the 
security against one type of strike (hence increasing the risk of terrorists 
being caught, the attractiveness of this strike will diminish. As a result, 
other strikes will be perceived as more attractive.  
This causal variation in the attractiveness of strikes caused by the effect 
of the defender might be captured by updating the partial utilities of the 
relevant strikes.  
Terrorists and 
Narrow 
Selfishness 
A rational decision maker will not engage in actions in which they are 
disinterested. The question in the case of active and suicidal terrorists is 
what benefit they value in their behaviour Such terrorists evaluate the 
consequences of their act according to the cause they serve rather than the 
consequences to themselves. 
One way to reflect this could be by assigning a relatively higher weight on 
objectives relating to the benefits to the cause resulting from the act than 
the weight assigned to the cost to the terrorist’s life. See examples of 
benefits described in Table 3-1.  
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Area of 
Concern 
Key Modelling Considerations 
Terrorists and 
Rational 
Expectations 
This area concerns whether terrorists’ expectations or beliefs are rational.  
Active terrorists behave as social solidarity maximisers, rather than 
political maximisers and seek to prolong the viability of the units for the 
social benefits it provides. In DTs (from the perspective of the terrorists), 
GT or ARA models representing decisions of Active terrorists may: 
 Include the social benefits involved with terrorism (for instance, 
those described in Table 3-1)  
 Include the psychological benefit of violence, these are means to 
act out their emotions (anger) 
Suicidal terrorists’ behaviour can be considered rational if the utility 
gained from being a martyr in terms of care and attention received in 
included. In DTs (from the perspective of the terrorists), GT or ARA 
models representing decisions of Suicidal terrorists may:  
 Include the utility gained from taking the status of martyr or 
victim. These are means to gain attention.  
Time 
discounting 
Terrorists can be considered as myopic decision makers, modellers may: 
 Assign greater relative weight to short-term objectives to reflect 
these are prioritised over long-term ones 
 Omit, in certain extreme cases, long-term objectives, such as 
gaining political concessions 
Altered view of 
Objectives 
Visceral factors cloud judgement; certain objectives, even self-destructive 
ones are prioritised.  
Analysts may thus: assign a greater relative weight to objectives 
contributing to prolong the existence of the terrorist organisation. 
Utility 
functions: Risk 
attitudes 
Visceral factors affect risk attitudes in the following way: 
 Fear renders agents to be risk-averse, hence when dealing with 
terrorists prone to fear (for instance, suicidal terrorists), their 
utility function should have a steeper concave shape. 
 Anger renders agents to be risk-seeking, hence, when dealing 
with terrorists prone to anger (for instance, active terrorists and 
terrorist leaders), their utility function should have a steeper 
convex shape. 
Chapter 3 In the Opponent ’s Shoes:   
On Modell ing Terrorists ’ Judgements for Counter-Terrorism Analysis   
 
 
69 
Area of 
Concern 
Key Modelling Considerations 
Biased 
Assessment of 
Uncertainties 
Visceral factors affect risk assessments in the following way: 
 Fear makes agents more pessimistic and hence lowers their 
perception of being in control or successful, thus when dealing 
with terrorists prone to fear (for instance, suicidal terrorists), 
analysts may use a lower perceived probability of success. 
 Anger makes agents more optimistic, they have a higher 
perception of being in control, hence when dealing with terrorists 
prone to anger (for instance, active terrorists and terrorist 
leaders), and analysts may use a higher perceived probability of 
success. 
Table 3-2 Summary of Modelling Considerations 
 
This article has reviewed some of the modelling approaches based on Expected Utility 
Theory and Multi-Attribute Utility Theory for analysis of terrorism risk and 
highlighted their main assumptions and limitations. The aim of these types of models 
has been developed in an attempt to infer preferences of agents.  
Whilst these tools can provide interesting insight into how decisions might be made, 
or how a game may be played, the insights gained from these analyses seem geared 
towards a normative view. We argue it is essential to understand the descriptive 
elements, which may affect this decision maker and examine if these assumptions 
might be violated, and if so, how they are violated. 
One main consideration is the nature of the threat. Terrorism, unlike engineered 
systems and natural hazards, is caused by human intent. Contrary to the latter ones, 
the cause of the threat is an adversary who is going to consider the actions of the 
defender before acting. This therefore requires some adjustments to be made to how 
the risk is assessed.  
Indeed, the adversary is going to modify their behaviour given their knowledge of 
what the defender is planning. Therefore, a strong understanding of what their 
rational behaviour consists of is required to provide some insight into how they might 
adapt to the situation. Evidence shows terrorists are not likely to take risks if they 
can avoid them. Thus, an increase in costs associated to their lives may lead most of 
them (Sympathisers and Active Terrorists, in contrast to Suicidal Terrorists) to 
review their beliefs and adjust them as explained by the concepts of responsiveness to 
incentives, narrow self-interest and rational expectations.  
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Further, we argue that several psychological factors need to be taken into 
considerations. One of them is the effects of visceral factors on decision-making. These 
effects are shown empirically to be non-negligible. Preferences appear temporarily 
altered under the influence of strong emotions. This can lead to risk attitudes being 
modified, goals being restructured, priorities changed, and risk assessments being 
altered. For instance, certain objectives, not always leading to positive consequences, 
are made more salient for a certain period and emotions such as fear and anger lead 
to pessimistic and optimistic risk assessments respectively. Not considering these 
effects when modelling judgements of terrorists using Probabilistic Risk Analysis 
methods can render their solutions even more biased.  
Incorporating such insight into the modelling process of Probabilistic Risk Analysis, 
Game Theory, and Adversarial Risk Analysis methods may help increase the validity 
of the models from a descriptive point of view. Hence this may help with the 
management of risk caused by terrorism. To do so, further research into the impact 
of psychological factors (in particular, particular visceral factors) can help. It would 
be interesting to see empirical evidence showing if and how priorities are changed 
through the influence of visceral factors, and if agents would increase the prioritisation 
of objectives that are counterproductive to their goals.  
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Appendix 3.A Axioms of Rationality 
 
The four axioms of rationality are as follows (French, 1986; North, 1968).  
𝐿𝑒𝑡 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶 𝑏𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑎 𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦. 
 Axiom 1 Transitivity: The decision maker’s preferences between prizes or 
lotteries can be established in an unambiguous manner.    
𝑖𝑓 𝐴 ≳ 𝐵, 𝐵 ≳ 𝐶 ⟹ 𝐴 ≳ 𝐶 
 
 Axiom 2 Continuity: There exists a lottery between the worst and best 
outcome, which the decision maker is indifferent between that lottery and a 
mid-point consequence 𝐶. 
𝑖𝑓 𝐴 > 𝐶 > 𝐵, ∃ 𝑝, 0 < 𝑝 < 1 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝐶 ∼ (𝑝, 𝐴; 1 −  𝑝, 𝐵) i.e. the decision 
maker is indifferent between receiving 𝐶 or the lottery (𝑝, 𝐴; 1 −  𝑝, 𝐵) as a prize. 
 
 Axiom 3 Reduction of compound lotteries: a decision maker is indifferent 
between a multi-stage lottery and a single stage lottery. 
(𝑝, 𝐴 ; 1 −  𝑝, (𝑝′, 𝐵; 1 −  𝑝′, 𝐶)) ∼ (𝑝, 𝐴 ; 𝑝′ −  𝑝𝑝′, 𝐵; 1 −  𝑝 −  𝑝′ +  𝑝𝑝′, 𝐶) 
 
 Axiom 4 Independence of irrelevant alternatives: The preferences between two 
prizes A and B holds independently of a third prize.   
𝑖𝑓 𝐴 > 𝐵 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 ∀ 𝐶 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝 ∈ (0,1], 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 (𝑝, 𝐴;  1 − 𝑝, 𝐶) > (𝑝, 𝐵;  1 −  𝑝, 𝐶) 
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Appendix 3.B Axioms for Expected Utility  
 
The expected utility of an alternative is described as follows (Keeney and Raiffa, 
1993).  
Let the set of attributes 𝑋 be defined as {𝑋1, … , 𝑋𝑛} where 𝑋𝑖 may either be a vector 
or scalar attribute. Let the consequences be designated by 𝑥 ≡ (𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛), where 𝑥𝑖 
represents a specific amount of 𝑋𝑖 for 𝑖 = 1, … 𝑛. Assuming the set of assumptions 
outlined in Appendix 3.A, let the utility function 𝑢 be designated by 𝑢(𝑥) or 
𝑢(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) of the form: 
 
𝑢(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) = 𝑓[𝑢1(𝑥1), … , 𝑢𝑛(𝑥𝑛)]  
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑓 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑢𝑖  𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑋𝑖 
 
Finally, let 𝑝𝑗 ∈ 𝒫 represent the probability of a state within the set of possible states, 
for 𝑗 = 1, … 𝑚.  
In the case of discrete variables, the expected utility is defined as: 
Ε[𝑢(𝑥)] = ∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑢(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛)
𝑚
1
= ∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑓[𝑢1(𝑜1), … , 𝑢𝑗(𝑜𝑗),
𝑚
1
𝑘1, … , 𝑘𝑚] (10) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑗  𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑗, 𝑢𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑋𝑖 ,   𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑓 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟
− 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
 
Similarly, in the case of continuous variables, the expected utility of an alternative 
resulting from a random outcome ?̅? is then defined by the following equation: 
 
Ε[𝑢(?̅?)] = ∫ 𝑢(𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
+∞
−∞
  (11) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝑥 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓(𝑥)  
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In MAUT, we can distinguish two main cases. One is mono-objective case, 𝑖 = 1 and 
is straightforward to model. In contrast, when 𝑖 > 1, further conditions need to be met 
for a multi-attribute utility function (Keeney and Raiffa, 1993). We distinguish two 
cases, the additive, and the multiplicative utility functions.  
Assuming preference independence (i.e. that the preference over one attribute does 
not depend on the level of the other attributes), and utility independence (i.e. that 
two attributes 𝑥 and 𝑥′are independent when conditional preferences for lotteries on 
x given 𝑥’ do not depend on the particular level of 𝑥’), we can use an additive utility 
function. In this case, the expected utility is represented as follows: 
   
Ε[𝑢(𝑥)] = ∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑢(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛)
𝑚
1
= ∑ 𝑝𝑗 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑢𝑖(𝑥𝑖)
𝑛
1
𝑚
1
 (12) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑗  𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑗, 𝑢𝑖  𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑋𝑖  ,
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
 
On the other hand, in cases where preference and utility independence conditions are 
not met, a multiplicative model needs to be used, where the utility function is:  
 
1 + 𝑤𝑢(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) =∏[1 + 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑢𝑖(𝑜𝑖)], 𝑤 ≠ 0 
𝑚
1
 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑗  𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑗, 𝑢𝑖  𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑋𝑖 ,
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑖  𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠  
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Prelude to Chapter 4  
Rational Self-Destruction –  
The effect of Anger on the Prioritisation of Self-
Destructive Objectives 
In Paper I, after having explored the types of assumptions made across various models 
that represent malicious agents’ judgements, we discussed their suitability from a 
descriptive point of view. We discussed how the effect of visceral factors can have 
significant effects on judgement and decision-making. Anger is highlighted as one of 
the factors that can have a non-negligible impact on terrorist decision-making, and 
specifically, on the prioritisation of their objectives. From the literature, anger is likely 
to be a key underlying emotion that drives the strategy of terrorists – this can arise 
from offensive actions from the west. Fear is also an emotion that can be relevant in 
the context of terrorism, but this emotion is likely to be felt before the execution of a 
strike. In this research, we are interested in understanding the selection of a strike, 
where anger more than fear would play a role.   
These findings were based on behavioural secondary research, and more evidence 
seems needed to put them in context with terrorist decision-making. To this end, 
Paper II undertakes the analysis of visceral factors (anger and fear, in particular) on 
the prioritisation of objectives. An empirical study is carried out to evaluate the 
impact the effect of these emotions on the prioritisation of objectives, some of which 
were self-destructive in the long term. We also analyse the impact of such emotions 
on the preferences of self-destructive actions, and discuss the implications of the 
findings in the context of modelling preferences, specifically those of terrorists.   
The study, which aims to build on the current research relating to the impact of 
visceral factors on decision-making, used scenarios to elicit the desired emotions. These 
scenarios were written such that participants could relate to them, and which 
replicated, as close as possible, the types of emotions perceived by people supporting, 
or part of a terrorist group.  
Using a between-subject design, each participant was assigned to a treatment 
randomly. They were asked to prioritise three objectives in relation to the scenario. 
Subsequently, the participants were asked to rate a number of actions describing a 
range of behaviours.  
As predicted, the study found that anger had an impact on the prioritisation of 
revenge and success. In addition, a number of actions were perceived more (and less) 
attractive if they were self-destructive (and productive respectively). We discuss the 
implication of such findings on models of terrorism decision making. 
                                               
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Rational Self-Destruction –  
The Effect of Anger on the Prioritisation of Self-
Destructive Objectives 
Sumitra Sri Bhashyam s.sribhashyam@lse.ac.uk   
Department of Management, London School of Economics and Political Science,  
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK 
 
ABSTRACT 
An experimental study was used to examine the impact of certain visceral factors on 
the prioritisation of long-term self-destructive (Revenge) versus long-term productive 
(Reputation and Success) objectives and the preferences for long-term self-destructive 
versus long-term productive actions. We hypothesised that participants who were in 
a state of anger and fear would assign a greater priority to self-destructive objectives, 
and would find certain self-destructive actions more attractive than productive actions 
(in the long term). To test these hypotheses, we assigned participants randomly to 
three conditions (Anger, Fear, and Neutral). They were then asked to rank, and 
priorities to the objectives in the form of swing-weights, conforming to the multi-
attribute value analysis framework. Subsequently, they were made to score the 
attractiveness of a number of actions in five different categories. Self-reported anger 
was found to have an impact on the prioritisation of revenge and success, given the 
hypothetical scenario, and as predicted, a number of actions were perceived more (and 
less) attractive if they were self-destructive (and productive respectively). Such results 
have theoretical impacts in the context of models representing terrorism decision 
making. Indeed, current models are based on the assumption of rational choice, and 
do not take the impact of visceral factors into account. These implications are 
discussed.  
Key-words: Rationality, value models, decision making, behaviour decision making, 
visceral factors, anger, fear, preferences, dynamic priorities 
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« Ce n’ est jamais à  cause d’ un é tat d’ esprit qui n’ est pas destiné  à  durer  
Que l’ on prend des ré solutions dé finitives. » 
Marcel Proust –  A la recherche du temps perdu. A l’ ombre des jeunes filles en 
fleurs  
(Proust, 1927, p. 142) 
 
"It is always thus, impelled by a state of mind which is destined not to last,  
That we make our irrevocable decisions."  
Marcel Proust –  Remembrance of Things Past: Within a Budding Grove 
 
 
f, as Becker and Murphy (1988) define them, “rational consumers maximise 
utility from stable preferences as they try to anticipate the future consequences 
of their choices”, then, similarly to addictions, choosing self-destructive 
behaviours must be the antithesis of rational behaviour. Agents’ preferences can 
vary widely depending on a variety of factors and in some cases, seem to follow 
irrational and unpredictable patterns. Road-rage, addiction to tobacco, alcohol, 
procrastination, and engaging in acts of extremism are examples of actions going 
against an agent’s long-term interest. Could it be that certain factors have an 
important effect on judgement and decision making whereby the agents’ observed 
preferences do not seem to lead them towards achieving the long term objectives these 
agents have? 
Economists have argued that addictions could be explained by theories of rationality 
(Becker and Murphy, 1988; Iannaccone, 1986; Stigler and Becker, 1977), but 
behavioural economists have also suggested visceral factors could account for these 
self-destructive behaviours (Loewenstein, 2000, 1996). Such factors have a non-
negligible effect on preferences. They act as a motivational force, which can influence 
people’s behaviour by altering their needs or desires. Given that these factors are 
driven biologically, preferences are susceptible to be strongly impacted by such factors. 
Indeed, Loewenstein & Angner (2003) explain that tastes are partly determined by 
biological processes, which regulate the human body. These processes are there to 
ensure homeostasis (a physiological reactions aimed at regulating and stabilising the 
body in response to fluctuations caused by the external environment) is maintained. 
Following some sort of discomfort, transient changes in preferences are induced 
specifically in order to reinstate balance. As their influence is highly systematic, they 
are relatively predictable (Elster, 1998; Frederick et al., 2002; Loewenstein and 
Angner, 2003; Loewenstein, 2000, 1996; Rolls, 2000). 
I 
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Empirical research has found that certain types of affective states (such as anger, 
happiness, fear) influence decision-making in opposite ways, including altering the 
agent’s decision process, or shaping the agent’s motives. Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that different kinds emotions, even though within the same valence, may 
lead to distinct influences (Ariely and Loewenstein, 2006; Bodenhausen et al., 1994; 
Isen and Geva, 1987; Lerner and Tiedens, 2006; Lerner et al., 1998; Loewenstein, 2000, 
1996; Wright and Bower, 1992).  
Agents involved in acts of violence, criminal behaviour and more particularly, acts 
taking the form of terrorism are expected to be driven by high level of visceral factors, 
in particular, anger and possibly, fear. Given emotions act as systems of rewards and 
punishments, motivating us towards achieving certain goals (Rolls, 2000), we would 
expect their choices to be inevitably shaped differently than by agents having more 
neutral emotions. Therefore, further insight into how agents prioritise their goals and 
how the attractiveness of specific actions is dependent on visceral factors could be 
helpful to better understand their actions and model their decisions. 
Whereas the role and influence of affect on judgement and behaviours has been widely 
researched in social psychology, neuroscience and decision science, there has been little 
research on formalising this influence into traditional decision models (Loewenstein 
and O’ Donoghue, 2007; Loewenstein, 2000). However, a new trend in models for 
counter-terrorism analysis has been to model decisions of terrorists from their 
perspective using decision analytical methods. This therefore calls for an 
understanding of how such methods can capture the impact of visceral factors.  
Following the Appraisal-Tendency Framework, the experiment conducted as part of 
this study was designed to test if a state of anger – a key emotion in the context of 
terrorism – and fear had an impact on the prioritisation of long-term self-destructive 
versus long-term productive objectives (Revenge versus Reputation and Success 
respectively). Furthermore, we tested the attractiveness of long-term self-destructive 
versus long-term productive actions (the attractiveness of a range of actions to succeed 
in the bid, their preference for a range of aggressive behaviours, their willingness to 
engage in contentious behaviour as a response to an injustice, their endorsement of 
third parties engaging in contentious behaviours, their willingness to compromise 
productivity/image to respond to a conflict). 
In addition to bringing some insight in the context of counter-terrorism modelling, 
this study could have some potential contributions of a descriptive nature. Anger has 
received substantial attention in the fields of behavioural decision-making and 
cognition. Lerner and Tiedens (2006) highlight that in the United States, anger is one 
of the most commonly experienced emotions. It also rarely goes unnoticed by neither 
those subject to it or those perceiving it. Finally, anger is an emotion that has the 
potential to carry over to unrelated judgments and decisions. Thus, this study could 
contribute to adding some insight to current findings relating to how anger affects 
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depth of processing of information under the influence of anger – in particular by 
analysing how anger affects the prioritisation objectives, some of which with long-
term negative impacts on the decision maker. 
This paper first provides an overview of the characteristics of terrorists as a decision 
maker. We then discuss the relevance of the effect of visceral factors, and anger in 
particular, in the analysis of terrorist decision-making. Subsequently, we describe the 
study carried out, and its results. Finally, we discuss the implication of the results in 
modelling terrorist decision making for counter-terrorism analysis and outline the 
limitations of our study.  
 
Terrorism rationality is supported by empirical evidence, indeed, according to 
numerous psychological studies, terrorists are not insane (Richardson, 2007);  
“[Terrorists] rationally and carefully calibrate their tactics to exploit their 
enemy’s weaknesses and ensure maximum effect” (Richardson, 2007, p. 
32).  
In particular, Mickolus (1980) observed terrorists rank the performance of their tactics 
according to economic costs, risks, time, and likelihood of confrontation with 
authorities. Their choice of attack strategy has been seen to be based on a hedging 
strategy, with portfolio of strikes which varying levels of risks (Sandler and Scott, 
1987).  
In addition, terrorists adapt very quickly to changes in the environment, such as 
governmental interventions (Cordes et al., 1984; Landes, 1978; Mickolus, 1980). When 
protection levels are heightened, terrorists have been seen to engage in target 
substitution strategies, whereby they have selected a softer target, achieving similar 
levels of impact at lesser costs and risks (Woo 2002; 2003; 2004; 2006). Woo (2006, 
p.1) states: 
“Terrorists have to be intelligent in order to make an impact in 
asymmetric warfare.”  
According to Richardson (2007), operational aspects aside, terrorists have three main 
objectives which they use to choose and evaluate their alternatives; the ‘ 3R’ s’ : 
 Revenge: Terrorists want to achieve revenge for the wrongs that have been 
done to them. For instance, they want to kill as many people, if not more, as 
their enemies have killed.  
 Renown: Terrorists want renown. They want to be recognised as being 
powerful, and they want to be remembered for what they have achieved. “The 
larger the number of casualties, the more innovative the tactic, the greater the 
symbolic significance of the target, the more heinous the crime, the more 
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publicity accrues to the perpetrators.”(Richardson, 2007, p. 121). “The more 
I’m talked about the more dangerous I appear. That’s all the better for me” 
(The Jackal, cited in Richardson 2007, p.122). 
 Reaction: From their attacks, terrorists expect some reactions from their 
opponent. In the case of Al Qaeda, they want “to remove the external influence 
and return to the rule of traditional Islamic law, called Sharia” (Richardson, 
2007, p. 83). 
 
 
Figure 4-1: Terrorists’ Value Tree 
 
The profile that has been drawn by terrorists can be seen as rational agents with 
objectives they try to optimise (as illustrated by the value tree showed in Figure 4-1). 
However, despite the evidences stated above, there have been several cases of 
inconsistencies in terrorist decision making which has led researchers to question 
terrorists’ rationality. Sri Bhashyam and Montibeller (2013) argue that this 
assessment could be due to some of the assumptions made in terrorism modelling 
being too rigid. Among other things, they have highlighted that the impact of visceral 
factors, might need to be taken into account when looking at the prioritisation of 
objectives. Incorporating these impacts into the process of counter-terrorism analysis 
models such as Game Theory, and Adversarial Risk Analysis methods may help 
increase the validity of the models from a descriptive point of view. In turn, this may 
help with the analysis of the risks caused by terrorism and provide some insight to 
support decisions towards counter-terrorism measures. Indeed, if modellers could have 
a better understanding of what motivates malicious agents, then they would be in a 
better position to anticipate unrest they cause. In the next section, we describe the 
experiment carried out.  
 
Ideal 
Attack
3Rs
Revenge Renown Reaction
Operation
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Preference construction or formation is not a new area of research. It has received 
interdisciplinary interest, from economics to philosophy, anthropology, and especially 
psychology. The complexity of the phenomenon, however, means that the progress 
has been slow (Loewenstein et al., 2003).  
Two schools of thoughts exist on the topic of preference change. One school of thought 
argues that tastes and preferences are stable over time and do not vary significantly 
between individuals. According to this school of thought, whilst final preferences may 
change over time (a terrorist’s preferred type of strike, for instance), they treat the 
underlying preferences as constant (the impact a terrorist aims to achieve by using a 
certain type of strike) (Stigler and Becker, 1977).  
Simon (1981), on the other hand, argues that as new experiences produce new tastes, 
hence considering utility functions as fixed entities is unrealistic. Instead, he proposes 
to regard those as evolving structures that describe the changes in tastes using a 
‘production function’ . The production function is defined by the utility gained from 
the new/accumulated experiences. Decision makers have also been seen to alter their 
priorities (weights on objectives) depending on the situations with which they were 
faced, using fewer objectives the more turbulent the situations were (Kornbluth, 
1992).   
One significant element triggering preference change is the influence emotion has on 
judgement and decision-making, which has been of interest to behavioural researchers. 
The Appraisal-Tendency Framework (ATF) was proposed to evaluate how specific 
emotions affect judgement and decision making (Lerner and Keltner, 2001, 2000; 
Lerner and Tiedens, 2006). According to this framework, emotions are thought to 
have cognitive and motivational properties, which are evident at both a biological and 
behavioural level. Appraisal-tendencies are defined as  
“goal-directed processes through which emotions exert effects on 
judgement and choice until the emotion-eliciting problem is resolved” 
(Lerner and Keltner, 2000, p. 477).  
Anger, in particular, has been found to trigger the need to change the situation, as 
well as acting against the person or hurdle through various means, such as fighting, 
and hurting that object (Frijda et al., 1989). By doing so, the agent’s aim is to restore 
the situation as it used to be prior to having been angered (Lerner and Keltner, 2001). 
In the process, visceral factors, including anger, influence the cognitive processes by 
focussing judgement and thoughts on the event which triggered the visceral factors 
(Johnson-Laird and Oatley, 1992; Lazarus, 1991; Schwarz, 1990; Simon, 1967). 
The effect of visceral factors and the effect of anger and fear in particular, on 
preferences are of concern in the context of terrorism. Through interviews of terrorists, 
Merari et al. (2009) found suicide bombers and their organisers to be particularly 
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prone to the influence of emotions. From the literature, anger is likely to be a key 
underlying emotion that drives the strategy of terrorists – this can arise from offensive 
actions from the west. Fear is also an emotion that can be relevant in the context of 
terrorism, but this emotion is likely to occur much later in the decision process, and 
after the decision has been taken to adopt a certain strike as a strategy. In this 
research, we are interested in understanding the selection of a strike, where anger 
more than fear would play a role. 
In situations where agents are motivated to commit acts of terror, emotions are 
fundamental elements that need to be taken into account. As Loewenstein states,  
“to predict or make sense of viscerally driven behavior, it is necessary to 
incorporate visceral factors into models of economic behavior” (2000, 
p.431).  
When considering the effects of visceral factors on decision-making, research shows 
that particular emotions, distinct by not only their valence but also their certainty 
dimension can have implications for cognitive processing. Hence, as anger is considered 
to belong to the type of emotions related with a sense of certainty, while fear tend to 
be linked with a sense of uncertainty, these emotions can have different effects 
(Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Smith and Ellsworth, 1985). In the context of 
terrorism decision making, the types of influence anger and fear can have that are of 
particular interest can be classified in the following way: belief and attitude formation 
and depth of processing. 
Belief and attitude formation. Visceral factors affect belief and attitude formation. 
Indeed, research has found that emotions have certain impacts on the estimation of 
probabilities and agent’s attitudes towards risk (Isen and Geva, 1987; Isen and 
Patrick, 1983; Lerner and Keltner, 2001). In particular, and of relevance in the 
terrorism context, anger and fear have opposite effects on these estimations. Whilst 
anger tends to render agents overconfident (hence their perceived belief of succeeding 
is inflated from what it would be otherwise), fear tends to make them under confident. 
A similar pattern has been observed on risk attitudes. On the one hand, fearful agents 
tend to make risk-averse choices, on the other, angry agents were observed to make 
risk-seeking choices (Lerner and Keltner, 2001, 2000; Lerner and Tiedens, 2006).  
Depth of processing. The depth and quality of information processing are also affected 
by the influence of visceral factors, with positive affect generally favouring better 
quality decision making (Isen and Means, 1983; Isen, 2001; Lerner and Tiedens, 2006). 
However, emotional valence may not be enough to analyse the effect of visceral factors 
on decision-making. Indeed, anger and fear, even though emotions from the same 
valence, have opposite effects on decision-making. Research on the effect of anger has 
shown that information processing is relatively automatic and superficial, and based 
on knowledge readily available. Furthermore, angry people have been found to be 
prone to impulsivity, and make ill-advised decisions. In particular, anger has been 
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found to trigger heuristic processing, decrease the attention given to the quality of 
arguments, induce stereotype thinking, increase punitive attributions and give harsher 
punishments (Bodenhausen et al., 1994; Kuhl, 1983; Lerner and Tiedens, 2006; Lerner 
et al., 1998; Tiedens, 2001). As opposed to anger, fear, anxiety or worry being 
associated with a sense of uncertainty can result in more systematic processing 
(Tiedens and Linton, 2001).  
As visceral factors make certain consequences more salient, agents may disregard 
other consequences they would have otherwise considered when not under their 
influence. Specifically, agents will tend to behave relatively more myopically, 
prioritising short-term consequences much more than long-term ones. This myopic 
prioritisation can be explained by the type of situation in which the emotion arises. 
For instance, anger mostly stems from situations being generated by conflict or 
disputes. Because of that, the literature suggests people may have developed a reflex 
to react quickly and make use of heuristics by way of evaluating actions to remedy 
the problem. Hence, this can render agents to be impulsive and rash in their actions 
(Bodenhausen et al., 1994; Kuhl, 1983; Lerner and Tiedens, 2006; Loewenstein and 
O’ Donoghue, 2007).  In the case of terrorism, this myopic decision-making is 
especially observed in the case of suicide bombers or self-martyrs (Merari et al., 2009). 
In this study, we focus on the impact of anger and fear on depth of information 
processing. Based on the literature, it seems reasonable to predict that the 
prioritisation of objectives and the attractiveness of various actions in angry, fearful, 
and neutral agents would differ. In particular, we look at the prioritisation of specific 
objectives relating to terrorists’ objectives and attractiveness of productive and self-
destructive actions.   
 
This study aims to build on the current research relating to the impact of visceral 
factors – anger and fear in particular –on decision-making. We aim to examine how 
anger and fear will influence the prioritisation of objectives and the attractiveness of 
certain options.  
In particular, we suggest the emotions will temporarily affect the prioritisation of long-
term self-destructive objectives versus long-term productive objectives ones. We chose 
to examine three specific objectives, Revenge, Reputation and Success, to represent 
the terrorists’ objectives that were described earlier in their value tree, see Figure 4-1. 
Given the effect of prioritisation of short-term objectives over long-term ones, we also 
expect that angered participants will find actions representing the personal 
involvement in succeeding a task less attractive than otherwise. On the other hand, 
fear arising from a sense of uncertainty, we expect the opposite behaviour, i.e. long-
term objectives would be prioritised.   
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Furthermore, we expect angered participants to find behaviours enabling restoring 
the situation as it was prior to the offence, as well as those enabling punishments. 
Thus, we expect confrontational, contentious, behaviours more attractive in the 
angered state than neutral. In addition, as anger has been found to trigger heuristic 
processing, hence rendering decision making impulsive and reckless, we expect the 
willingness to compromise productivity and image to respond to a conflict. 
Contrasting with anger, we expect participants to find behaviours favouring 
succeeding in the project more preferred to behaviours that could be detrimental, such 
as confrontational and contentious behaviours.  
In the next section, we propose an experiment whereby the participants would be 
exposed to a visceral factor after which their preferences and judgement/decision 
process making process will be evaluated.  
 
Participants. The research participants were a group of 76 students at the London 
School of Economics (LSE), 27 females (36%), between the ages of 18 and 29 (mean 
age 21 years old). The participants were recruited from the summer school course 
‘Judgement and Decision Making for Management’. In exchange for participating, 
they received a tour of the newly built behavioural lab. The visit included some 
explanations of the types of studies that are run and how, in relation to the course 
they were undertaking at the summer school. In addition, the participants were told 
that by taking part, a donation of £1 per student would be donated to the NSPCC 
charity (National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children 
www.nspcc.org.uk). Before the study was administered, the participants were 
informed about the experiment, and that it might involve the possibility of feeling 
some negative emotions or discomfort in relation to some aspects of the questions 
asked. The participants were reassured their participation would be anonymous and 
could cease taking part in the study at any time. Furthermore, they were informed 
the study had been designed to provide them with a reflective tool that was directly 
linked with one of the lectures during the course.  
Affect manipulation. Affect manipulation can be done a number of ways. Giving 
subjects a bag of sweet or a gift certificate from McDonald’s has been used by Isen 
and Geva (1987); and Isen and Patrick (1983). Wright and Bower (1992) used 
hypnosis, and Raghunathan and Pham (1999) asked participants to read scenarios 
depicting a situation to induce various emotions.  
To test whether visceral factors momentarily altered the elements highlighted above, 
we chose the use of scenarios that participants could relate to, and which attempted 
to replicate as close as possible the types of emotions perceived by people supporting, 
or part of a terrorist group. The scenarios therefore had to incorporate a sense of 
belonging to a cause, which was one that was personal and important to the 
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protagonist. Then, to emulate the triggers of visceral factors in terrorists, the scenarios 
had to include a sense of being wronged via betrayal, and fear via loss of resources.   
To do so, the three scenarios involved the protagonist running an inherited family 
business, and the opportunity to participate in an international bid had arisen. These 
scenarios depicted a situation where the cause was highly personal to the protagonist, 
similarly to how terrorists would consider their cause. Depending on the treatment 
administered to the participants, one of the scenarios then involved being betrayed 
by their business partner. This was to emulate the government (i.e. the enemy of the 
terrorists) interfering and preventing the protagonist from achieving their goals. 
Another scenario involved their business partner being unfairly arrested to emulate a 
case were terrorist leaders being arrested killed; hence reducing the capabilities of a 
terrorist cell (see Appendix 4.A). 
 
The experimental design was a between-subjects design (described in Table 4-1). Each 
treatment was administered randomly, and each participant was given 30 minutes to 
complete the questions. A between-subject design was chosen over a within-subject 
design to exclude range and carryover effects that can limit interpretation of the 
results. Furthermore, the experiment consisted of asking around twenty questions for 
each treatment, which meant that a within-subject design would have required 
participants to answer sixty questions. In addition to the other effects, we expected 
tiredness to have a negative effect on the quality of responses (Greenwald, 1976; 
Poulton, 1973).   
Experimental Conditions N 
Treatment 1 N – Neutral Scenario 23 
Treatment 2 ANG – Scenario Triggering Anger  18 
Treatment 3 ANX – Scenario Triggering Fear  18 
Analysis – Treatment 1 Versus Treatment 2 23 Versus 18 
Analysis – Treatment 1 Versus Treatment 3 23 Versus 18 
Table 4-1 The three experimental conditions 
 
Procedure. The research participants were gathered in the LSE Behavioural lab, where 
they were assigned to a cubicle with a computer. They were provided with a link to 
a web-based questionnaire. 
Chapter 4 Rational Sel f -Destruction –  
The Effect of Anger on the Prioritisation of Sel f -Destructive Objectives   
 
 
91 
Dependent variables. The questionnaire included standard demographic items in order 
to determine sample characteristics. In addition, the participants were asked to assess 
how they were feeling by rating how well a range of statements described their 
emotional state. We used a six-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (very slightly or not 
at all) to 6 (extremely). The emotional states included the states of interest (Anger, 
Fear) and others (Happiness, Depressed or Sad, Content or Relaxed, Frustrated, 
Contempt or Disdain, Frustrated, Impatient). These measures were derived from 
several research papers on decision making and emotions (Lerner and Keltner, 2001; 
Lerner et al., 2004; Small and Lerner, 2008).  
Three experimental conditions were tested. The participants were randomly assigned 
one of the three scenarios, asked to read it, and instructed to relate to the protagonist 
as best they could, so they would be able to experience what the protagonist thought 
and felt. Following the affect manipulation, the participants were presented with the 
emotion-related dependent measures, which included eliciting their priorities for the 
different objectives and determining the attractiveness of several actions as outlined 
earlier.  
Emotion-related priorities. In order to test the effect of the emotional state on the 
prioritisation of objectives, we used the swing weighting technique, as in Multi-
Criteria Decision Analysis (a well established procedure for eliciting weights in multi-
attribute value analysis, see Belton and Stewart (2001) for a comprehensive 
description of the steps in the elicitation process). The participants were asked to 
assign Swing Weights to three objectives (Revenge, Reputation, and Success, as 
displayed in Figure 4-2) in relation to the scenario with which they were presented.  
 
 
Figure 4-2 Scenario Value Tree 
To enable an adequate elicitation of swing weights, we first asked the participants to 
rank the three objectives by dragging each objectives in the order they desired (see 
Figure 4-3). The next question presented the objectives ordered as per what the 
participant had answered in the previous question, and the first objective was rated 
Objectives
Revenge (The damage caused to your rival)
Reputation (How much visibility you get upon yourself to alter your reputation)
Success (The extent to which you want to succeed in your business endeavour)
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with 100. The participants were then instructed to rate the other objectives relatively 
to the 100 points assigned to that first weight and the upper and lower bounds of each 
objectives. The upper and lower bounds were selected so the ranges for each objective 
were as similar as possible (see Figure 4-4). Each participant was presented with the 
three objectives randomly to minimise the effect of order in the ranking of objectives.   
 
Figure 4-3 Ranking objectives 
 
Figure 4-4 Eliciting Swing Weights 
Chapter 4 Rational Sel f -Destruction –  
The Effect of Anger on the Prioritisation of Sel f -Destructive Objectives   
 
 
93 
Emotion-related attractiveness of actions. Following the ranking and weighting of 
objectives, the participants were presented with a range of questions. The participants 
were asked to rate them using a scale ranging from 0: ‘strongly disagree’ to 100: 
‘strongly agree’ using a visual scroll bar. The questions were presented into five 
modules aimed at addressing the issues highlighted earlier. Each module contained 
the description of a range of actions that are increasing in intensity towards achieving 
a certain goal. 
To test the attractiveness of a range of actions representing personal involvement, the 
participants were asked whether they would commit themselves fully to the bid, would 
financially invest their own savings for the bid, and take a loan in their names to fund 
the activities.  
To assess their preference for a range of confrontational behaviours, the participants 
were asked if they would raise their voice at, swear privately at their business partner, 
and speak ill of them to other people.  
To test their willingness to engage in contentious behaviour, the participants were 
asked if they would find it acceptable to exaggerate facts in their favour, spread 
rumours and make false claims about the events to damage their business partner’s 
reputation to their colleagues, and to the press or using social media websites.  
To test if they would endorse third parties engaging in contentious behaviours, we 
asked the participants, whether they would find it acceptable for co-workers to 
exaggerate facts in their favour, spread rumours about the events to damage their 
business partner’s reputation, and confront their business partner publicly.  
To test their willingness to compromise productivity/image, the participants were 
asked if they would engage in a confrontation if it meant compromising their 
participation in the bid, damage their image, and reduce their change of winning the 
bid.  
The questions asked are summarised in Table 4-2. 
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 Questions 
P
er
so
n
a
l 
C
o
m
m
it
m
en
t 
1. Would you commit yourself fully to succeed in the bid (proposal) for a 
partnership with the international organisation? 
2. Would you invest a great share of your savings into the bid (proposal) for a 
partnership with the international organisation if you thought it helped improve 
its quality and chances of success? 
3. Would you take a loan in your name to fund the activities involved in the bid 
(proposal) for a partnership with the international organisation if you thought it 
helped improve your chances of success? 
C
o
n
fr
o
n
ta
ti
o
n
a
l 
A
ct
io
n
s 1. Would you privately raise your voice at your business partner? 
2. Would you privately swear at your business partner? 
3. Would you speak ill of your business partner to other people? 
C
o
n
te
n
ti
o
u
s 
a
ct
io
n
s 
1. Would you find it acceptable to exaggerate facts in your favour as long as you 
remain generally truthful to the events? 
2. Would you spread rumours or make false claims about the events if you thought 
it might damage your business partner’s reputation even though it would not 
turn the situation to your advantage? 
3. Would you spread rumours or make false claims about the event to the press, on 
blogs or various networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter even though it 
would not turn the situation to your advantage? 
E
n
d
o
rs
in
g
 c
o
n
te
n
ti
o
u
s 
a
ct
io
n
s 
b
y
 o
th
e
rs
 
1. Would you find it acceptable for your co-workers to exaggerate facts in their and 
your favour as long as they remain generally truthful to the events? 
2. Would you find it acceptable for your co-workers to spread rumours or make 
false claims about the event to the press, on blogs or various networking sites 
such as Facebook and Twitter even though it would not turn the situation to 
their or your advantage? 
3. Would you condone (forgive) your co-worker for confronting your business 
partner publically? 
C
o
m
p
ro
m
is
in
g
 s
u
cc
es
s 
o
r 
im
a
g
e
 
1. Would you engage in a confrontation if it meant you would not prepare 
sufficiently to participate in the bid (proposal) for a partnership with the 
international organisation? 
2. Would you engage in a confrontation if it meant you would miss participating in 
the bid (proposal) for a partnership with the international organisation? 
3. Would you engage in a confrontation with your business partner if it damaged 
your business image and reduce your chances of winning the bid (proposal) for a 
partnership with the international organisation? 
Table 4-2 Questions testing the emotion-related attractiveness of actions 
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Manipulation checks. Prior to analysing the results, we first looked at whether the 
emotional treatment had taken effect by performing an analysis on the self-reported 
emotional state. A paired t-test showed that the manipulation was successful for 
Treatment 2 (Anger), but not so successful for the Treatment 3 (Fear). Indeed, in 
Treatment 3, the Fear levels showed only an increase of 1.28 (𝑝 < .001) (scored on a 
6 point Likert scale). In contrast, the Anger levels in Treatment 2 increased by 2.5 
(𝑝 < .001). A minimal change in mood was observed in the Neutral group, which 
might have been induced by the nature of the questions: the Nervous or state Fear 
showed an increase of 0.65 (𝑝 = .01), and Anger increased by 1.22 (𝑝 < .001). Table 
4-3 summarises the paired t-test comparing the differences in means of self-reported 
level of Fear and Anger pre and post treatment. 
 
 
 Manipulation Check 
t df p 
Treatment Emotion Pre Post 
Neutral 
Fear 1.26 (1.05) 1.91 (1.56) -2.47 22 .01 
Anger .43 (.73) 1.65 (1.61) -3.66 22 <.001 
Anger 
Fear 1.50 (1.55) 1.94 (1.53) -.91 17 .37 
Anger 1.00 (1.33) 3.50 (1.72) -5.21 17 <.001 
Fear 
Fear .61 (.85) 1.89 (1.57) -3.55 17 <.001 
Anger .28 (.67) 1.44 (1.50) -3.70 17 <.001 
Table 4-3 Paired t-test comparing the differences in mean self-reported emotions pre and post treatment 
A One-way ANOVA further confirmed that Treatment 3 (Fear) was not successful. 
Self-reported fear was not significantly reported  𝐹(2,56) = .006, 𝑝 = .994, on the 
other hand, participants reported significantly more anger after Treatment 2 
𝐹(2,56) = 9.09, 𝑝 < 0.0001. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated 
that the mean levels for Treatment 2 (Anger) (𝑀 =  3.5, 𝑆𝐷 =  1.73) were 
significantly different from Treatment 1 (Neutral) (𝑀 =  1.65, 𝑆𝐷 =  1.61). However, 
Treatment 3 (𝑀 =  1.44 𝑆𝐷 =  1.5) did not significantly differ from Treatment 1.  
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Figure 4-5 illustrates the z-score of self-reported emotions for Fear and Nervousness 
and Anger in the three treatments.  
 
Figure 4-5 Self-reported emotion post-treatment.  
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
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Inferential analyses.  
In line with similar studies examining the effect of emotions on preferences and choices 
(Isen and Geva, 1987; Isen and Patrick, 1983; Small and Lerner, 2008; Tiedens, 2001), 
we analysed the relationships between the means in each different treatment. This 
was done in two parts; we first analysed the influence of anger on the prioritisation of 
objectives and then on the attractiveness of various actions.  
First, a Shapiro-Wilk test was performed to test for normality, which showed that the 
data were approximately normally distributed for all groups. A Levene’s test 
confirmed homogeneity of variances. We then checked for outliers in the weights' data 
by eliminating all data points outside the “whiskers” from their respective box plots. 
Consequently, we removed one outlier in the weight for reputation as well as some 
other outliers in the attractiveness of various actions.  
Prioritisation of objectives. A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to 
compare the effect of two negative emotions on the prioritisation of objectives 
(Revenge, Reputation, and Success) and the attractiveness of certain actions in a state 
of anger, fear (Treatment 2 and 3), and neutral (Treatment 1, the control group) 
conditions.  
The results showed that emotions did not have a significant effect on the prioritisation 
of the three objectives Revenge, Reputation, and Success at the 𝑝 < .05 level for the 
three conditions [𝐹(2, 56) =  2.174, 𝑝 = .123], [𝐹(2, 56) = .071, 𝑝 = .932], [𝐹(2, 56)  =
 2.330, 𝑝 =  .107] respectively. This could be explained because the fear treatment did 
not work.  
An independent-samples t-test was then conducted instead to compare the 
prioritisation of objectives between Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 (omitting the 
results of Treatment 3). The study found that there was a significant difference in the 
prioritisation of Revenge and Success (depicted by the normalised weights) for the 
anger (MREVENGE=21, SDREVENGE=7.30; MSUCCESS=40, SDSUCCESS=5.78) and neutral 
(MREVENGE=15, SDREVENGE=9.25; MSUCCESS=45, SDSUCCESS=8.58) conditions; 
tREVENGE(39)=-2.09, pREVENGE=.04 and tSUCCESS(39)=2.140, pSUCCESS=.04 (summarised in 
Table 4-4). We note that the effect size for the weights of Revenge and Success were  
(d=.72, d=.68) was found to exceed Cohen’s convention for a medium effect (d=.50) 
(Cohen, 1992). These results suggest that anger really does have effect on the 
prioritisation of certain objectives. Specifically, our results suggest that under the 
influence of anger, agents prioritise revenge more than when not angry, and the 
opposite is observed for success, this was observed for up to 5% on average, as seen 
in Figure 4-6. These results are not surprising. Indeed, the literature suggests that 
under the influence of visceral factors, agents have the tendency to prioritise goals 
mitigating the visceral factors (Loewenstein, 1999). 
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Normalised 
Weights 
Treatment       
Effect 
Size Neutral Anger t df p 
Revenge 15a (9.25) 21b (7.30) -2.09 39 .04 0.72** 
Reputation 39a (5.34) 40a (6.39) -.27 38 .79 0.17* 
Success 45a (8.58) 40b (5.78) 2.14 39 .04 0.68** 
Note: Values in the same row and sub table not sharing the same subscript are significantly 
different at 𝑝 <  0.05 in the two-sided test of equality for column means. Cohen's d effect 
size: *, **, *** represent small, medium, and large effect sizes respectively. 
Table 4-4 t-test comparing the impact of Anger and Neutral emotional state on 
the prioritisation of objectives 
 
 
Figure 4-6 Normalised weights for Treatment 1 (Neutral) & 2 (Anger).  
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
Attractiveness of various actions. We then conducted fifteen independent-samples t-
test for each of the questions to compare the attractiveness of certain actions in 
angered and neutral emotional conditions. To facilitate the analysis, the results are 
analysed in five different categories (personal commitment, confrontational actions, 
contentious actions, endorsing contentious actions by others, and actions 
compromising success and image). The significant results are highlighted here, and all 
the results are summarised in Table 4-5.  
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There were no differences between the angered and neutral treatments for the 
questions relating to the personal commitment to the success of the bid. However, the 
next questions, which dealt with confrontational actions, were significantly influenced 
by anger. In the angered treatment, respondents found actions such as raising their 
voice at and swearing at business partner more attractive compared to the 
participants in the neutral treatment. Speaking ill of their business partner to other 
people was also found more attractive, but less significantly so. In each of these 
questions, the effect sizes were found to exceed Cohen’s convention for a medium effect 
(d=.50), hence, it is possible that a larger sample size would provide more significant 
results (Cohen, 1992). There were no differences between angered and neutral 
treatments for the questions relating to contentious actions, endorsing contentious 
actions by other people, or compromising actions.  
 
 Treatment      
 Neutral Anger 
Diff 
t df p 
Effect 
Size 
Personal Commitment 1 (N) 78a (16.23) 85a (16.79) -7 -1.20 37 .24 .42* 
Personal Commitment 2 (N) 60a (26.27) 54a (24.66) 6 .78 39 .44 .24* 
Personal Commitment 3 (N) 54a (20.17) 51a (25.66) 3 .41 39 .68 .13* 
Confrontational Action 1 (A) 43a (32.25) 66b (36.74) 23 -2.07 39 .05 .67** 
Confrontational Action 2 (A) 31a (31.21) 55b (42.43) 24 -2.11 39 .04 .64** 
Confrontational Action 3 (A) 20a (22.69) 37a (35.62) 17 -1.84 39 .07 .57** 
Contentious Action 1 (A) 40a (24.84) 34a (33.32) -6 .70 39 .49 .20* 
Contentious Action 2 (A) 01a (2.53) 09a (26.44) 8 -1.26 32 .22 .43* 
Contentious Action 3 (A) 01a (2.46) 02a (2.63) 1 -.12 32 .90 .39* 
Endorsing contentious actions 1 (A) 33a (32.54) 27a (29.95) -6 .57 39 .57 .19* 
Endorsing contentious actions 2 (A) 05a (7.16) 03a (4.68) -2 .74 36 .46 .33* 
Endorsing contentious actions 3 (A) 41a (29.05) 44a (27.15) 3 -.32 39 .75 
.11* 
 
Compromising actions 1 (A) 16a (24.26) 10a (12.64) -6 .79 31 .44 .31* 
Compromising actions 2 (A) 00a (.24) 04b (8.19) 4 -2.08 31 .05 .69** 
Compromising actions 3 (A) 08a (12.76) 05a (11.38) -3 .54 34 .59 .25* 
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Note: Values in the same row and sub table not sharing the same subscript are significantly different 
at 𝑝 <  0.05 in the two-sided test of equality for column means. Cohen's d effect size: *, **, *** 
represent small, medium and large effect sizes respectively (Cohen, 1992). 
The expected higher response is marked with A for Angered, or N for Neutral 
Table 4-5 t-test comparing the impact of Anger and Neutral emotional state on the attractiveness of a 
range of actions  
We note that this study was aimed at analysing the effect of anger on the preferences 
for various behaviours including aggressive, contentious and destructive ones. 
However, the types of participants in this study (university students) were unlikely 
to be prone to engage in the types of behaviours described in the study (similarly as 
Tiedens (2001) points out in their study). This might explain the lack of differences 
between treatments observed for certain actions, unlike what was expected. 
 
In our study, we analysed the effect of anger on the prioritisation of self-destructive 
versus productive objectives. In addition, we tested the attractiveness of long-term 
self-destructive versus short and long-term productive actions (such as the 
attractiveness of a range of actions to succeed in the bid; a range of aggressive 
behaviours; their willingness to engage in contentious behaviour as a response to an 
injustice; the endorsement of third parties engaging in contentious behaviours; and 
their willingness to compromise productivity/image to respond to a conflict). 
Our results supported the prediction that anger would be associated with an increase 
in the prioritisation of the revenge objective and a decrease in the prioritisation of the 
success objective. These results are consistent with other findings in the literature 
showing that emotional states have an impact on decision making, in particular anger 
has an impact on depth of processing (Lerner et al., 1998; Small and Lerner, 2008; 
Tiedens, 2001). An increase in the prioritisation of revenge and a decrease of the 
prioritisation of success is also consistent with findings of decision makers becoming 
myopic under the influence of visceral factors (Loewenstein, 2000). Indeed, revenge 
and success are respectively short-term and long-term objectives.  
Three activities stood out as being much more attractive when subjects were angry, 
than when not: privately raising their voice and swearing at their business partner. 
Speaking ill of their business partner was also found more attractive, though less 
significantly so. This is consistent with the objective of revenge having been scored 
higher in the angered state. This is consistent with findings that certain objectives 
can become eclipsed under the influence of anger. Similar findings were drawn from 
other studies: due to arousal, goals which did not lead to achieving sexual fulfilment 
were clouded out (Loewenstein and O’ Donoghue, 2007).  
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Such findings have important implications on modelling terrorist decision making for 
counter-terrorism analysis. Indeed, agents involved in terrorism may be subject to 
high levels of anger, which can also fluctuate depending on the outside environment, 
and actions of their opponents. The results of this study and the findings from the 
literature suggest that this would have an impact on their judgement and decision-
making, which must be considered in counter-terrorism policies.  
Research has found that following an offence that triggers feelings of anger, agents are 
compelled to take action to restore the situation as it was. By doing so, certain 
objectives not pertaining to achieving this goal are clouded out whilst objectives 
enabling a confrontation or harming the sources of the conflict. In addition, time can 
be discounted as agents can become myopic in their decision-making. In particular, 
this research has confirmed a tendency to have an altered view of objectives under 
the influence of anger. Indeed, we observed an increase in weight for the objective 
revenge whereas the weight for success decreased in the angered state, versus the 
neutral one.  
Research has highlighted that terrorists’ objectives might include prolonging the 
existence of their organisations (possibly for revenge), even if it is at the expense of 
not achieving their political goals (Abrahms, 2008). The results of this study 
contribute to support this insight, and suggest that anger might exacerbate this 
tendency.  
As this study showed that anger could have an impact on how the objective revenge 
and success were prioritised, it appears necessary for counter-terrorism models to allow 
for this type of changes to be captured and their impact analysed. Such changes might 
potentially have an impact on the overall ranking of terrorists’ preferred options. 
Indeed, some models are quite sensitive to various variables (for example Bakir and 
von Winterfeldt, 2011; Bakir, 2008), where changes in priorities due to anger could be 
especially relevant.  
Such findings also provide some avenues for further research in counter-terrorism 
modelling using decision analytical methods. In this type of modelling, the decision 
maker whose preferences are being modelled is not available, and hence their 
preferences need to be inferred. Expanding the current frameworks used in the context 
of counter-terrorism to include the impact of visceral factors (as in Loewenstein & 
O’Donoghue (2007), see Figure 4-7) could help make counter-terrorism model more 
descriptively valid, and hence help have more insight into terrorists’ behaviour.  
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Figure 4-7 Schematic representation of the model from Loewenstein & O’Donoghue (2007) 
 
 
This study on the effect of anger and fear on the prioritisation of objectives is subject 
to several methodological limitations. Given that the participants used were mostly 
from foreign countries, and hence English was not their mother tongue, it is possible 
that this reduced the effectiveness of the treatment. In fact, the fear treatment was 
not effective. Other methods of mood inductions could have been used, which could 
have had different effects. For instance, mood recall techniques as used by Tiedens 
(2001) could have led to different results. Furthermore, we do not expect that the 
level of emotions felt by the participants is as high as those we expect the terrorists 
to experience themselves. In addition, cognitive tasks generally washes away the effect 
of emotions, and therefore it is likely that the emotions felt after the mood induction 
decreased towards the end of the test. We also relied on self-reported level of feelings 
rather than using physiological/neurological means to measure their feelings.  
As suggested by Ariely and Loewenstein (2006), it is impossible to determine with 
certainty the actual behaviour of the agents in the situations we have described 
without observing them. However, previous research on hot-cold empathy gaps has 
shown agents often do not predict correctly how they will choose to behave in an 
emotional state different to their current one. In fact, they underestimate the effect 
of visceral factors on their behaviour (Ariely and Loewenstein, 2006; Bouffard, 2002; 
Loewenstein et al., 1997). Therefore, it might be safe to come to the conclusion that 
the agents’ predictions of their priorities and preferences are more accurate under the 
influence of anger than when they are in a neutral emotional state.   
In this study, to compare priorities assigned to the objectives valued by terrorists, we 
imposed the list of  objectives to be prioritised. However, it is possible that much 
more striking results could have been found on the prioritisation had we not presented 
these specific ones, but instead elicited objectives from them. Decision makers are 
generally not good at articulating relevant objectives for consequential decisions (Bond 
et al., 2008). It is highly likely that the productive objectives (reputation and success) 
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were weighed at all because they were presented to the participants. Indeed, decision 
makers have been found to rate omitted objectives almost as high as those generated 
on their own. This can be explained by visceral factors as they tend to cloud 
judgement, and temporarily make certain objectives much less salient in a decision 
maker’s mind (Bond et al., 2008; Loewenstein, 2000).     
Another limitation of this research is that the sample included both male and female 
participants. Given terrorism has been a male-dominated environment (the 
involvement of females in terrorism increasing but not yet so prosminent (Galvin, 
1983; Jacques and Taylor, 2008)), it is possible that this study does not describe effects 
generalising terrorists decision making. This study shows that agents do prioritise 
objectives differently under the influence of anger, in particular, they prioritised 
revenge more than success in an angered state, however this does not show whether 
male and female agents prioritise differently. The sample we had did not allow us to 
analyse the effect of gender on the prioritisation of objectives.  
Furthermore, this study aimed to examine the effect of emotions on the prioritisation 
of revenge, reputation and success, and the preferences for various behaviours 
including aggressive, contentious and destructive ones. Given the participants in this 
study were university students, the types of behaviours described in our study might 
not have impacted their lives (similarly as Tiedens (2001) points out in their study). 
It might be useful to conduct a similar study with individuals with a background more 
prone to aggressive and self-destructive behaviours, as they might better resemble 
terrorists.  
Finally, the participants were tested after having followed several lectures of a 
behavioural decision making course, and therefore it is possible that their awareness 
of how affect and other situational elements can impact decision-making would have 
had an effect on the way they answered. Having said that, given the significance of 
the current results, it is possible that if the participants had had no prior behavioural 
insight, more striking results could have been observed. 
Further research, which could be conducted in the same context as this study, includes 
the changing risk attitudes of agents, and their level of confidence. As highlighted 
earlier in this paper, different types of visceral factors, such as anger and fear, have 
opposite effects on risk attitudes and levels of confidence (Isen and Geva, 1987; Isen 
and Patrick, 1983; Lerner and Keltner, 2001, 2000; Lerner and Tiedens, 2006). In the 
context of terrorism, it would be interesting to test how utility functions vary 
concerning actions that have a self-destructive component to them, and how their 
level of confidence varies depending on their level of fear and anger.     
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Appendix 4.A Scenarios for Study 
 
Scenario 1: (Neutral) 
 
Imagine the following scenario and try to experience the events described in 
the scenario as vividly as possible and to imagine what you would feel like if 
you were in this situation. 
A couple of years ago, you inherited your family business, which has been a successful, 
well known and profitable firm for several generations. Your family has invested much 
of money and time in the business, making it very much an integral part of your lives.  
Whilst your family are still active in the day-to-day business, they have made you 
one of the primary shareholders.  
Therefore, you now run the business alongside your business partner. He has been a 
close family friend and you have known him since you were a young child. 
Since you have been young, he and his family have been an integral part of your life. 
Your parents often invited him and his family, to family weekend dinners, and you 
often went on family holidays together. Ever since you can remember, you have 
considered him as much part of your family as an uncle would be. From the very early 
stages of you joining the board of directors, he has also supported you and advised 
you with the decisions that had to be made in growing the business.  
Recently, a very well known international organisation has approached you to put a 
bid for a partnership with them. This is a one-time opportunity to be able to grow 
your business abroad and get a substantial amount of visibility on your business name. 
There is a lot of money at stake in this endeavour, but the payoff could be truly vast 
and you and your colleagues are working towards that aim.  
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Scenario 2: (Anger caused by betrayal) 
 
Imagine the following scenario and try to experience the events described in 
the scenario as vividly as possible and to imagine what you would feel like if 
you were in this situation. 
A couple of years ago, you inherited your family business, which has been a successful, 
well known and profitable firm for several generations. Your family has invested much 
of money and time in the business, making it very much an integral part of your lives.  
Whilst your family are still active in the day-to-day business, they have made you 
one of the primary shareholders.  
Therefore, you now run the business alongside your business partner. He has been a 
close family friend and you have known him since you were a young child. 
Since you have been young, he and his family have been an integral part of your life. 
Your parents often invited him and his family, to family weekend dinners, and you 
often went on family holidays together. Ever since you can remember, you have 
considered him as much part of your family as an uncle would be. From the very early 
stages of you joining the board of directors, he has also supported you and advised 
you with the decisions that had to be made. 
Recently, a very well known international organisation has approached you to put a 
bid for a partnership with them. This is a one-time opportunity to be able to grow 
your business abroad and get a substantial amount of visibility on your business name. 
There is a lot of money at stake in this endeavour, but the payoff could be truly vast 
and you and your colleagues are working towards that aim.  
Unfortunately, you have just learned terrible news. Your business partner and close 
friend has been selling trade secrets to your biggest competitor. Given the ties you 
had with your business partner, such news came as a terrible shock and you as well 
as your family are quite devastated from the betrayal of your family friend.  
Even more, such information being revealed has resulted in a dramatic loss of business, 
as a great share of your clients are now seeking business from your competitor. On 
top of having lost your competitive edge, your ability to perform well in the bid is 
seriously threatened.  
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Scenario 3: (Fear by loss of key individual) 
 
Imagine the following scenario and try to experience the events described in 
the scenario as vividly as possible and to imagine what you would feel like if 
you were in this situation. 
A couple of years ago, you inherited your family business, which has been a successful, 
well known and profitable firm for several generations. Your family has invested much 
of money and time in the business, making it very much an integral part of your lives.  
Whilst your family are still active in the day-to-day business, they have made you 
one of the primary shareholders.  
Therefore, you now run the business alongside your business partner. He has been a 
close family friend and you have known him since you were a young child. 
Since you have been young, he and his family have been an integral part of your life. 
Your parents often invited him and his family, to family weekend dinners, and you 
often went on family holidays together. Ever since you can remember, you have 
considered him as much part of your family as an uncle would be. From the very early 
stages of you joining the board of directors, he has also supported you and advised 
you with the decisions that had to be made. 
Recently, a very well known international organisation has approached you to put a 
bid for a partnership with them. This is a one-time opportunity to be able to grow 
your business abroad and get a substantial amount of visibility on your business name. 
There is a lot of money at stake in this endeavour, but the payoff could be truly vast 
and you and your colleagues are working towards that aim.  
Unfortunately, you have just learned terrible news. Your business partner and close 
friend has been arrested on criminal claims (unrelated to your business).  
Given the ties you had with your business partner, such news came as a terrible shock 
and you as well as your family are quite devastated by what has happened to your 
family friend.  
Even more, his departure from the business is likely to result in a dramatic loss of 
business, as a great share of your clients might seek business from your competitor. 
On top of possibly losing your competitive edge, your ability to perform well in the 
bid is seriously threatened.  
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Prelude to Chapter 5 
Modeling State-Dependent Priorities of 
Malicious Agents 
To develop a framework for combining the objectives of terrorists and their changes 
over time, two main aspects need to the taken into account. These are an 
understanding of what drives terrorists, secondly insight into how their behaviour is 
influenced by visceral factors. In Paper I, we discussed the suitability of assumptions 
made in counter-terrorism models from a descriptive point of view. We highlighted 
how the effect of visceral factors can have significant effects on judgement and 
decision-making. In particular, anger is highlighted as one of the factors that can have 
an important influence on terrorist decision-making, and specifically, on the 
prioritisation of their objectives.  
Following from these findings, in, Paper II we undertook a study to analyse the effect 
of anger on the prioritisation of objectives. Some of these objectives were self-
destructive in the long term, as in the case of terrorism. Self-reported anger was found 
to have an impact on the prioritisation of revenge over success-related  objectives, 
given the hypothetical scenario, and as predicted, a number of actions were perceived 
more (and less) attractive if they were self-destructive (and productive respectively).  
In this third paper, we seek to address the impacts that the findings from the two 
previous papers have on models representing terrorism decision making. We outline 
the framework that could be taken to assess preferences altered by visceral factors, 
taking into account how weights could be dependent on the visceral state of the agents 
and show how such an analysis may support risk management in this context. The 
agents modelled here represent the terrorist organisation, but we make the assumption 
that it behave as an individual.  
To try to infer the visceral factors, we suggest in the third paper using System 
Dynamics by modelling the system terrorists. This could indicate the evolution of the 
variables in the environment that would trigger the fluctuations of the visceral factors 
experienced by the malicious agents. By integrating SD to the agent’s Multi-Attribute 
Utility Theory model, the proposed framework will investigate how to infer the impact 
of the anger on the weights assigned to the objectives. This could help have a better 
understanding of what motivates malicious agents and hence have more insight into 
their preference patterns. Combining the two approaches would inform how the agents 
may re-prioritise their objectives in response to changes in their environment and so 
their behaviour. This may also help in better anticipating potential risks of violence 
outbreaks based on changes in the environment. 
The following is the exact copy of the journal paper referenced here:  
Sri Bhashyam, S., Montibeller, G., 2012. Modeling State-Dependent Priorities of 
Malicious Agents. Decision Analysis 9, 172–185. 
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With ever-increasing terror threats, governments and security officials would benefit 
from a better understanding of what motivates terrorists to cause social unrest. A 
recent research trend is on gaining greater knowledge about the values of malicious 
agents to help manage the risk of terrorism. As a result, there seems to be the potential 
to use decision analysis as a means to model what may drive malicious agents to 
commit harmful actions. So far, research on this topic has assumed static preferences 
of such agents. In this paper, we present a framework that may be used to infer how 
terrorists’ priorities may change over time and their impact on their choice of a 
harmful action. We suggest modeling state-dependent priorities of a terrorist group 
via a multi-criteria model that incorporates state-dependent priorities to account for 
preference change caused by exogenous triggers and representing the environment as 
a system dynamics model. We describe how terrorists’ visceral factors may affect the 
prioritization of objectives, and show how such an analysis may support risk 
management in this context.  
Key words: terrorism; terrorist threats; multiattribute utility theory; value models; 
state-dependent priorities 
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If you know the enemy and know yourself,  
you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.  
If you know yourself but not the enemy,  
for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.  
If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle. 
Sun Tzu – The Art of War (Tzu and Giles, 2008, p. 52)  
 
 
“To predict or make sense of viscerally driven behaviour, it is necessary to 
incorporate visceral factors into models of economic behaviour” (2000, p.431). 
 
ince the 9/11 and the later 7/7 terrorist strikes in New York and London 
respectively, governments and security officials increasingly try to find ways to 
protect the public against attacks and, hence, concerns over what needs to be 
protected has become a growing issue. The complexities security officials face when 
assessing threats and their prevention lie in the inherent intricacy in predicting crime 
or violence outbreaks (WHO 2002; Broder 2006). By its own nature violence, and 
more specifically terrorism, is complex and interrelated, with varying root causes and 
risk factors (WHO 2002; Linotte 2007).  
The evaluation of terrorist threats can be classified into two main branches. One 
approach is to try to determine the likelihood of such events. Achieving this can be 
done by including subjective probabilistic elicitation from expert judgment. With the 
capacity brought by mathematical modeling, another way of modeling threats have 
been made available which consists of the field of risk analysis (Broder 2006; Woo 
2006). On the other hand, for threats involving human intent, actions of the different 
parties have to be taken into account when identifying potential proactive measures. 
In these cases, game theoretic models have been the most commonly used methods 
(Major 2002; Woo 2006; Wilson & Olwell 2006; Hausken & Zhuang 2011). Other 
widely applied mathematical models used in this context include Markov chains and 
adaptive learning processes and decision analytic models (Paté-Cornell & Guikema 
2002; Haynes et al. 2005; von Winterfeldt & O’Sullivan 2006). More recent frameworks 
include the use of decision analysis and sequential game theory, in which an adaptive 
decision maker can be represented and hence the resulting variation in risk can be 
observed (Merrick and Parnell, 2011; Parnell et al., 2010; Rios and Rios Insua, 2012). 
A different perspective, and a recent research trend in this field, is trying to better 
understand the values of malicious agents, to better support the management of 
terrorism risk. In fact Rosoff & John (2009) suggest it is crucial to have more 
knowledge of the malicious agents’ objective function to gain some insight on the 
threat they cause. They suggest using subjective probabilistic elicitation along with a 
multi-attribute utility model to generate a risk profile for each type of attacks (Rosoff 
S 
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& John 2009). Similarly, other researchers suggest including terrorists’ objectives in 
the assessment of risk (Keeney 2007; Merrick & McLay 2010).  
This trend assumes that terrorists behave rationally (substantive rationality as 
described by Simon (1981)), whereby they seek to choose the right course of action 
according to their goals and values. Indeed, empirical evidence from numerous 
psychological studies supports this view (Richardson 2007; English 2010). Woo (2006) 
and Enders & Sandler (2006) point out that some level of intelligence and rational 
thinking is required for an entity to make an impact in asymmetric warfare. Mickolus 
(1980) observed terrorists rank the performance of their tactics according to economic 
costs, risks, time, and likelihood of confrontation with authorities and overall benefits. 
Characteristics of terrorism can further inform us on terrorists’ objectives. Acts of 
terrorism are motivated by a political issue, and through means primarily involving 
either violence or the threat of violence, terrorists seek to communicate a message to 
their political opponent and the rest of the world (Mickolus 1980; Cordes et al. 1984; 
Drake 1998; Woo 2006; Richardson 2007; Enders & Sandler 2006; English 2010).  
The traditional decision models used to model terrorist values assume a stable and 
static set of priorities, and hence tend to ignore the potential for the agents to change 
their initial preferences through the decision process (Bennett & Howard 1996; von 
Auer 1998). However, terrorists adapt very quickly to changes in the environment, 
such as governmental interventions by engaging in target substitution strategies 
whereby they have selected a softer target that achieved similar levels of impact at 
lesser costs and risks (Mickolus 1980; Cordes et al. 1984). Given such an adaptive 
behavior, a framework to model their priorities and preferences should examine what 
they would prefer given a certain state of the environment. 
In addition, empirical research has shown that preferences may be influenced by 
changes in the environment and emotional states (Loewenstein 2000; Loewenstein & 
Angner 2003; Loewenstein & Lerner 2003). Picard (2000) argues that emotions are a 
component necessary in computer models of human behavior and decision making. 
This is especially relevant when trying to predict, or make sense, of viscerally driven 
behavior, such as violent crimes. Hence, in the context of terrorism, it appears crucial 
to look at the effect of the environment, because violent acts may arise from exogenous 
triggers, such as political issues. This could be done by incorporating visceral factors 
into models of economic behavior (Loewenstein 2000). 
In this context, our aim in this paper is thus to present a framework that may be used 
to infer how terrorists’ priorities would change over time and examine the impacts of 
these changes on their choice of a harmful action. To do so, we try to have a better 
understanding of their choice mechanism, what motivates terrorists and the reasons 
behind the assumptions we are making, focusing on Islamist groups. 
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We suggest modeling their state-dependent priorities via a multi-attribute utility 
model that incorporates state-dependent priorities to account for preference changes 
caused by exogenous triggers, representing the environment as a system dynamics 
(SD) model. We describe how the visceral factors may have impact on the 
prioritization of objectives, and show how such an analysis may support risk 
management in this context. If authorities could infer how malicious agents’ priorities 
change based on the state of the environment, we believe they might be better placed 
to understand terrorists’ motivations and guide efforts towards pre-empting their 
malevolent actions. The motivation of this research lies in providing insights into 
inferring decision making of inaccessible decision makers. 
Our framework does not make any descriptive claims. Rather it seeks to provide a 
means to describe what a rational malicious agent with state-dependent priorities 
would prefer. We illustrate the framework by analyzing how the situation prior to the 
the Lockerbie bombing in 1988 could have been modeled and analyzed.  
This paper consists of three sections. Firstly, we provide the theoretical assumptions 
behind the approach we are taking, and present the resulting framework we are 
proposing. Subsequently, we illustrate how the framework may be used in the case of 
terrorism, by assessing the terrorists’ state-dependent priorities. Finally, using the case 
of the Lockerbie bombing, we illustrate how the model could be used to generate 
insights into the priorities and hence preferences of the terrorists based on a certain 
state and provide directions for further research. 
 
Modeling preferences of an agent who has multiple objectives can be done using Multi 
Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT), where the overall utility of each alternative can 
be assessed based on the utility of each alternative on each objective, and the relative 
importance of the latter (Keeney & Raiffa 1993; Keeney 1996; Belton & Stewart 2001). 
Generally, this framework assumes that the weights, or relative importance attached 
to the objectives, are fixed.  
However, empirical research has shown that new information and changes in the 
environment have an impact on preferences and their ordering (Loewenstein & Angner 
2003; Loewenstein et al. 2003; Hansson & Grüne-Yanoff 2009; Bradley 2009). Hansson 
& Grüne-Yanoff (2009) explain that for complex situations, choices do not originate 
from a stable set of preferences. Moreover, according to Bradley (2009), an agent’s 
choices and preferences depend on his/her opinions and desires, and these depend 
among other things on the information s/he possesses. For these reasons, priorities 
and preferences may be dependent on the environment, resulting in a potential 
preference ordering which may differ at various points in time. 
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In the next sub-section, we expand on the effects of the environment on an agent’s 
priorities, and comment on why it might be useful to consider these effects. The 
framework we suggest to achieve this is discussed further in the subsequent sub-
section.  
 
Emotions can have an important influence on decision-making by altering the way in 
which decision makers may approach a problem, the way they perceive the 
probabilities or outcomes and even their behaviors (Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003). 
Models of decisions which simulate the influence of various types of emotions have 
been researched in the field of artificial intelligence (for a comprehensive review, see 
El-Nasr et al. (2000)).  
Emotions can be broadly classified into two main categories, core affect and 
prototypical emotional episodes. The former refers to the elementary consciously 
accessible affective feelings experienced by a person. The latter refers to rare emotional 
responses triggered by external events (Russell and Barrett, 1999). In this paper, we 
focus our attention on the role of prototypical emotional episodes triggered by visceral 
factors on decision-making, more specifically on its effect on the prioritization of 
objectives. Visceral factors denote certain types of emotions, drive states and feeling 
states; such factors for instance include anger, fear, hunger and other cravings. These 
factors have an influence on preferences in the sense that they have a motivating effect 
on people’s behavior by altering their needs or desires. For instance, anger will lead 
to a heightened preference for aggression. Because such factors are driven biologically, 
they are likely to have a strong impact on preferences preferences. Following some 
sort of discomfort, transient changes in preferences are induced specifically to reinstate 
balance (Elster, 1998; Frederick et al., 2002; Loewenstein and Angner, 2003; 
Loewenstein, 2000, 1996). This can be described by “all goals other than that of 
mitigating the visceral factor [being virtually crowded out]” (Loewenstein, 1999, p. 
236).   
In behavioral economics, such effects are modeled using state-dependent preferences, 
which provide an agent’s instantaneous utility function given a certain visceral state. 
The instantaneous utility 𝑢 = 𝑓(𝑐𝜏, 𝑠𝜏), is hence described as a function of the 
consumption activities (in our context, aggressive behavior) and the visceral states 
(similarly in this situation, anger) in period τ. Furthermore, the marginal utility of 𝑐 
gained as 𝑠 increases is described by the following relationship, 
𝜕2𝑢(𝑐,𝑠)
𝜕𝑐𝜕𝑠
≥ 0 (i.e. the 
utility gained from aggression increases as the level of anger increases). For more 
details on calculating the instantaneous utility, refer to Loewenstein (2000).  
Similarly, we want to model the impact of visceral factors on priorities. To do so, we 
propose using an MAUT framework where the agents seek to maximize the utility 
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gained from an action but the weights are state-dependent. One way of translating 
the model described above is as follows:  
 Weights assigned to objectives which contribute to fulfilling the craving 
(i.e. mitigating the visceral factor) would increase as the stock of a 
visceral factor (such as level of anger) increases  
 Weights assigned to objectives countering the fulfillment of the craving 
would decrease as the stock of the visceral factor increases.  
Formally, our malicious agent has a set of alternatives (potential strikes) 𝐴 =
{𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑖}, is pursuing objectives 𝑂 = {𝑜1, … , 𝑜𝑘}, and makes trade-offs between the 
objectives using weights that are dependent on the effect of the visceral factors, 
𝑊(𝑠𝑡) = {𝑤1(𝑠𝑡), … , 𝑤𝑘(𝑠𝑡)}, where 𝑠𝑡 denotes the stock of visceral factors at time 𝑡. 
The malicious agent seeks to maximize the utility gained from the alternatives 
(potential strikes). The main variation from the traditional MAUT framework lies 
thus in how the relative importance of objectives is modeled.  
Given the new assumption of state-dependent weights, it is necessary to make a 
change to the set of general independence conditions required, if one wants to use a 
simple MAUT additive model for calculating the overall utilities 𝑈𝑖  of alternatives 𝑖. 
In addition to utility independence and additive independence, we also assume that 
future states are independent from the present one. This also implies that we are able 
to measure the future partial utilities of the alternatives independently from the 
present utilities. This seems to be a reasonable assumption given that the decision 
makers are likely to behave myopically under such circumstances. Indeed, empirical 
research suggests individuals tend to discount the future when under the effect of 
visceral factors (Loewenstein, 2000). Hence, because emotions play a great part in acts 
of violence, it may be less realistic to assume terrorists are critically thinking about 
all the subsequent consequences whilst contemplating on a criminal act.  
Formally, we assume that the utility independence condition can be extended to all 
states of 𝑇, where 𝑇 = {𝑡0, … , 𝑡𝑁) represents the set of time states. If attribute 𝑋 is 
utility independent to attribute 𝑌 at 𝑡0, then the same preference relationships will be 
assumed for future states 𝑡1, … , 𝑡𝑁, i.e., supposing that at 𝑡0 consequence 𝐵 is 
indifferent to the lottery yielding either 𝐴 or 𝐶 with a probability of 0.5 each, then we 
assume that this relationship can be translated to all levels of 𝑡. Hence, at 𝑡1 the same 
consequence 𝐵 will be indifferent to a lottery yielding 𝐴 or 𝐶 with a probability of 0.5 
each (see Figure 5-1). 
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Figure 5-1: Illustration utility independence through time (adapted from (Keeney, 1996, p. 136)) 
We also assume that the additive independence condition can be extended to all states 
of 𝑇. Suppose at 𝑡0 we have two lotteries 𝐿1 and 𝐿2 (as described in Figure 5-2), with 
𝐿1 yielding {𝑥
0, 𝑦0} or {𝑥′, 𝑦′} equal probabilities, and 𝐿2 yielding {𝑥
0, 𝑦′} or {𝑥′, 𝑦0} 
equal probabilities. Then, by definition, they yield the same marginal probability 
distribution on each of the attributes 𝑋 and 𝑌, as defined in Figure 5-2. If 𝑋 and 𝑌 
are additive independent, the agent must be indifferent between lotteries 𝐿1 and 𝐿2. 
This additive independence condition is assumed to hold through time, i.e. the agent 
will be indifferent between the same lotteries at 𝑡1 … 𝑡𝑁, (see Figure 5-2). For a more 
in depth discussion of all independence conditions see (Keeney, 1996).  
 
Figure 5-2: Illustration of additive independence through time (adapted from (Keeney, 1996, p. 137)) 
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Given these assumptions, we could formally assess the overall utility at time 𝑡 of the 
i–th alternative as follows: 
𝑈𝑖(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑤𝑘(𝑠𝑡)𝑢𝑖,𝑘
𝑘
 (1) 
With wk(st) the state − dependent weights at time t for each objective k  
and ui,k the partial utilities of alternative i on the k
th objective, as discussed in the next 
subsection, see Equation 2 
Although predicting the effects of visceral factors can be done relatively easily, it may 
not be as straightforward to model the triggers that cause them to arise. In fact, 
because these factors are correlated with the external environment, they are prone to 
oscillate over time (Loewenstein, 1999). The next sub-section explains how we suggest 
modeling the external environment and its impact on the state dependent weights 
using System Dynamics.  
 
Inferring the state of the visceral factors involves an understanding of the system 
surrounding the malicious agents in question. By determining the evolution of the 
environment, or more specifically, the evolution of the variables that represent the 
triggers of the visceral factors, we could then infer the state of the visceral factors. 
We suggest using System Dynamics (SD) to model the environment; for details see 
Forrester (1968); and in the context of terrorism, see Grynkewich and Reifel (2006), 
and Chamberlain (2007).  
We believe there is a potential to integrate MAUT and SD in a single framework to 
address the effects of the environment on visceral factors, and in turn, on priorities. 
This type of hybrid modeling is not new. Indeed, it has been used for policy analysis 
purposes and for modeling judgments (Andersen and Rohrbaugh, 1992; Gardiner and 
Ford, 1980; Gruver et al., 1984); for performance evaluation purposes (Santos et al., 
2008); for designing and evaluating long and short term strategies in socio-economic 
control (Brans et al., 1998; Kunsch and Springael, 2008; Kunsch et al., 1999); and for 
designing policies by looking at how preferences may be influenced to improve systems, 
it has been investigated by Springael et al. (2002) in the context of traffic commuters. 
However, as far as we are aware, there has been no work on how to model the impact 
of the environment, and more specifically, how visceral factors may have an impact 
on priorities. 
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Figure 5-3: Modeling State-dependent priorities with MAUT & SD 
Combining the two approaches may inform how the agents re-prioritize their 
objectives in response to changes in their environment. Conceptually, we represent 
the triggers within the environment that will alter the weights of the agent’s 
objectives. Numerically, the model informs us the extent to which the swing weights 
may be altered. As illustrated by Figure 5-3, the swing weights may be inferred by 
extracting the information from the state of the system, more specifically the level of 
variables (quantifying the visceral triggers) susceptible to having an impact on the 
visceral factors (Visceral triggers 1, 2, and 3). For instance, supposing one of the 
visceral factors (let us say “anger”) has been triggered by an event in the environment 
(for instance Visceral Trigger 1), this, in turn, triggers Objective 1 (let us say “desire 
for aggression”). Using rates, which reflect how sensitive the visceral factor is to that 
particular event, we simulate how the level of desire for aggression increases (see 
Equation 2 below). The swing weights are determined as follows, max
k
(𝑠𝑤𝑘) = 100; 
the values of the other swing weights are determined relatively to the highest one. 
Finally, we normalize them to get 𝑤𝑘(𝑠𝑡) which is used to calculate the utilities of the 
agent’s alternatives (as per Equation 1): 
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𝑳𝑶𝒌(𝒕) = 𝒇(𝜶𝒌 ∗ 𝑳𝑽𝑻𝒌(𝒕))   (2) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒, 
 𝐿𝑂𝑘(𝑡): 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑘 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡  
 𝛼𝑘: 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑘, 𝑎𝑛𝑑  
 𝐿𝑉𝑇𝑘(𝑡): 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑘 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡. 
The next section illustrates the application of such a framework in the context of 
terrorism, and provides an example of how the relative importance of Revenge is 
determined using the model. Using the Lockerbie bombing case as an example, we 
examine how terrorists’ state-dependent priorities could have been modeled and how 
the results may be analyzed. 
 
This section describes the use of the framework in practice. We illustrate how one 
might assess terrorists’ state-dependent priorities and describe the way a decision 
analyst may formalize an interpretation of their values. Subsequently, we provide an 
overview of how their visceral states may be modeled to infer the state-dependent 
weights. Finally, we show how a preference ordering may be derived from them.  
 
The first step towards modeling terrorists’ priorities consists of defining the objectives 
that terrorists would use to evaluate the attack, which would offer the best trade-off 
between the operational side (costs) of an attack and its benefits (whether it achieves 
their intended goal). According to the literature, the objectives they try to achieve 
can be formalized along three main categories Revenge, Renown, and Reaction (the 3 
R’s) (English, 2010; Richardson, 2007).  
These may be defined more extensively by finding the attributes that terrorists might 
be using to evaluate alternatives against each objective. The literature suggests 
terrorists seek to achieve Revenge in terms of the resulting casualties on the 
opponents’ side as well as short and long-term economic damage they can cause to 
their opponents. Similarly, attributes for the other objectives were defined, as 
summarized in Table 5-1. 
For the purpose of this example, we have adapted the list of alternatives, i.e. strikes, 
suggested by the National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events 
(CREATE) (Rosoff and John, 2009): Improvised Explosive Device (IED) in a 
public place; Surface to air missiles or Man-portable air-defense systems 
(MANPADS) attack on airplane; Portable nuclear device in major city (Nuclear); 
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Explosions on mass transports (Transports); Detonation of dirty bomb (Dirty 
Bomb); and Biological release in a major city/special event (Biological Release). 
 Objectives Attributes 
M
a
x
im
iz
e 
A
tt
a
ck
 
P
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
 
Revenge 
Max –Westerners/non Islamic casualties 
Max - Short term economic damage 
Max - Long term economic damage 
Renown 
Max – Media coverage (Instill fear in the western world) 
Max – Number of supporters/insurgents (Popular support) 
Reaction Min – Intervention of the western world in Middle east affairs 
Operations 
Min – Cost 
Min – Resources 
Table 5-1: International Terrorists’ Objectives and Attributes (Note: Data from McCormick, 2003; 
Mickolus, 1980; Richardson, 2007; Rosoff and John, 2009; Sandler and Lapan, 1988) 
 
From the strikes’ characteristics and the attributes (see Table 5-1), we inferred their 
partial utilities (see Table 5-2). These were assessed on an interval scale ranging 
between zero for the lower bound (worst performing strike on the 𝑘𝑡ℎ objective) and 
one hundred for the upper bound (best performing strike on the 𝑘𝑡ℎ objective). This 
was done using information from several publicly available sources, which we used to 
evaluate the utility of each strike on each objective as a terrorist might have done, 
see Appendix 5.A for more details. (In practice, expert judgments would need to 
inform such parameters). 
 
 Revenge Renown Reaction Operations 
No attack 0 0 0 100 
IED  20 40 40 80 
MANPADS Attack 45 5 10 5 
Portable nuclear device 100 100 100 0 
Explosions on mass transport 60 75 60 30 
Detonation of dirty bomb 10 90 70 40 
Biological release 5 50 10 5 
Table 5-2: Partial Utilities of Possible International Terrorist Strikes 
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To assess the evaluation of the state-dependent priorities against each objective, 
factors contributing to increase the visceral states (or visceral triggers) were modeled 
for the example. Figure 5-4 shows the stock and flow diagram built to model the 
dynamic nature of the environment surrounding terrorists and its effects. This enabled 
us to infer the state-dependent priorities on the three main objectives. The model was 
adapted from Lin et al. (2007) and Choucri et al. (2007) to incorporate the visceral 
triggers and their effect on the objectives. (It is important to note that these levels 
calculated by the model are inferred parameters, as discussed section 5.3.3.1). 
Box 1 in Figure 5-4 describes the evolution of the number of opponents within the 
system. This increases through recruitment, which occurs from the elements modeled 
in Box 3, and is reduced through the effect of governmental interventions (Box 2). 
Box 4 describes how the visceral triggers affect the objectives (Revenge, Renown and 
Reaction). The extent to which the visceral factors are triggered is determined by the 
external intervention imposed upon the terrorists or the regime of their country. A 
desire for Revenge may be triggered by Islamic states being attacked.  
The desire for revenge is then determined by looking at the number of casualties, and 
its effects. Formally, we use a logarithmic function to model this effect to reflect the 
law of diminishing returns. Equation 3 describes the calculations: 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒 
=  𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑁(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) 
The effect of death on revenge is then used to determine how the revenge desire 
is changing, taking into account the amount of time required for the terrorists 
to react. 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒 
=  
(𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒 ∗ 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒 − 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒)
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒
 
Finally, the model calculates the evolution of the revenge desire using the 
following differential equation:  
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒(𝑡) =  𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒(𝑡 −  𝑑𝑡)  +  (𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒)  ∗  𝑑𝑡 
(3) 
A desire for Renown, i.e. to be famous or dangerous and hence powerful, may be 
triggered by terrorists being captured or killed. The level of craving for Reaction is 
influenced by the level of involvement of the Western world in the Islamic world. The 
more Western governments are involved in Middle East affairs (economically, 
politically and militarily), the more terrorists want their government to retaliate 
(Drake, 1998; Gearty, 2004; Richardson, 2007; Woo, 2006). Similarly to the calculation 
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of the desire for Revenge, we determine those last two desires using differential 
equations. 
 
Using the SD model as described in the previous sub-section, we derived the state-
dependent weights 𝑤𝑘(𝒔𝒕) at time 𝑡 for each objective 𝑘, and in turn, inferred the 
overall utilities of the various strikes which the terrorists may consider. Subsequently, 
we used Equation (1) to calculate the overall utilities at time 𝑡 of alternative 𝑖. Once 
the model was built, the variables in the model were calibrated to reflect the current 
state of the environment.  
To illustrate the use of the framework, let us look at the case of the Lockerbie tragedy 
caused by the bomb in the Pan Am flight 103 in 1988 (D’Amato, 2009). Between 1981 
and 1986, several incidents between the US and Libya occurred, affecting Libya’s 
forces and its population. After the Libyan government allegedly retaliated, by 
bombing a West Berlin nightclub often frequented by US soldiers in April 1986, the 
US struck back and caused dozens of military and civilian casualties. More 
importantly, Gaddafi’s adopted daughter was killed in an airstrike. Then, in 
September 1986, there were at least 20 fatalities after the Pan Am flight 73 was 
hijacked, which Gaddafi was accused of sponsoring. Two years later, a bomb was 
placed in Pan Am flight 103, causing 207 fatalities near Lockerbie in the UK. It was 
only in 2003 that the Libyan government formally admitted to have sponsored the 
strike.  
5.3.3.1 Calibration of the model to reflect the situation prior to the 
Lockerbie bombing 
Suppose we are in April 1986 and want to use the model we proposed to determine 
the impact of the US strikes against Tripoli and Benghazi on the state of priorities of 
various possible strikes. (These are described in 5.3.1 with the exception of the 
MANPADS, dirty bombs and nuclear devices, because these are relatively newer 
threats not available at the time (Kelly, 2002; Linotte, 2007).). To do so, the relevant 
variables are calibrated to reflect the current situation between Libya and the US. 
Quantitative variables such as the number of casualties and the extent of economic 
losses incurred by Libya are inputted in relevant nodes within the SD model. In our 
model, these variables are depicted by the ‘Population removed’, and the ‘Level of 
Western interference’ respectively.  
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Figure 5-4: Stock and Flow model of the terrorism system and triggers of visceral states 
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Because of the nature of some of the variables, some subjectivity is involved in their 
calibration and expert assessment as well as consulting the Islamic media may bring 
insight into such values. For instance, in the Lockerbie case, not all of the fatalities 
may be perceived the same way, in particular, the loss caused by the death of 
Gaddafi’s adopted daughter would need to be reflected in the model. A possible way 
would be to inflate the number of fatalities to a figure that we believe Gaddafi and 
the Libyan population might perceive equivalent to the baby’s death.  
Similarly, expert assessment would need to be sought, to determine the initial level of 
the visceral factors (Revenge, Renown and Reaction) before the events occurred, and 
how sensitive the entity (Libya) is to the various exogenous factors. These sensitivity 
levels partially determine how much the visceral factors are going to be impacted by 
changes in the environment (such as casualties inflicted, for instance). Once again, 
the media and experts may be consulted to consolidate the calibration of variables, 
because these would vary between entities studied. Incidents such as warnings or 
threats made may be useful to evaluate those levels. In the case of the Lockerbie 
bombing, several warnings had been made. For the purpose of the illustration, we 
have hypothesized on those values. 
5.3.3.2 Analysis of the results based on the dynamic MAUT behavior 
Here, we discuss how the model could be used to gain insight into how to help manage 
the risks of possible repercussions of certain actions performed by the Western 
countries if they escalated, or if no actions are taken to mitigate the issues. There are 
two main elements of the model that a decision analyst may want to focus on, the 
evolution of the weights on the objectives (the 3 R’s), and the evolution of the overall 
utility of the alternatives. The two types of behavior of interest are discussed below. 
Observed changes in weights  
It could be that whilst the weights on the objectives are changing, the preference 
ordering of the alternatives considered remains relatively static. For instance, the 
weight on Revenge may be relatively higher than that of the other two weights (see 
the initial three months in Figure 5-5), but their preferred strike is a bomb in public 
transport (see Figure 5-6. Based on the attributes the entity is using to measure the 
performance of options against Revenge (i.e. casualties and economic damage), we can 
infer the agent would want to strike a larger plane and close to their opponent’s land 
(to increase the number of casualties and economic damage). It appears that such 
behavior occurred in the case of the Lockerbie bombing. Indeed, Libya chose to strike 
a plane on two occasions, and the second time, opted for a strike that caused more 
deaths and economic damage.   
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Figure 5-5: State-Dependent Weights Example 
 
Observed changes in preference ordering 
Visceral factors are likely to increase if no mitigating actions are taken, either by the 
entity (Libya), or by its opponent (the US). Overtime, the stock of visceral factors 
may increase to such a level that we may observe large enough changes in weights, 
which in turn may affect the preference ordering. In this case, security officials may 
need to consider directing efforts to protect the population against the emerging threat 
that the model highlights (IED and Transport), as displayed in the example in Figure 
5-62. Alternatively, a more proactive stance could be considered, such as initiating 
dialogues to try to lessen the visceral factors of the entity.  
 
Figure 5-6: State-Dependent Preferences Example 
                                        
2 Note that in Figure 6 and 7, the utility of ‘No attack’  remains constant. This is due 
to the partial utilities on the 3 R’s being zero (worst performing option), and therefore 
we do not observe a variation in overall utility even as the weights on the 3 R’s varies.  
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5.3.3.3 Using the model to evaluate policies 
Another potential use of the model is to modify the MAUT section of the model in 
terms of the partial performances of the attacks. For instance, consider a situation 
where a policy was put in place that could substantially reduce the effectiveness of a 
certain strike concerning certain objectives. We could infer which other attack would 
be deemed a suitable replacement. Indeed, as discussed in Section 5.1, terrorists 
sometimes have engaged in substitution strategies to still achieve their objectives. It 
is therefore essential, when devising deterrence policies, to consider the potential side 
effects these might have. In fact, they could sometimes be as harmful as if no actions 
had been taken, and additional policies may have to be put in place to mitigate the 
side effects by protecting ‘the next best thing’. For instance, Figure 5-7 illustrates how 
strengthening security against IEDs in public places may affect the state of 
preferences. 
 
Research suggests that to gain insights on the threat that malicious agents might 
cause, it is crucial to have more knowledge of their objective function (Rosoff & John 
2009) and further suggests that agents’ objective weights (or priorities) are subject to 
changes depending on various exogenous triggers (Loewenstein and Angner, 2003; 
Loewenstein, 2000). However, traditional models usually assume a stable and static 
set of preferences (Bennett and Howard, 1996; von Auer, 1998). Such an assumption 
in the case of a terrorism context, where violent acts may arise from exogenous triggers 
such as political issues, may not be suitable. 
 
 
Figure 5-7: State-Dependent Preference Ordering (impact of a policy) 
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To account for these effects, our paper has suggested a framework for modeling state-
dependent priorities in Multi-Attribute Utility models, to help in inferring the 
valuation of alternative types of strikes by malicious agents. By incorporating the 
effects of visceral factors, the proposed framework may infer the relative weights 
assigned to the objectives the agents seek to achieve. This may help in cases where 
one does not have direct access to the agents’ preferences. In the case of terrorism, for 
instance, understanding what triggers certain visceral factors, such as anger, might be 
useful in better understanding the impact of such triggers on terrorists’ evaluation of 
various types of attacks. 
Using the Lockerbie bombing to illustrate the framework, we described how the model 
could be analyzed to infer possible changes in priorities, and thus preferences, and 
how this could affect the strikes terrorists may consider. In so doing, this research has 
sought to provide insights into inferring decision making of inaccessible decision 
makers. Nevertheless, as in any decision model, the framework has some limitations, 
both theoretical and practical. From a theoretical perspective, there are shortcomings 
arising from the implicit and explicit assumptions we have made to model behaviors. 
Specifically, we assume that the terrorists, as an entity, are rational decision makers, 
which may be a reasonable assumption only as far as a terrorist cell is concerned 
(McCormick, 2003). However, it is also possible to observe some irrational actions 
committed by terrorists, (Drake, 1998; McCormick, 2003). But, as Broder (2006, p.78) 
explains,  
“The prediction of crime, like risk analysis, is an inexact science and is 
often based on the professional’s best educated guess. The methodologies 
used to predict crime are subject to more debate than those of risk 
analysis.”  
Similarly, the proposed framework cannot claim to be predicting the exact preference 
ordering of the opponents. However, it may provide a useful support for learning and 
understanding the ramifications behind terrorism, what triggers the strikes and hence 
may help us be better prepared and equipped against it. 
From a practical point of view, the limitations of the proposed model could be dealt 
with by gathering more accurate data and, possibly, the model could be expanded by 
using expert elicitation in the field of terrorism, similarly to the work of Rosoff & 
John (2009). A challenge is that terrorism data is scarce and most of it is highly 
classified. Furthermore, by generalizing the proposed framework, we hope it could be 
used and applied in other areas concerning violence (such as gang violence) to assist 
in policymaking in the management of risk caused by violence outbreaks.  
We hope the suggested framework could also open some avenues for further research. 
On a theoretical front, we believe there is potential to investigate the extent to which 
visceral factors have an impact on objectives’ weights and how this may be modeled 
formally. Indeed, despite the importance of visceral factors in decision-making 
(Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2007; Loewenstein et al., 1997; Raghunathan and 
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Pham, 1999), the current literature suggests that little work has been done in the field 
of decision analysis or economics to account for the effects of visceral factors on the 
formal modeling of evaluation of options (Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2007; 
Loewenstein, 2000). In addition, one of the main assumptions and limitations of the 
model we suggested lies in the fixed utility functions (stability of the agent’s risk 
attitudes over time), which may not necessarily always be the case. However, research 
shows that visceral factors may have an impact on utility (Loewenstein and 
O’Donoghue, 2007; Loewenstein et al., 1997; Raghunathan and Pham, 1999) 
suggesting that further research should be done on dynamic utility functions. 
Furthermore, a greater understanding of terrorists’ utility functions and their 
priorities could be helpful if incorporated in Adversarial Risk Analysis (ARA) models 
(for instance, in models such as the one proposed by Parnell et al. (2010) where 
defenders and attackers have diametrically opposed objectives).   
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Appendix 5.A Performances of Terrorists’ 
Alternatives 
Improvised Explosive Device (IED)  
Production & Execution. IEDs are the easiest weapons to prepare and execute, indeed it 
does not require specific knowledge, or a special infrastructure. Any terrorist member can 
build an IED from instructions they would find on the internet, or would have received by 
the organization. The material used to build this type of bomb can be found easily from 
medical and agricultural supplies (Defense Update, 2006). 
IEDs can be used in a variety of ways, including placing them within cars, burying them 
under ground, or even placing them on a human being. IEDs can then be detonated by 
remote controls. Because this type of weapon can take different forms and formats, it is 
very difficult to put systems in place to detect them. This is the reason why the majority 
of attacks performed by terrorists are done using this technique (Defense Update, 2006). 
Impact. Depending on the size of the bomb, and where it is placed, IEDs can cause several 
casualties. This method cannot be classified in the same categories as a weapon of mass 
destruction, because the number of casualties is relatively low compared to other types of 
attacks. 
MANPADS attack on airplane 
Production & Execution. MANPADS (Man-portable air-defense systems) can be bought 
on the black market, and cost between a few 100 dollars to almost ¼ million dollars 
depending whether the model is old or new (Congressional Research Service, 2006). 
There have been several unsuccessful attacks so far in Baghdad, Iraq and Kenya (Security 
Service MI5, 2011; von Winterfeldt and O’Sullivan, 2006), however it is not certain how easy 
it would be for terrorists to acquire or bring such a weapon in western countries. 
Impact. The economic impact of MANPADS could rise up to $250 billion, and depending 
on the type of plane targeted there could be up to 400 casualties to (von Winterfeldt and 
O’ Sullivan, 2006). 
Portable nuclear device in major city 
Production & Execution. “The warhead of a suitcase nuke or suitcase bomb consists of a 
tube with two pieces of uranium, which, when rammed together, would cause a blast. Some 
sort of firing unit and a device that would need to be decoded to cause detonation may be 
included in the “ suitcase.”  (National Terror Alert, 15:00:37) 
Hence it would be quite challenging and costly for terrorists groups to make or acquire 
these types of weapons (Bakir and Kardes, 2011; Maerli et al., 2003; Richardson, 2007). 
Impact. The impact of such a strike would score quite high on each of the 3 R’ s 
objectives, as they would cause extensive damage, in loss of lives and economical terms 
(Richardson, 2007). 
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Explosions on mass transports 
Production & Execution. From all the other types of strikes, this one is the most 
feasible, as shown by the number attacks of this type having occurred in the world. The 
resources and knowledge required are minimal, relatively to the other types. The 
obstacles that the perpetrators would face are the increasing security levels. However, 
these are still quite low in train and subway stations. 
Impact. The impact compared to the other types of attacks is relatively low, so this type 
of attack will not score very high on the revenge objective. Depending on the countries 
such attacks may get more or less reaction from the government; indeed, such attacks are 
so common in some countries that the reaction from their government would not be as 
high as in the UK for instance. 
Detonation of dirty bomb 
Production & Execution. Terrorist groups will need to acquire radioactive components, 
which is a difficult thing to achieve. Indeed, the materials which can be stolen from 
hospitals or laboratories are not suitable to make this type of bomb. On the other hand, 
if they manage to acquire such materials by stealing them or through the black market, 
they would manage to construct such a weapon (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2006) 
Impact. Dirty bombs are more disruptive than harmful; they would cause panic within 
the public and fewer victims compared to other types of strikes. The psychological effect 
is quite high, therefore would satisfy the terrorist desire for renown, but would not score 
high on their revenge objectives (Richardson, 2007). 
Biological release in a major city/special event  
Production & Execution. Even though they are easy to acquire, the successful execution 
of biological weapons is very difficult. Indeed, producing large quantities of biological 
agents require the appropriate infrastructure. On the other hand, if terrorists have been 
successful in producing them, it is quite difficult for authorities to detect them 
(Richardson, 2007). 
Impact. This sort of weapon has not caused a significant number of casualties; however, 
Richardson (2007) points out terrorists have often tried successfully to instigate fear in 
the public by acquiring this sort of weapons even though they do not intend to use them. 
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Conclusions and Further Research Directions 
nlike in cases of risks arising by natural or random events, preventive 
measures taken against a type of risk caused by the action of a malicious 
intelligent agent (such as terrorists) may lead to another action becoming 
more likely (Bier et al., 2005; Brown and Cox, Jr., 2011; Guikema and Aven, 2010; 
Kardes and Hall, 2005). This has led to a focus on understanding the threat, the 
vulnerability and the consequences of risks in the effort of identifying and prioritising 
them (Chertoff, 2007). To do so requires gaining insight into the various types of 
strikes terrorists are considering as well as an understanding of the consequences 
counter terrorism policies and actions might have (Ezell et al., 2010; Keeney and von 
Winterfeldt, 2011). Recently, models of a decision analytical flavour been used for 
counter-terrorism analysis, and are built from the perspective of terrorists to try to 
determine which targets they would value most.  
A challenge in using decision analysis in this context lies in the unavailability of the 
agent whose decision, preferences and judgements we are modelling. Because of this, 
such models are largely based on strong assumptions. Hence, Rosoff & John (2009) 
have highlighted the importance in gaining more insight into what the malicious 
agents’ objective function is to better understand the threat they cause. Thus being 
able to infer their preferences would enable one to have more insight into their 
potential nefarious actions. This would guide pre-emptive efforts against their criminal 
acts, and hence may help with reducing the feeling of insecurity caused by terrorism. 
This research explored three aspects of terrorist judgement. First, in order to describe 
terrorists’ preferences and judgements using decision models such as Multi-Attribute 
Utility Theory, we investigated the objectives that drive terrorists. While traditional 
decision models tend to ignore the potential for the agents to change their initial 
preferences through the decision process (Bennett and Howard, 1996; von Auer, 1998), 
dynamic preferences have been observed empirically. In fact, the dynamicity of 
preferences is especially relevant in the context of models for counter-terrorism 
analysis due to the adversarial nature of terrorism, with the actions of the defender 
and attacker based on each other’s action (Bier et al., 2005; Brown and Cox, Jr., 2011; 
Guikema and Aven, 2010; Kardes and Hall, 2005).  
The second area of terrorist decision-making that we explored concerns how their 
judgement is influenced. We believe that having more descriptive insight into these 
U 
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influences could help with making models more realistic and descriptively accurate for 
risk analysis. Visceral factors, in particular anger, have the potential to affect a 
decision maker’s judgement, including affecting his/her risk attitude and his/her 
evaluation of outcomes and their likelihood (Lerner and Keltner, 2000; Lerner and 
Tiedens, 2006). In this research, we focussed on capturing such effects, as they can 
incur non-negligible influences on both the agents and the environment in which they 
operate (Loewenstein 1996; 1999; 2000).  
Finally, integrating the insight gained into the areas mentioned into modelling 
behaviours with a malicious intent, we attempted to develop a framework for 
combining the objectives of terrorists, and their changes over time. The resulting 
model may help anticipate a motivation to cause social unrest by terrorists. We used 
the resulting model to illustrate the prescriptive insight that could be gained for 
counter-terrorism analysis.  
This research had four main objectives. First, it consisted of critically analysing the 
assumptions made in counter-terrorism modelling, using knowledge from the fields 
surrounding terrorism – including conflict management and politics, the theory of 
choice, public choice, behavioural decision theory, expected utility theory, and Multi-
Attribute Utility Theory – to provide insight into what influences terrorists’ decision 
making. Specifically, we analysed differences between types of terrorists, the 
characteristics of their rationality, the goals that drive them, and psychological 
elements, on judgement. Second, we carried out an empirical study of the impact of 
the visceral factor anger on terrorists’ prioritisation of objectives. Given the 
confrontational nature of terrorism, anger is in fact an emotion terrorists might be 
prone to feel. Third, we contextualised this knowledge within modelling terrorist 
decision making using multi-attribute utility theory. Finally, based on this insight and 
hypothetical data, we developed a dynamic framework for capturing preference 
rankings that does not require the assumption of static preferences, by integrating 
system dynamics with multi-attribute utility theory to capture the effect of visceral 
factors on priorities. 
Through these objectives, we hope to help with the inference of an opponent’s 
preference ordering based on their value system, their objectives and on the state of 
a system. We achieved these objectives via the following main steps: 
1. Critical analysis of assumptions made in counter-terrorism modelling and 
characteristics of terrorists as decision makers: 
Adopting a multidisciplinary approach (conflict management and politics, the 
theory of choice, public choice), determining the characteristics of terrorists was 
done by providing a comprehensive understanding of terrorists as decision makers, 
what might influence their decision making, and relate it to Expected Utility 
Theory and Multi-Attribute Utility Theory. Furthermore, knowledge was brought 
from the fields of behavioural decision-making and psychology to provide insight 
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into how decision making is influenced by the effect of visceral factors, in particular 
anger and fear. To support these findings, an empirical study was carried out to 
analyse the effect of anger on the prioritisation of objectives relevant to what 
terrorists might have.  
2. Prescriptive guidelines on relaxing current modelling assumptions: 
Using the insight from the characteristics of terrorists as a decision maker, we 
provided prescriptive guidelines on two aspects: first, on how to modify and relax 
the assumptions made when modelling terrorists’  judgement and preferences, and 
second to model these more accurately from a descriptive point of view. 
3. Empirical study to examine the effect of anger on the prioritisation of objectives: 
Using an experimental study, we examined the impact that anger has on the 
prioritisation of long-term self-destructive objectives (Revenge) versus long-term 
productive objectives (Reputation and Success), and the preferences for long-term 
self-destructive versus long-term productive actions. Self-reported anger was found 
to have an impact on the prioritisation of Revenge compared to Success, given the 
hypothetical scenario, and as predicted, a number of actions were perceived more 
(and less) attractive if they were self-destructive (and productive, respectively).  
4. Development of a framework capturing dynamic priorities: 
Drawing from the prescriptive insight, we developed a framework capturing 
dynamic preference rankings that does not require the assumption of static 
preferences. This framework may be used to infer how terrorists’ priorities may 
change over time through the effect of visceral factors, and their impact on their 
choice of a harmful action. We suggested modelling state-dependent priorities of 
a terrorist group via a multi-attribute model that incorporates state-dependent 
priorities to account for preference change caused by exogenous triggers, and 
representing the environment as a system dynamics model. We described how 
terrorists’ visceral factors may affect the prioritisation of objectives and show how 
such an analysis may support risk management in this context. 
In order to achieve the aims of this research outlined above, we conducted several 
types of investigations. The original contributions of each are discussed in detail in 
the next section.  
 
Achieving the aims of this research was carried out within three research papers. We 
summarise their objectives and the main findings in the following subsections. 
 
In the first paper, ‘In the Opponent’s Shoes: On Modelling Terrorists’ Judgements for 
Counter-Terrorism Analysis’, we conducted a critical review of the main assumptions 
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and limitations of models for counter-terrorism analysis with the aim of suggesting 
some modifications to describe terrorists’ preferences more accurately.  
Given that terrorism is a type of threat distinct from those caused by engineered 
systems and natural hazards, the means used to assess its risk need to be adjusted. 
Indeed, they need to include a crucial element: human judgement and intent (Bedford 
and Cooke, 2001; Bier, 2006). Current models are idealised and based on a number of 
assumptions. 
Empirical research and theories from various fields show that these normative 
assumptions may be unrealistic, and hence could lead to wrong counter-terrorism 
measures (Brown and Cox, Jr., 2011; Ezell et al., 2010; Lerner and Tiedens, 2006; 
Loewenstein, 2000). We believe that management of risk caused by terrorism could 
be enhanced through increasing the validity of models from a descriptive point of 
view. To do so, our research was aimed at extending the understanding of terrorists 
as decision makers, what their objectives are and what affects them by analysing 
several elements influencing how terrorists make decisions. 
Through our research, we found if we relaxed the assumptions of rationality, then 
terrorists could be considered as rational decision makers. Terrorists respond to 
incentives, and the actions taken by the defender will contribute to terrorists changing 
preferences (Berman and Laitin, 2005; Hoffman and McCormick, 2004). Terrorists 
also follow narrow selfishness principles, but rather than evaluating the consequences 
of their act to themselves, they appraise them according to how well they serve their 
cause (Caplan, 2006; Merari et al., 2009). Finally, terrorists can be considered to have 
rational expectations; however these vary depending on the type of terrorists we are 
modelling. For instance, active terrorists behave as social solidarity maximisers. The 
advantages of being involved in terrorism arise from the social aspect of it, as well as 
the psychological benefit of violence. For suicidal terrorists, the benefits arise from 
being martyrs (Caplan, 2006; Merari et al., 2009).  
Terrorists can be viewed as utility maximisers, but unlike the dominant view that 
suggests they are political maximisers, our research suggests non-political benefits may 
be involved that equally drive terrorists’ actions (Abrahms, 2008; Cordes et al., 1984; 
Landes, 1978; Mickolus, 1980; Pape, 2003; Rios and Rios Insua, 2012). 
Finally, as research has showed that visceral factors, and anger in particular, can have 
strong effect on judgement and decision-making (Lerner and Tiedens, 2006), we 
believe the way modellers infer how terrorists evaluate alternatives and uncertainties 
should be adjusted. Terrorists can be considered as myopic decision makers. Because 
of the effect of anger, their view of objectives can be altered, potentially leading to a 
change in priorities. Indeed, objectives that are not necessarily contributing to their 
cause could be weighed more heavily. Finally, terrorists’ risk attitudes and their 
perception of uncertainties can also be altered by the effect of visceral factors. Anger 
can make decision makers risk-seeking, optimistic and overconfident. On the other 
Chapter 6 Conclus ions and Further Research Directions   
 
 
141 
hand, fear has the opposite effect, making decision makers risk averse, and pessimistic 
(Isen and Geva, 1987; Isen and Patrick, 1983; Lerner and Keltner, 2001, 2000; 
Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003; Wright and Bower, 1992).  
 
In the second paper, “Rational Self-Destruction: The effect of Anger on the 
Prioritisation of Self-Destructive Objectives”, we carried out a study of the impact of 
anger on the prioritisation of objectives, some of which were self-destructive. The 
influence of anger on judgement and decision-making has implications in the context 
of modelling preferences, in particular those of terrorists. So far, research in the field 
of terrorism modelling has assumed static preferences of terrorists, but empirical 
research has shown that priorities may change over time. The effect of anger on 
decision-making is of particular interest in this research as terrorists, being involved 
in acts of violence, are expected to be driven by high level of anger. Recent counter-
terrorism modelling focuses on building decision analytical models from the 
perspective of terrorists, and such a modelling approach benefits from an 
understanding of the impact of anger on the terrorists as decision makers. Hence, 
following on from the insight gained in the first paper, we furthered our research on 
the effect of anger on the prioritisation of objectives. 
Through the study, we tested if a state of anger had an impact on the prioritisation 
of long-term self-destructive (Revenge) versus long-term productive (Reputation and 
Success) objectives of decision makers. In addition, we tested the attractiveness of 
long-term self-destructive versus long-term productive actions.  
Consistent with current research on the effects of anger on decision-making, our results 
showed that anger was associated with an increase in the prioritisation of the revenge 
and a decrease in the prioritisation of success. This can be explained by anger 
compelling agents to act towards restoring the situation as it was prior to having 
angered, causing certain objectives not directly pertaining to this goal to be clouded 
out (Lerner et al., 1998; Small and Lerner, 2008; Tiedens, 2001). The results of our 
study support the suggestion that terrorists’ objectives might include prolonging the 
existence of their organisations (possibly for the purpose of revenge), even if those 
objectives are counter-productive towards achieving their political goals (Abrahms, 
2008). 
 
Our final paper: “Modelling State-Dependent Priorities of Malicious Agents” is based 
the findings from the study carried out in Paper II and the insight from the current 
literature described in Paper I and is used to allow for potential changes in priorities 
triggered by varying levels of anger to be captured. Through this, we hope to improve 
the descriptive validity and hence the quality of counter-terrorism policies. 
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In this paper, we presented a framework that may be used to infer how terrorists’ 
priorities may change over time and their impact on their choice of a harmful action. 
By incorporating the effects of visceral factors, the proposed framework may infer the 
relative weights assigned to the objectives the agents seek to achieve. This may help 
in cases where one does not have direct access to the agents’ preferences. In the case 
of terrorism understanding what triggers certain visceral factors, such as anger, will 
be useful in better understanding the impact of such triggers on terrorists’ evaluation 
of various types of attacks (Lerner and Tiedens, 2006; Merari et al., 2009). To account 
for these effects, our paper has suggested a framework for modelling state-dependent 
priorities in Multi-Attribute Utility models, to help in inferring the evaluation of 
alternative types of strikes by malicious agents. This was done by combining a system 
dynamics model representing the terrorist situation into a Multi-Attribute Utility 
model. Combining the two methods has been done before, it has been used for policy 
analysis purposes and for modeling judgments (Andersen and Rohrbaugh, 1992; 
Gardiner and Ford, 1980; Gruver et al., 1984); for performance evaluation purposes 
(Santos et al., 2008); for designing and evaluating long and short term strategies in 
socio-economic control (Brans et al., 1998; Kunsch and Springael, 2008; Kunsch et al., 
1999); and for designing policies by looking at how preferences may be influenced to 
improve systems, it has been investigated by Springael et al. (2002) in the context of 
traffic commuters. In our case, we described how terrorists’ visceral factors may affect 
the prioritisation of objectives and showed how such an analysis could support risk 
management in this context. Finally, we showed how a preference ordering could be 
derived from them.  
We used the Lockerbie bombing case to illustrate the framework, and to describe how 
the model could be analysed to infer possible changes in priorities - thus preferences - 
and how this could affect the strikes terrorists may consider. In so doing, this research 
has sought to provide insights into inferring decision making of inaccessible decision 
makers.  
As with any research and decision model, our approach and framework have some 
limitations, both theoretical and practical. These are discussed in the next section. 
 
In trying to achieve our objectives, our research is subject to several limitations and 
there are areas that have not been investigated. Further research in those areas could 
help strengthen the research and the insight that could be added to counter-terrorism 
models, which we discuss below.  
Terrorists’ Judgements. Our first paper has adopted a multidisciplinary approach to 
determine the characteristics of terrorists as decision makers. However, our findings 
were mostly drawn from secondary research. Therefore, this research could benefit 
from further research to be carried out on a primary level. In particular, whilst studies 
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have been carried out on the political objectives of terrorists (Keeney and von 
Winterfeldt, 2009; Kydd and Walter, 2006; Pape, 2003), modelling terrorist values 
requires additional insight to be gained into non-political objectives, i.e. the social 
aspect of a terrorist organisation. If empirical research was carried out to understand 
the non-political motivations of agents joining and participating in terrorist 
organisations, this could enhance the descriptive validity of models describing terrorist 
preferences. This could be helpful if incorporated in Adversarial Risk Analysis models, 
where defenders and attackers have diametrically opposed objectives. Indeed, as 
models currently focus on the political motivations of terrorists, the results they 
generate may be biased.  
Furthermore, our research as focused on looking at cognitive decision making at the 
level of an individual agents, and thus we made the assumption that a terrorist 
organisation behaves as an individual. Further research should be carried out to 
investigate the nature of terrorist decision making at an organisational behaviour 
level.  
Psychological Factors. This research has highlighted the impact of psychological 
factors (in particular visceral factors) on terrorist judgement and decision-making. An 
empirical study was carried out to analyse the effect of anger on the depth of 
processing, in particular the prioritisation of objectives in a context comparable to 
terrorist’s situations. The study carried out on the effect of anger on the prioritisation 
of objectives was subject to several methodological limitations. These include the 
sample of participants used to carry out the survey, the method used for the mood 
induction, and the way we elicited participants’ priorities. For instance, a sample that 
held more similarities with terrorists – such as a sample of males prone to violence – 
could have provided more significant and reliable results. Furthermore, our sample 
included participants whose mother tongue was not English, and it is likely that this 
could have affected the effectiveness of the emotional treatment as they were asked 
to read and engage with a written scenario. Other mood induction methods involving 
videos could have been used in addition to the scenario to strengthen the emotional 
effect.  
Other influences have been found to be linked with this anger, such as biased risk 
attitudes and uncertainty assessment that our study did not investigate. The insight 
gained through Paper I and Paper II has opened avenues for investigating the impact 
of visceral factors on risk attitudes, and the level of confidence of agents involved in 
terrorism and violence. Therefore, we hope further research is carried out in two main 
areas. Empirical work on how risk attitudes vary when actions have a self-destructive 
component to them, and investigating how agents’ level of confidence varies depending 
on their level of fear and anger, could contribute to enhancing the descriptive validity 
of models for counter-terrorism analysis.  
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Our Framework. As in any decision models, several assumptions were made, and some 
shortcomings arise from these. Specifically, in our model, we made the assumptions 
that terrorists were seeking to achieve the following objectives: maximise revenge, 
renown, and reaction from the defender, but also minimise operational elements 
associated with performing a strike. As we saw in Paper I, social benefits derived from 
terrorism can be sought by the agents, which have not been included in our model.  
Furthermore, whilst we have allowed for the priorities for the first three objectives 
(revenge, renown and reaction) to be dynamic, we have assumed the priorities 
associated with the operational elements to remain static. This could be a reasonable 
assumption within a certain timescale. However, should the actions of the defender 
severely deplete the resources of terrorists, the weights on minimising the operational 
elements would need to be adjusted.     
Another assumption and limitation of the model we suggested lies in the fixed utility 
functions (stability of the agent’s risk attitudes over time) and the evaluation of strikes 
based on utilities as opposed to expected utility (assumption of equal probability of 
success), which may not necessarily always be the case. Indeed, as we saw in Paper I, 
research shows that visceral factors may have an impact on agents’ risk attitudes 
(hence utility functions) as well as their levels of confidence (hence terrorists’ perceived 
probabilities of various events) (Isen and Geva, 1987; Isen and Patrick, 1983; Lerner 
and Keltner, 2001, 2000; Lerner and Tiedens, 2006; Raghunathan and Pham, 1999). 
We also assumed that the terrorists, as an entity, are rational decision makers, which 
may be a reasonable assumption only as far as a terrorist cell is concerned 
(McCormick, 2003). However, it is also possible to observe some irrational actions 
committed by terrorists, such as suicidal ones. Indeed, as we saw in Paper I, this type 
of terrorist may not always be considered fully rational (Caplan, 2006; Drake, 1998; 
McCormick, 2003). But, as Broder (2006, p.78) explains,  
“The prediction of crime, like risk analysis, is an inexact science and is 
often based on the professional’s best educated guess. The methodologies 
used to predict crime are subject to more debate than those of risk 
analysis.”  
Whilst the proposed framework cannot claim to be predicting the exact preference 
ordering of the opponents, it may provide a useful tool for learning and understanding 
the ramifications behind terrorism, what triggers the strikes and hence may help be 
better prepared and equipped against it. We also hope the suggested framework could 
open avenues for further research in the area of models for counter-terrorism analysis. 
The limitations of our proposed model could be dealt with by gathering more accurate 
data and, possibly, expanded by using expert elicitation in the field of terrorism, 
similarly to the work of Rosoff & John (2009).  
Furthermore, we hope that, following empirical studies on the areas of the influence 
of anger on risk attitudes and confidence level, further research is carried out on 
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capturing the potential dynamicity of utility functions and perceived probabilities 
within multi-attribute utility models. In so doing, this could help enhance making the 
modelling of inaccessible decision makers more descriptively accurate. 
Finally, by generalising the proposed framework, we hope it could be used and applied 
in other areas of violence (such as gang violence) to assist in policymaking in the 
management of risk caused by violence outbreaks.  
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